考虑决策者行为因素的双渠道供应链协调研究

发布时间：2018-01-13 18:10

本文关键词：考虑决策者行为因素的双渠道供应链协调研究　出处：《天津大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着互联网技术的飞速发展,越来越多的传统企业选择开设网上直销渠道来直接参与市场销售,这就形成了传统零售渠道与网上直销渠道共存的混合营销模式。这种模式大大加剧了市场竞争,使得供应链变得愈加脆弱和充满不确定性。同时,越来越多的实验和观察发现经理人在制定决策时,不仅仅关注自身收益最大化,而是考虑公平、风险偏好等因素的效用最大化。因此,本文基于双渠道供应链的背景设置,运用优化理论、博弈理论等研究了决策者的公平关切行为、风险规避行为等对广告策略、定价策略以及渠道选择策略的影响。首先,与现有大多文献假设制造商是市场主导者不同,论文假设零售商是市场竞争主导者,制造商是跟随者且采取双渠道营销策略。同时假设双方均具有公平关切行为,两方进行合作广告的策略问题。以制造商和零售商都没有公平关切行为为基准,研究了双方均有公平关切行为和只有一方有公平关切行为等多种情形。分析结果表明制造商、零售商的公平关切行为对广告投入水平、合作比例以及双方利润都有显著影响。数值实验进一步显示了供应链上相关成员的公平关切程度对利润的影响程度。进一步,考虑到市场需求的不确定性以及零售商的风险承受能力,论文还研究了一条由具有风险中性特征的制造商和一个具有风险规避特征的零售商组成的二级供应链,Stackelberg博弈的主导者是制造商,并采用CVaR方法来测量零售商的风险。分别考虑了制造商仅采用传统零售渠道分销产品以及采用双渠道分销产品两种经营策略。研究了零售商风险规避态度和市场波动程度对供应链成员各自利润以及整个渠道利润的影响,并对两种策略下各自利润进行了对比分析。最后,采用收益共享契约协调了双渠道供应链并使成员利润达到帕累托最优。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of Internet technology, more and more traditional enterprises choose to open online direct marketing channels to directly participate in market sales. This has formed the traditional retail channel and the online direct marketing channel coexistence of the mixed marketing model, this model greatly intensifies the market competition, makes the supply chain become more fragile and full of uncertainty. At the same time. More and more experiments and observations have found that when managers make decisions, they not only focus on maximizing their own income, but also consider the utility maximization of factors such as fairness, risk preference and so on. Based on the background setting of dual-channel supply chain, this paper uses optimization theory and game theory to study the fair concern behavior, risk aversion behavior and other advertising strategies of decision-makers. The influence of pricing strategy and channel selection strategy. First of all, the paper assumes that the retailer is the market competition leader, which is different from most existing literature hypothesis that the manufacturer is the market leader. The manufacturer is a follower and adopts a double-channel marketing strategy. At the same time, assuming that both sides have fair concern behavior, the strategic problem of the two sides carrying out cooperative advertising is based on the fact that neither manufacturer nor retailer has fair concern behavior. The analysis results show that the fair concern behavior of manufacturers and retailers to the level of advertising investment. Both the proportion of cooperation and the profit of both sides have significant influence. The numerical experiments further show the degree of concern of the relevant members of the supply chain on the profit. Considering the uncertainty of market demand and the risk tolerance of retailers, this paper also studies a two-level supply chain composed of risk-neutral manufacturers and a retailer with risk-averse characteristics. The dominant player in the Stackelberg game is the manufacturer. The CVaR method is used to measure the risk of retailers. Two strategies are considered: the manufacturers only use traditional retail channels to distribute products and the two channels are used to distribute products. The risk-averse attitude of retailers is studied. And the influence of market volatility on the profit of supply chain members and the profit of the whole channel. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is used to coordinate the two-channel supply chain and make the member profit reach Pareto optimal.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F274

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