官员视察、媒体关注与政府补助——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2019-01-29 05:35

【摘要】：本文以2008-2011年沪深两市的上市公司为样本,实证研究了官员视察活动对企业获取政府补助的影响,并进一步考察了媒体报道对官员视察效应的调节作用。结果显示:(1)官员视察对企业获取政府补助具有显著的正向影响,这种影响因企业产权性质和视察官员级别存在差异;(2)考虑媒体的监督作用之后,本文发现,负面媒体报道会显著减少官员视察带来的政府补助,非负面媒体报道则无显著影响;(3)从政府补助的经济效果来看,政府补助对于企业业绩的提升作用因有无官员视察呈现差异,即对于受到官员视察的企业而言,政府补助的经济效果要弱得多。本文尝试从政府官员活动和外部治理机制的视角探讨政府补助现象,这有助于理解转型经济国家中政企关系扮演的角色和媒体在公共资源配置中的监督作用。
[Abstract]:This paper takes listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as samples from 2008 to 2011 to empirically study the impact of official inspection activities on enterprises' obtaining government subsidies and further investigate the moderating effect of media reports on officials' inspection effects. The results show that: (1) the official inspection has a significant positive impact on the enterprises to obtain government subsidies, and this impact varies with the nature of the enterprise property rights and the level of inspection officials; (2) after considering the supervisory role of the media, it is found that the negative media report will significantly reduce the government subsidy brought by the official inspection, while the non-negative media report will have no significant impact; (3) from the point of view of the economic effect of government subsidy, the effect of government subsidy on enterprise performance is different from that of official inspection, that is to say, the economic effect of government subsidy is much weaker for enterprises inspected by officials. This paper attempts to explore the phenomenon of government subsidy from the perspective of government officials' activities and external governance mechanism, which is helpful to understand the role played by the relationship between government and enterprise in the countries with economies in transition and the supervisory role of the media in the allocation of public resources.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院;厦门大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“基于慈善捐赠视角的公司财务行为与市场反应研究”(71372071);国家自然科学基金项目“媒体的公司治理作用及其对资本市场的影响研究”(71172051)
【分类号】：D630;F812.45

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