地方政府财政竞争的生产要素空间配置效应研究

发布时间：2019-01-28 20:44

【摘要】：中国的经济增长奇迹令世界瞩目,然而在高速增长背后却始终无法找到与之相匹配的生产效率的提高。对这一问题的解答,势必要深入到中国经济体制改革的本质以及与之相伴的政治制度中进行探讨。在中国的政府主导型市场经济体制中,地方政府被赋予了干预经济的巨大能力和空间。同时,在中国政治集权与财政分权共存的特殊治理结构下,对于政治利益和经济利益的激烈竞争又激发了地方政府干预市场经济运行的强烈动机。在这种情况下,地方政府利用财政政策工具和行政管理手段持续干预生产要素配置,已成为生产要素配置的准市场主体。然而,目前学术界对于中国地方政府竞争行为对生产要素流动及配置的影响尚未给予充分关注,对于地方政府财政竞争的相关研究仍旧停留在其存在性检验及其经济增长效应方面。这一研究现状严重脱离了中国地方政府干预要素配置进而主导市场经济发展的现实特征。本文针对中国持续存在的经济增长高速低效的实际问题和现有地方政府财政竞争相关研究中的不足,理论与实证相结合的探讨了地方政府财政竞争对于资本和劳动两种流动性生产要素空间配置的影响,为解释中国经济增长高速低效问题的成因、并为在体制改革和制度优化的视角下寻找高效经济增长的途径提供一定的理论支持和现实指导。本文首先分析了资本和劳动力流动的特点,探讨了区域要素禀赋差异、要素价格差异、要素聚集与区位优势等市场因素以及政府宏观调控对这两种基本生产要素空间流动与配置的影响机制。在此基础上,以中国231个地级市28年间的宏观经济面板数据为基础,本文利用空间面板计量模型,对中国市级地方政府税收竞争和财政支出竞争的行为特征及时空差异进行了实证分析和量化描述,并借鉴Jeffrey Wurgler思想对中国各省的资本和劳动力的空间配置效率进行合理测算。在此基础上,从生产要素空间配置数量和空间配置效率两个角度实证分析了中国市级地方政府在增值税、企业所得税、经济性支出和社会性支出等主要财政项目上的财政竞争行为对资本和劳动力的空间配置产生的影响,揭示了这一影响在改革开放初期和近年间呈现的显著差异,并结合中国政治治理特征和财政体制改革背景深入剖析这一影响及其演化的形成机制。最后,结合中国地方政府财政竞争的行为特征,分析了近年来中国地方政府财政竞争对资本和劳动力空间配置效率产生负面影响的制度性根源。并针对性的提出建立过度竞争的惩罚机制、建立服务型政府绩效考核机制和加强地方政府合作三个方面的政策建议。
[Abstract]:The miracle of China's economic growth has attracted the attention of the world, but it has never been possible to find a corresponding increase in production efficiency behind the rapid growth. The answer to this question is bound to go deep into the nature of China's economic system reform and the accompanying political system. In China's government-oriented market economy system, local governments have been given a huge capacity and space to intervene in the economy. At the same time, under the special governance structure of the coexistence of political centralization and fiscal decentralization, the fierce competition for political and economic interests arouses the strong motivation of local government to intervene in the operation of market economy. In this case, the local government continuously interferes with the allocation of production factors by means of fiscal policy tools and administrative means, and has become the quasi-market subject of the allocation of production factors. However, at present, the academic circles have not paid enough attention to the influence of the competitive behavior of Chinese local governments on the flow and allocation of factors of production. The research on local government financial competition is still focused on its existence test and its economic growth effect. The present situation of this study is seriously divorced from the realistic characteristics of local government intervention in China and then dominating the development of market economy. This paper aims at the existing problems of high speed and low efficiency of economic growth in China and the deficiency of the existing research on the financial competition of local governments. This paper discusses the influence of local government financial competition on the spatial allocation of two kinds of liquidity production factors, capital and labor, in order to explain the causes of the problem of high speed and low efficiency of China's economic growth. It also provides some theoretical support and practical guidance for finding the way of efficient economic growth from the perspective of system reform and system optimization. This paper first analyzes the characteristics of capital and labor flow, discusses the regional factor endowment differences, factor price differences, The market factors such as factor agglomeration and location advantage, and the influence mechanism of government macro-control on the spatial flow and allocation of these two basic factors of production. On this basis, based on the macroeconomic panel data of 231 prefecture-level cities in China for 28 years, this paper uses the spatial panel metrological model. This paper makes an empirical analysis and quantitative description of the behavioral characteristics and space-time differences of tax and fiscal expenditure competition among local governments in China, and calculates reasonably the spatial allocation efficiency of capital and labor force in all provinces of China by using the idea of Jeffrey Wurgler. On this basis, this paper empirically analyzes the value added tax (VAT) and enterprise income tax (EIT) of local governments in China from the aspects of the quantity of spatial allocation of factors of production and the efficiency of spatial allocation. The influence of financial competition behavior on capital and labor force allocation in the main financial items, such as economic expenditure and social expenditure, reveals the significant differences between the initial and recent years of reform and opening up. Combined with the characteristics of Chinese political governance and the background of financial system reform, this influence and its evolution mechanism are deeply analyzed. Finally, based on the behavioral characteristics of local government financial competition in China, this paper analyzes the institutional causes of the negative effects of local government financial competition on the efficiency of capital and labor spatial allocation in recent years. It also puts forward three policy suggestions: establishing excessive competition punishment mechanism, establishing service-oriented government performance appraisal mechanism and strengthening local government cooperation.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630;F812.2

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