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地方政府与投融资平台:基于政府担保和激励视角的委托-代理模型

发布时间:2018-02-12 22:17

  本文关键词: 投融资平台 地方政府 委托-代理模型 政府担保 最优激励 银行贷款 选择机制 预期效用 委托-代理关系 公司治理水平 出处:《系统管理学报》2017年06期  论文类型:期刊论文


【摘要】:在对地方政府与投融资平台之间的关系进行全面考察的基础上,基于政府担保和激励视角构建地方政府与投融资平台之间的委托-代理模型。研究结果表明,地方政府对投融资平台的最优激励力度、投融资平台高管人员付出的最优努力水平以及地方政府获得的预期效用水平与投融资平台项目投资规模、投融资平台高管人员的能力水平以及地方政府从投融资平台项目投资产出中获得的隐性额外收益正相关;与投融资平台项目投资周期和外部经营环境风险负相关。从理论上解释了我国地方政府投融资平台资产规模和银行贷款债务不断增加、省级政府投融资平台治理效率优于市县级政府投融资平台、地方政府参与投融资平台公司治理的力度普遍不大、投融资平台高管人员付出的努力水平普遍不高,以及投融资平台公司治理水平普遍较低的原因;以现有省级政府投融资平台为基础,整合市县级政府投融资平台、完善投融资平台高管人员市场选择机制、实施地方政府官员任期内的决策责任终身负责制、强化投融资平台的独立法人人格和市场经济主体地位,以及完善地方政府官员考核评价晋升激励机制等方面提出了优化地方政府与投融资平台公司委托-代理关系的政策建议。
[Abstract]:Based on the comprehensive investigation of the relationship between the local government and the investment and financing platform, the principal-agent model between the local government and the investment and financing platform is constructed based on the perspective of government guarantee and incentive. The optimal incentive strength of local government to the investment and financing platform, the optimal level of effort paid by the executives of the investment and financing platform, the expected utility level obtained by the local government and the investment scale of the investment and financing platform project, There is a positive correlation between the ability level of the executives of the investment and financing platform and the hidden extra income obtained by the local government from the investment output of the investment and financing platform project. It is negatively related to the investment cycle of investment and financing platform project and the risk of external operating environment. It explains theoretically that the assets scale of local government investment and financing platform and the bank loan debt are increasing continuously. The governance efficiency of provincial government investment and financing platform is better than that of municipal and county level government investment and financing platform. Local governments generally do not participate in the corporate governance of the investment and financing platform. The level of effort paid by senior executives of the investment and financing platform is generally not high. On the basis of the existing provincial government investment and financing platform, the integration of municipal and county government investment and financing platform, improve the investment and financing platform executives market selection mechanism, To implement the system of responsibility for decision-making during the term of office of local government officials, to strengthen the independent legal personality of investment and financing platforms and the status of the market economy as the main body, The paper also puts forward some policy suggestions on optimizing the principal-agent relationship between the local government and the investment and financing platform companies from the aspects of perfecting the incentive mechanism for the assessment, evaluation and promotion of local government officials.
【作者单位】: 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【分类号】:D630

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