特大城市郊区乡镇政府征地拆迁的策略逻辑研究

发布时间：2018-04-20 21:21

  本文选题：郊区乡镇政府 + 征地拆迁　； 参考：《上海大学》2017年博士论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着城市化和工业化的推进,郊区乡镇的产业结构、区域面积和人口规模已经接近一个小城市的规模,与一般乡镇有很大的差别。由组织结构、权责配置和公共服务等矛盾引发的郊区乡镇政府的策略行为也比一般乡镇更为突出。尤其是在征地拆迁这一涉及乡镇政府关键财政收入来源的行动中,乡镇政府展现出了更丰富、更复杂的策略行动。以往的研究关注到了乡镇政府与上级政府和动迁村民互动的策略行为,但是乡镇政府超越科层结构限制的策略被简化为不遵从制度规范的“偏离”行为,乡镇政府与动迁村民互动的策略被简单地归因为土地财政和土地财产不明确导致的维护自身利益的自利行为,乡镇政府运作隐匿的复杂问题与复杂机制被忽略了。本研究将组织决策分析引入郊区乡镇政府征地拆迁策略逻辑的研究中,试图从行动者角度探究以下问题:郊区乡镇政府在征地拆迁行动中面临哪些结构性限制?它在结构中获取了哪些关键性资源?它的自由余地是什么?在结构制约下它采取什么策略与上级政府和动迁村民谈判?乡镇政府运作的复杂机制是什么?本研究运用的组织决策分析强调,虽然科层制组织的规则对行动者有制约作用,但是行动者总是可以在结构中获取不确定性,控制影响组织运行的不确定性领域,为自己保留一定的自由余地。行动者在权衡了组织环境的影响、自身决策可能带来的后果、其他行动者可能做出的决策之后,会依据自身的自由余地和行动能力,制定、调整决策,使游戏规则变化最大程度得朝有利于自己方向发展。正是从这一理论出发,本研究对上海市宝山区G镇的征地拆迁实践展开田野调查,运用了观察法、深度访谈法和拓展个案法收集资料,运用组织环境、行动能力、自由余地和策略选择这四个分析工具对郊区乡镇政府征地拆迁的策略逻辑展开研究。研究发现,郊区乡镇政府的征地拆迁策略是在征地拆迁游戏中形成的。征地拆迁将上级政府、乡镇政府、动迁村民紧密地联系在一起,彼此在决策上高度依赖,构成一种可以容纳行动者之间的谈判、协商、讨价还价、竞争与合作、冲突与妥协的游戏。G镇政府受到产业结构转型、征地政策和地方性规范的制约,同时也受到政府内部的角色冲突、财政困局的限制。但是乡镇政府从来不是结构制约的被动接受者,它在环境中发现了机遇,并且控制了能够影响上级政府和动迁村民的不确定性领域,形成信息模糊与连带责任、政策解释与执行的自由余地。拥有这些自由余地意味着乡镇政府与上级政府、动迁村民形成了一种不平等的权力关系,并且获取了在其中占据获利优势的协商能力。为了在权力关系中获取更大的权力和利益空间,乡镇政府想方设法地扩大自己的自由余地,缩小他人的自由余地,在考虑上级政府和动迁村民对它的行动可能做出的回应的基础上,采取不同策略与上级政府和动迁村民进行谈判。针对上级政府采取的统一管理、日常监督、年终考核、控制资金和政策更新的监控策略,乡镇政府采取政策再生产、协议动迁、项目动员、压力传递的策略与上级政府协商。针对动迁村民使用的违规、拖、比较、强调“弱者”身份的讨价还价策略,乡镇政府选择逐个击破、磨、攀关系、诱民动迁、开口子、拔钉子的策略与动迁村民谈判。行动者的策略行动导致乡镇政府、上级政府和动迁村民围绕征地拆迁重构权力关系。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the promotion of urbanization and industrialization, the industrial structure, area and population size of the suburban villages and towns are close to the size of a small city, and there are great differences with the general towns. The strategic behavior of the rural township government, which is caused by the contradictions of the organization structure, the allocation of power and responsibility and the public service, is also more prominent than the general township. Especially in the action of land expropriation and demolition, which involves the key financial revenue sources of the township government, the township government has shown a more rich and more complex strategic action. The previous research has paid attention to the strategy behavior of the interaction between the township government and the higher government and the moving villagers, but the strategy of the township government overstepping the bureaucratic structure is simplified as a method. The strategy of the interaction between the township government and the moving villagers is simply attributable to the self-interest of the land finance and the undefined land property, and the complex and complex mechanism of the township government's hidden operation has been neglected. In the study of town government land expropriation and demolition strategy logic, it tries to explore the following questions from the actor's point of view: what are the structural constraints faced by the suburban township government in the land expropriation and demolition operations? What are the key resources it gets in the structure? What is its free room? What strategy it takes under the structure system and the higher government and the moving village under the structure system What is the complex mechanism of the operation of the township government? The organizational decision analysis used in this study emphasizes that although the rules of the bureaucratic organization have restrictive effects on the actors, the actors can always obtain uncertainty in the structure, control the indeterminacy fields that affect the organization's operation, and retain certain free leeway for themselves. The activist is weighing the influence of the organization environment, the possible consequences of its own decision, and after the other actors may make decisions, it will be formulated and adjusted according to their own free space and ability to act, so that the change of the rules of the game will be beneficial to the development of its own direction. The field survey of the land expropriation and demolition practice in G Town, Baoshan District, has been carried out by the observation method, the depth interview method and the expansion of the case law. The four analytical tools of the organizational environment, action ability, free space and strategy selection are used to study the strategic logic of the land expropriation and demolition of the rural township government. The demolition strategy is formed in the game of land expropriation and demolition. Land expropriation and demolition are closely linked to the governments of higher authorities, township governments and moving villagers, and they are highly dependent on each other in decision making, forming a kind of negotiation, negotiation, bargaining, competition and cooperation among the actors, and the.G government of conflict and compromise is transferred to the industrial structure. The policy of land expropriation and local regulation, but also by the role conflict within the government and the limitation of financial difficulties. However, the township government has never been a passive recipient of structural constraints. It has found opportunities in the environment and controlled the uncertain fields that can affect the higher government and the moving villagers, forming a fuzzy information and the formation of information. The free space of joint responsibility, policy interpretation and implementation. The possession of these freedoms means that the township government and the higher government, the moving villagers have formed an unequal power relationship, and obtain the consultative ability to occupy a profit advantage in it. In order to gain greater power and interest space in the power relationship, the township government wants to On the basis of the possible response of the higher government and the moving villagers to its actions, Fang took different strategies to negotiate with the higher government and the moving villagers on the basis of the possible response to the actions of the higher government and the moving villagers. The township government takes policy reproduction, the township government adopts policy reproduction, agreement migration, project mobilization, and the strategy of pressure transfer with the higher government. The strategic action of the actors led to the township government, the higher authorities and the relocation villagers to reconstruct the power relationship around the land acquisition and demolition.

【学位授予单位】：上海大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630.1
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本文编号：1779501