中国式分权体制下地方政府竞争与环境治理研究

发布时间：2018-05-14 12:27

本文选题：中国式分权 + 地方政府竞争　；参考：《云南大学》2015年博士论文

【摘要】：改革开放以来,中国经济发展取得了显著成就,但与之相伴的是不断恶化的环境污染。传统文献主要基于环境库兹涅茨曲线、环境污染的公共物品性质和外部性等对环境污染问题进行研究。但环境污染的特殊性决定了政府在环境污染治理中的重要作用,特别是在中国这种政府主导型经济体中,对环境污染背后的政府行为进行深入分析就显得十分必要。由此,本文提出了一个理解我国地方政府环境治理的分析框架,从“财政分权、政治集权”的中国式分权体制出发,构造了一个中央和地方、地方政府间的博弈竞争模型,分析我国环境治理困境的内在逻辑,从理论上阐述财政分权和基于GDP的晋升锦标赛对地方政府环境治理行为的影响。并采用2003-2012年省级面板数据实证检验了中国式分权与地方政府环境支出之间的关系、地方政府环境支出竞争是否存在?以及地方政府环境支出竞争的具体表现形式。理论研究表明,第一,中央政府对经济增长的强调和地方政府财政激励的增强,使得地方政府过分偏向基础设施投入,而忽视了环境的保护和治理；第二,在资本流动情况下,禀赋条件好的地区,地方政府这种“重基础设施、轻环境治理”的行为被进一步放大。相反,禀赋条件差的地区,地方政府基础设施投入相对减少,而环境公共物品投入将相对增加；第三,当地方政府间环境公共物品提供存在策略性互补行为时,溢出效应的上升将使两个地方政府环境公共物品供给增加。当地方政府间环境公共物品提供存在策略性替代行为时,溢出效应的上升将使地方政府环境公共物品供给出现“骑跷跷板”特征。同时,利用2003-2012年省级面板数据,构建空间计量经济模型,运用系统广义矩估计方法就我国地方政府环境支出的策略互动行为模式、形成机制等进行实证研究。研究发现：我国地方政府间环境支出存在显著的策略互动行为；地方政府环境支出竞争效应相当显著,而溢出效应并未发现；本文还发现我国的财政分权显著地挤出了地方政府的环境支出。在理论和实证分析的基础上,本文认为,必须从政府行为激励机制设计的视角,改变地方政府“重经济增长轻环境治理”的行为,使地方政府从“为增长而竞争”走向“为和谐而竞争”。首先,要调整现行的环境治理体制,根据环境污染问题的实际采取属地管理与垂直管理相结合的混合体制,并强化环境管理机构的权威；其次,在保持中央政治集权前提下,调整中央政府政绩考核指标体系,将“绿色GDP”纳入地方政府政绩考核指标体系,取代基于GDP的政绩考核机制,并提高公众环境满意度在政绩考核和干部提拔任用中的力度；第三,完善纵向和横向财政转移支付制度,建立公平合理的环境治理生态补偿机制。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China's economic development has made remarkable achievements, but it is accompanied by worsening environmental pollution. The traditional literature is mainly based on the environmental Kuznets curve, the nature of public goods and externalities of environmental pollution. However, the particularity of environmental pollution determines the important role of government in environmental pollution control, especially in the government-led economy such as China, so it is necessary to deeply analyze the government behavior behind environmental pollution. Therefore, this paper puts forward an analytical framework to understand the environmental governance of local governments in China, starting from the Chinese decentralization system of "fiscal decentralization, political centralization", constructs a game competition model between central, local and local governments. This paper analyzes the internal logic of the plight of environmental governance in China, and theoretically expounds the influence of fiscal decentralization and the promotion championship based on GDP on the environmental governance behavior of local governments. Using the provincial panel data from 2003-2012 to test the relationship between Chinese decentralization and local government environmental expenditure, whether local government environmental expenditure competition exists? As well as the local government environment expenditure competition concrete manifestation form. Theoretical studies show that, first, the central government's emphasis on economic growth and the strengthening of local government fiscal incentives make local governments excessively biased towards infrastructure investment, while ignoring environmental protection and governance; second, in the case of capital flows, In areas with good endowments, the local government's "emphasis on infrastructure rather than environmental governance" is further magnified. On the contrary, in regions with poor endowment conditions, the investment in local government infrastructure will decrease relatively, while the investment in environmental public goods will increase relatively. Third, when local governments provide environmental public goods with strategic complementary behavior, The increase of spillover effect will increase the supply of environmental public goods in two local governments. When the local government provides environmental public goods with strategic substitution behavior, the increase of spillover effect will make the local government environmental public goods supply "ride the seesaw" characteristics. At the same time, using the provincial panel data from 2003 to 2012, this paper constructs a spatial econometric model, and makes an empirical study on the interactive behavior model and formation mechanism of local government environmental expenditure in China by using the method of system generalized moment estimation. It is found that there is significant strategic interaction between local governments in environmental expenditure, the competitive effect of local government environmental expenditure is quite significant, but the spillover effect is not found. It is also found that the fiscal decentralization of our country has significantly squeezed out the environmental expenditure of local governments. On the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper holds that we must change the local governments' behavior of "emphasizing economic growth over environmental governance" from the angle of the design of government behavior incentive mechanism. Make the local government from "competition for growth" to "competition for harmony." First, we should adjust the current environmental governance system, adopt a mixed system of territorial management and vertical management according to the actual situation of environmental pollution, and strengthen the authority of environmental management institutions; secondly, under the premise of maintaining the centralization of central politics, Adjust the central government performance assessment index system, put "green GDP" into the local government performance assessment index system, replace the performance assessment mechanism based on GDP, and improve the public environmental satisfaction in the performance assessment and cadre promotion and appointment; Third, improve the vertical and horizontal fiscal transfer payment system and establish a fair and reasonable ecological compensation mechanism for environmental governance.
【学位授予单位】：云南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630

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