地方政府的选择性执行研究：压力、自主与偏好

发布时间：2018-06-07 05:25

本文选题：选择性执行 + 压力型体制　；参考：《南京师范大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：地方政府是落实公共政策的具体执行主体,在政策实施过程中扮演着十分重要的角色,它们的决策和行动直接影响着公共政策的实施情况以及政策执行的结果。从现实来看,地方政府在执行上级政府或部门下达的公共政策时,存在着较为明显的选择性执行倾向。这种倾向不仅表现在对不同政策的选择上,同时也表现在对具体政策执行方案的选择上。其结果会导致,不仅有些政策长期得不到有效的贯彻,而且即使是那些得到执行的政策,也无法全面落实或者偏离正确轨道,和上级政府的核心精神不符。地方政府在政策实施过程中的这种行为特征,有着诸多的政治经济根源,但其中至为关键的,莫不与压力型体制有关。压力型体制是计划经济下的产物,是我国特有的一种政府体制和工作方式,它是指在经济建设的过程中,政府由上而下通过任务分解和指标控制的方法,驱使下级政府积极地行动,以促进经济的发展的一种工作方式。虽然压力型体制本身强调的是上级政府对下级政府行为的控制和激励,但这种通过数量化的指标分解所形成的控制和激励产生出来的结果,却是地方政府在执行政策时的选择性行为：凡是有利于完成指标的政策或任务都会积极地落实,凡是与指标任务无关的政策或任务都置之不顾,或者虚与委蛇。这种选择性行为在以经济建设为中心的总体性路线的支配之下表现得尤为突出。本文通过A市政府的选择性执行全貌描述和分析,结合压力型体制的历史成因与现实基础,研究两者之间的关联。文章首先从A市的实际出发,在分析政治、经济、发展环境的基础上,论述其选择性行为的具体表现,以及产生的政策后果,再引入压力型体制理论,回溯压力型体制的历史、地理等影响因素,以及其经过现代化改革后的变化,例如分权、综合考评等,得出选择性执行的制度基础,再结合A市案例分析地方政府行为的特征,具有何种自主选择的空间,涉及政策过程的哪些方面,最后得出选择性执行的行为机制,阐述地方政府的政策偏好,深入分析政策偏好的内在倾向和形成特点,受到哪些因素的影响。全文旨在理论联系实际,描绘选择性行为的全貌,深究其根源和特点,分析地方政府在上级政府的控制下如何形成既自主又受到制约的双重逻辑：一方面,考虑到地方政府作为执行主体的积极性以及政策执行本身的有效性,会赋予地方政府因地制宜的权力,使其在一定程度上掌握着政策实施的自主权；另一方面,为了避免地方政府的不作为并形成有效的激励,上级政府又会对地方政府进行严格的指标性监控和考核。如果说自主权使得地方政府选择性执行有了空间和制度上的可能,那么指标性的监控和考核就提供了这种行为的强激励。
[Abstract]:The local government is the concrete executive subject of implementing public policy and plays a very important role in the process of policy implementation. Their decisions and actions directly affect the implementation of public policy and the results of policy implementation. In reality, local governments have a tendency of selective execution when executing the public policies issued by higher governments or departments. This tendency is manifested not only in the choice of different policies, but also in the choice of specific policy implementation schemes. As a result, not only some policies cannot be effectively implemented for a long time, but even those policies that have been implemented will not be fully implemented or deviated from the correct track, which is inconsistent with the core spirit of the higher government. This kind of behavior characteristic of local government in the process of policy implementation has many political and economic roots, but the most important one is related to the pressure-type system. The pressure-type system is the product of the planned economy and a unique government system and working mode in our country. It refers to the method of the government from top to bottom through task decomposition and index control in the process of economic construction. A method of working that drives lower-level governments to act positively to promote economic development. Although the pressure-type system itself emphasizes the control and incentives of the superior government over the actions of the lower government, it is the result of the control and incentive formed by the decomposition of the quantitative indicators. But it is the selective behavior of the local government in carrying out the policy: any policy or task that is favorable to the completion of the target will be carried out actively, any policy or task that has nothing to do with the target task will be ignored, or the policy or task will be ignored. This kind of selective behavior is especially prominent under the domination of the overall line centered on economic construction. Based on the description and analysis of selective execution in A municipal government and the historical causes and practical basis of the pressure-type system, this paper studies the relationship between the two. Based on the analysis of politics, economy and development environment, this paper first discusses the concrete manifestation of its selective behavior and its policy consequences, and then introduces the theory of pressure-type system to trace back the history of pressure-type system. Geography and other influencing factors, as well as its changes after modernization reform, such as decentralization, comprehensive evaluation and so on, draw the institutional basis of selective implementation, and then analyze the characteristics of local government behavior by combining the case of A city. What kind of space to choose independently, which aspects of policy process are involved, finally, the behavioral mechanism of selective implementation is obtained, the policy preference of local government is expounded, and the inherent tendency and forming characteristics of policy preference are deeply analyzed. By what factors. The purpose of this paper is to combine theory with practice, to describe the whole picture of selective behavior, to study its root causes and characteristics, and to analyze how local governments can form a dual logic of autonomy and restriction under the control of higher governments: on the one hand, Considering the initiative of the local government as the subject of implementation and the effectiveness of the policy implementation itself, local governments will be given the power to adapt to local conditions and have a certain degree of autonomy in the implementation of policies; on the other hand, In order to avoid the inaction of local government and form effective incentives, the higher government will strictly monitor and assess the local government. If autonomy makes it possible for local governments to implement selectively, then the monitoring and evaluation of indicators provide a strong incentive for this kind of behavior.
【学位授予单位】：南京师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D63

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