分税制后企业所得税集权改革对地方政府资本竞争的影响
发布时间：2018-12-31 18:38
【摘要】：自我国改革开放以来,财政的纵向分权导致了地方政府的横向竞争,其模式从财政包干制的辖区割据的地方保护主义模式转化为争夺税基的“竞”模式。为了进一步探讨财政分权纵向演化引发的地方政府横向竞争变化的机制,我们借助企业所得税这一资本大税种,观测1994年分税制后企业所得税税制集权调整,对地方政府利用企业所得税进行税收竞争行为的变化。 本文采用1998-2012年的省级面板数据,利用空间权重和系统GMM动态计量方法,对地方政府间企业所得税税负反应函数的变化进行识别。我们发现,我国省级政府利用企业所得税进行的税收竞争程度,在分税制后的4次企业所得税集权改革时点上均有下降。2002年源于企业所得税收入分成和征管权的向上集中,2006年源于“新办企业”的新定义对企业所得税税收优惠的限制。2008年两税合并造成的整体企业所得税理论上税负的下降,以及对税收优惠和征管的统一规范,对地方政府的税收竞争行为影响程度最高。直到2009年企业所得税的征收权略微下放,地方政府间的税收竞争程度停止下降。 本文也对东、中、西部进行了同样的检验,发现东、中、西部省份都存在着明显的税收竞争行为。对于东部省份,在2006、2008、2009年的企业所得税税负反应函数并未受到企业所得税税制调整的影响。中部省份的企业所得税税收竞争行为则在历次企业所得税改革中受到最大的冲击。而西部省份的税负反应函数则反应最弱。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up in China, the vertical decentralization of finance has led to horizontal competition among local governments, and its mode has changed from the mode of local protectionism which is divided by fiscal contracting and dry system into the mode of "competition" for the tax base. In order to further explore the mechanism of horizontal competition changes of local governments caused by the vertical evolution of fiscal decentralization, we observe the centralized adjustment of enterprise income tax system after 1994, with the aid of enterprise income tax, a large capital tax category. To the local government use enterprise income tax to carry on the tax revenue competition behavior change. Based on the provincial panel data from 1998 to 2012, the spatial weight and the system GMM dynamic measurement method are used to identify the changes of the income tax response function of the local government. We find that the degree of tax competition of provincial governments using enterprise income tax has declined at four times after the tax-sharing reform. In 2002, it originated from the share of income from enterprise income tax and the upward concentration of the right of collection and management. In 2006, the new definition of "new enterprise" restricted the tax preference of enterprise income tax. In 2008, the overall corporate income tax burden dropped due to the merger of two taxes, as well as the unified regulation of tax preference and tax collection. It has the highest influence on the tax competition behavior of local government. Until 2009, when corporate income tax was slightly devolved, tax competition among local governments stopped falling. This article also carries on the same test to the east, the middle and the west, and finds that the east, the middle and the western provinces all have obvious tax competition behavior. For the eastern provinces, in 2006 and 2008, the corporate income tax response function in 2009 was not affected by the adjustment of the corporate income tax system. The competition behavior of enterprise income tax in the central province is the biggest impact in the previous enterprise income tax reform. The tax response function in the western provinces is the weakest.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.42
本文编号：2396961
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up in China, the vertical decentralization of finance has led to horizontal competition among local governments, and its mode has changed from the mode of local protectionism which is divided by fiscal contracting and dry system into the mode of "competition" for the tax base. In order to further explore the mechanism of horizontal competition changes of local governments caused by the vertical evolution of fiscal decentralization, we observe the centralized adjustment of enterprise income tax system after 1994, with the aid of enterprise income tax, a large capital tax category. To the local government use enterprise income tax to carry on the tax revenue competition behavior change. Based on the provincial panel data from 1998 to 2012, the spatial weight and the system GMM dynamic measurement method are used to identify the changes of the income tax response function of the local government. We find that the degree of tax competition of provincial governments using enterprise income tax has declined at four times after the tax-sharing reform. In 2002, it originated from the share of income from enterprise income tax and the upward concentration of the right of collection and management. In 2006, the new definition of "new enterprise" restricted the tax preference of enterprise income tax. In 2008, the overall corporate income tax burden dropped due to the merger of two taxes, as well as the unified regulation of tax preference and tax collection. It has the highest influence on the tax competition behavior of local government. Until 2009, when corporate income tax was slightly devolved, tax competition among local governments stopped falling. This article also carries on the same test to the east, the middle and the west, and finds that the east, the middle and the western provinces all have obvious tax competition behavior. For the eastern provinces, in 2006 and 2008, the corporate income tax response function in 2009 was not affected by the adjustment of the corporate income tax system. The competition behavior of enterprise income tax in the central province is the biggest impact in the previous enterprise income tax reform. The tax response function in the western provinces is the weakest.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.42
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