非经营性政府投资项目参建主体博弈模型研究
发布时间：2018-11-28 18:20
【摘要】：非经营性政府投资项目是政府利用财政性资金投资的工程建设项目。其投资规模巨大,并且对其他投资有引导性,因此一直是国内外工程界和理论界关注的焦点问题。近年来我国为改善对其管理效果,对管理体制与管理模式进行了代建制改革,提倡现代工程管理方法,然而各种问题仍层出不穷,代建制管理中存在的弊端逐渐显露。因此分析非经营性政府投资项目参建主体间的利益诉求及博弈过程,并基于此优化项目管理方法是一个值得研究的课题。 本研究首先搜集、查阅了非经营性政府投资项目领域内有关管理模式优化的研究,通过对比研究内容、研究方法及国内外研究现状,提出从代建人角度改进管理工作效果十分必要。然后基于动态博弈理论,分别构建了代建人、承包商及监理单位的一次性动态博弈模型、有限次重复博弈模型及无限次重复博弈模型,并采用逆推法求得了不同模型的纳什均衡解。本研究中的“承包商”是一个更为广义的概念,包括了勘察设计单位、咨询单位、施工单位及采购单位等多方。通过对纳什均衡解的对比分析,得出可从引导均衡解向帕累托效率最优方向移动的角度来优化代建人的管理工作的结论。最后,构建了非经营性政府投资项目的管理方法,包括三个方面：在完善合约中的惩罚机制方面,给出了承包商及监理常见的一般违约行为和严重违约行为,这是在合同中必须明确界定的；在代建人管理工作的网格化方面,提出了将网格化理论应用于代建人管理工作中,以提高监管效率并降低监管成本；在承包商与监理单位的工作效果评价中,采用文献分析法给出了二者的评价指标体系,以此促进长期合作机制的建立。 本研究全面分析了非经营性政府项目的参建主体之间的利益诉求并构建博弈模型；然后提出了基于上述博弈模型的非经营性政府投资项目的管理方法,一方面加深了对非经营性政府投资项目领域的博弈研究,也为优化项目管理工作提供了理论参考及一定指导作用。
[Abstract]:Non-profit government investment project is an engineering construction project invested by the government using financial funds. Its investment scale is huge, and has the guidance to other investment, therefore has been the domestic and foreign engineering circles and the theorists concerned the focal point question. In recent years, in order to improve its management effect, our country has carried on the reform of the management system and the management mode, advocated the modern engineering management method, but each kind of question still appears one after another, the malpractice existing in the agent system management gradually reveals. Therefore, it is worth studying to analyze the interest demand and game process among the participants of non-profit-making government investment projects, and to optimize the project management method based on this. This study first collected and consulted the research on management model optimization in the field of non-profit-making government investment projects, and compared the research contents, research methods and domestic and foreign research status. It is necessary to improve the effect of management from the angle of agent. Then, based on the dynamic game theory, the one-off dynamic game model, the finite repeated game model and the infinite repeated game model of the agent, the contractor and the supervision unit are constructed, respectively. The Nash equilibrium solutions of different models are obtained by inverse method. The "contractor" in this study is a broader concept, including survey and design unit, consulting unit, construction unit and purchasing unit. Through the comparative analysis of Nash equilibrium solution, the conclusion is drawn that the management of agent can be optimized from the angle of guiding equilibrium solution to Pareto efficiency optimal direction. Finally, the paper constructs the management method of the non-operating government investment project, including three aspects: in perfecting the punishment mechanism in the contract, the common general breach of contract and serious breach of contract by the contractor and the supervision are given. This must be clearly defined in the contract; In the aspect of gridding of agent management, this paper puts forward the application of grid theory to the management of agent, in order to improve the efficiency of supervision and reduce the cost of supervision. In the evaluation of the working effect of contractor and supervision unit, the evaluation index system of the contractor and supervision unit is given by the method of literature analysis, so as to promote the establishment of long-term cooperation mechanism. This study comprehensively analyzes the interests of non-profit-making government project participants and builds a game model. Then, the paper puts forward the management method of non-profit-making government investment projects based on the above game model. On the one hand, it deepens the game research on the field of non-profit-making government investment projects. It also provides theoretical reference and guidance for optimizing project management.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.45;F281
本文编号：2363846
[Abstract]:Non-profit government investment project is an engineering construction project invested by the government using financial funds. Its investment scale is huge, and has the guidance to other investment, therefore has been the domestic and foreign engineering circles and the theorists concerned the focal point question. In recent years, in order to improve its management effect, our country has carried on the reform of the management system and the management mode, advocated the modern engineering management method, but each kind of question still appears one after another, the malpractice existing in the agent system management gradually reveals. Therefore, it is worth studying to analyze the interest demand and game process among the participants of non-profit-making government investment projects, and to optimize the project management method based on this. This study first collected and consulted the research on management model optimization in the field of non-profit-making government investment projects, and compared the research contents, research methods and domestic and foreign research status. It is necessary to improve the effect of management from the angle of agent. Then, based on the dynamic game theory, the one-off dynamic game model, the finite repeated game model and the infinite repeated game model of the agent, the contractor and the supervision unit are constructed, respectively. The Nash equilibrium solutions of different models are obtained by inverse method. The "contractor" in this study is a broader concept, including survey and design unit, consulting unit, construction unit and purchasing unit. Through the comparative analysis of Nash equilibrium solution, the conclusion is drawn that the management of agent can be optimized from the angle of guiding equilibrium solution to Pareto efficiency optimal direction. Finally, the paper constructs the management method of the non-operating government investment project, including three aspects: in perfecting the punishment mechanism in the contract, the common general breach of contract and serious breach of contract by the contractor and the supervision are given. This must be clearly defined in the contract; In the aspect of gridding of agent management, this paper puts forward the application of grid theory to the management of agent, in order to improve the efficiency of supervision and reduce the cost of supervision. In the evaluation of the working effect of contractor and supervision unit, the evaluation index system of the contractor and supervision unit is given by the method of literature analysis, so as to promote the establishment of long-term cooperation mechanism. This study comprehensively analyzes the interests of non-profit-making government project participants and builds a game model. Then, the paper puts forward the management method of non-profit-making government investment projects based on the above game model. On the one hand, it deepens the game research on the field of non-profit-making government investment projects. It also provides theoretical reference and guidance for optimizing project management.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.45;F281
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