农用土地转为建设用地过程中的地方政府行为研究
发布时间:2018-03-19 18:27
本文选题:农用土地 切入点:建设用地 出处:《吉林大学》2015年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:三农问题一直以来都是我国政府和社会非常重视的主题,近年来土地利用上的利益纠纷问题愈加凸显,暴力征地、违规违法利用土地、失地农民上访等事件层出不穷,引发社会极大的关注。考察当代中国城市化进程中土地利用的过程,,尤其是在农用土地转为建设用地的环节上,我们发现诸多问题的产生都与地方政府有着直接或间接的关系。文章的研究目的就是将地方政府在土地转用过程中的失范行为揭露出来,从中找出规制政府行为和权力的制度与措施,以期让农民利益得到更好地保障。 文章的逻辑起点在于一个不合理的土地利益分配格局,即在农用土地转为建设用地的过程中,农民处于明显失利的状态,而各级地方政府和干部、用地企业则获得了大量的土地增值收益。文章主要探讨的就是这个利益格局产生的原因、过程和解决途径。 文章围绕这个利益分配格局和地方政府的行为而展开,首先说明农用土地转为建设用地的合理性以及转用过程中产生了巨大的级差利益,从而指出该级差利益分配存在着极为不公平的现象。然后从理论上建立分析框架,这个分析框架基于“土地规划、涉土项目申报与审批、土地征购征收、征地整理与储备、土地配置”等五个农用土地转为建设用地的主要环节,用于分析地方政府土地管理的方式和农用土地转为建设用地的规范流程,为现实层面分析地方政府土地行为提供规范和标准。 接着,文章采用案例归纳总结的方式,结合自2013年以来的202个有关地方政府与农转建过程的新闻,从现实的层面来详细整理阐述地方政府的失范行为表现和策略性行为,包括宏观目标的掩饰、巧妙利用现有国家政策制度、多主体利益联盟、唯上级考核至上的强力执行等。从案例中我们还挖掘出地方政府行为失范的成因涉及到国家的财税制度和土地管理体制,个人理性与贪污动力,资本的扩张和控制力。 最后,基于全文的分析,我们提出了包括降低地方政府实施土地财政的动力,整顿地方政府在农转建过程中的违法违规行为,提高农民的涉及土地权利,增加行政人员贪污渎职曝光的概率及问责力度等有关的行为规制措施。
[Abstract]:The issue of agriculture, rural areas and farmers has always been the subject of great attention by our government and society. In recent years, the issue of interest disputes over land use has become increasingly prominent, with violent land requisition, illegal use of land, land loss farmers' petition and so on. To investigate the process of land use in the process of urbanization in contemporary China, especially in the process of conversion of agricultural land to construction land, We find that many problems are directly or indirectly related to the local government. The purpose of this paper is to expose the abnormal behavior of the local government in the process of land conversion. This paper finds out the system and measures to regulate the government's behavior and power in order to better protect the interests of farmers. The logical starting point of the article lies in an unreasonable distribution pattern of land interests, that is, in the process of conversion of agricultural land to construction land, farmers are in a state of obvious failure, while local governments and cadres at all levels, The paper mainly discusses the reason, process and solution of this benefit pattern. This paper focuses on this benefit distribution pattern and the behavior of the local government. Firstly, it explains the rationality of the conversion of agricultural land to construction land and the huge differential benefit in the process of conversion. It is pointed out that there is a very unfair phenomenon in the distribution of the differential benefit, and then an analytical framework is established theoretically, which is based on "land planning, application and approval of earth-related projects, land acquisition and acquisition, land requisition and consolidation and reserve". The five main links of agricultural land conversion to construction land, such as land allocation, are used to analyze the mode of land management of local governments and the standardized process of conversion of agricultural land to construction land, It provides norms and standards for the analysis of local government land behavior. Then, using the method of case summary, combining 202 news about the process of local government and agricultural transformation since 2013, the paper elaborates the local government's abnormal behavior and strategic behavior from the realistic level. Including the concealment of macro targets, clever use of existing national policy systems, and multi-subject interest alliances. From the case we also dig out the causes of the local government behavior misconduct related to the national financial and tax system and land management system personal rationality and corruption motivation capital expansion and control. Finally, based on the analysis of the full text, we put forward some suggestions, including reducing the power of the local government to implement the land finance, rectifying the illegal and illegal behavior of the local government in the process of agricultural transformation, and improving the farmers' land rights. Increase the probability of corruption and malfeasance of administrative staff exposure and accountability and other related regulatory measures.
【学位授予单位】:吉林大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F321.1;D630
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