社会组织参与区域合作治理进化博弈模型

发布时间：2018-03-07 17:31

本文选题：区域治理　切入点：合作治理　出处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：社会多元化与公民社会的快速发展,促使社会组织参与社会治理和应急响应的诉求与能力日益加强,驱动着政府职能变革和区域治理方式创新。区域合作治理过程中,治理主体依据情景态势调整策略,影响其他主体的治理收益和策略选择,形成复杂的动态博弈关系。本文把握政府与社会组织的动态博弈行为特征,确定区域合作治理的博弈支付矩阵与复制动态方程,构建区域政府与社会组织合作治理进化博弈模型。分析得出5个可能的均衡点,通过雅可比矩阵分析均衡点的稳定性,可知政府与社会组织合作治理进化博弈的长期稳定策略集为{(合作,合作),(不合作,不合作)}。模型结果分析表明,合作收益直接影响着博弈稳定策略的进化方向,收益大于成本是政府与社会组织选择合作策略的必要条件,任一方的合作收益小于成本,选择独立行动是双方的占优策略,最终的策略选择与政府和社会组织合作所获取的超额收益、支付成本及合作水平密切相关。合作超额收益增加或合作水平提升时,博弈系统向(合作,合作)演化的概率加大;合作成本增加时,博弈系统向(不合作,不合作)演化的概率加大。制度规范不健全、组织信任缺失、社会组织力量薄弱等因素影响进化均衡结果,社会组织创新发展氛围尚未形成、自组织性和自律性内生动力不足,是制约社会组织参与合作治理的关键问题。基于此,提出社会组织参与区域合作治理的协调机制及培育机制,具体策略包括:明确权责关系、畅通参与渠道、创新合作形式,以及优化管理制度、让渡成长空间和树立社会公信。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of social diversity and civil society, the demands and abilities of social organizations to participate in social governance and emergency response are increasingly strengthened, which drives the transformation of government functions and the innovation of regional governance. The governance subject adjusts the strategy according to the situation situation, affects the other main body's governance income and the strategy choice, forms the complex dynamic game relation, this article grasps the government and the social organization dynamic game behavior characteristic, The game payment matrix and replicating dynamic equation of regional cooperative governance are determined, and the evolutionary game model of cooperative governance between regional government and social organization is constructed. Five possible equilibrium points are obtained, and the stability of equilibrium points is analyzed by Jacobian matrix. The long-term stable strategy set of cooperative governance evolutionary game between government and social organization is {(cooperation, cooperation, non-cooperation)}. The results of model analysis show that cooperative income directly affects the evolutionary direction of game stability strategy. The benefit is greater than the cost is the necessary condition for the government and the social organization to choose the cooperation strategy, the cooperation benefit of either party is less than the cost, and the choice of independent action is the dominant strategy of both sides. The final choice of strategy is closely related to the excess income, the cost of payment and the level of cooperation of the government and social organizations. When the excess return of cooperation increases or the level of cooperation increases, the probability of game system evolving to (cooperation, cooperation) increases; When the cooperation cost increases, the probability of the evolution of the game system to (non-cooperation, non-cooperation) increases, the institutional norms are not perfect, the organizational trust is lacking, the social organization strength is weak and other factors affect the evolution equilibrium results. The atmosphere of social organization innovation and development has not yet been formed, and the lack of endogenous motivation of self-organization and self-discipline is the key problem restricting the participation of social organizations in cooperative governance. The coordination mechanism and cultivation mechanism of social organizations participating in regional cooperative governance are put forward. The specific strategies include: clarifying the relationship between power and responsibility, unblocking participation channels, innovating the forms of cooperation, optimizing the management system, transferring the space for growth and setting up social public trust.
【作者单位】：同济大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重大研究计划重点支持项目“非常规突发事件处置模式及应急技术集成原理与方法(批准号:91024023)、“中国应急管理体系顶层设计原理方法及模式重构”(批准号:91224003);国家自然科学基金青年项目“中国区域环境整体政府治理模式及政策路径研究”(批准号:71403186)
【分类号】：D632.9

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