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如何最优地“放权”——行政事项集权与分权的最优边界

发布时间:2018-06-21 15:13

  本文选题:简政放权 + 放管结合 ; 参考:《财经研究》2017年04期


【摘要】:"简政放权、放管结合"是深化行政体制改革、转变政府职能的重要内容之一。"放权"政策体现了政府的权力分配模式从集权向分权的转变,其本质是一种"行政性分权"。文章从提高经济运行效率即最大化中央政府效用的视角,以建模方式——建立了一个三层次政府的动态博弈模型,给出了集权与分权的边界,揭示"放权"政策的逻辑,从而试图为研究政府最优行政分权提供一种可行的思路,并尝试用这一模型为"放权"政策提供合理的解释。模型分析结果表明,(1)分权能够在不改变社会福利水平的情况下,通过减少中央政府的信息成本负担提升了经济运行的效率,这也是"放权"政策的主要目的。同时,权力的下放可能导致下级政府"寻租"的隐患,需要加大对这一行为的惩罚力度。"权力清单"制度的建立,通过明确规定中间政府的权力范围,加强了对中间政府行使权力的监督,减弱了其滥用权力的动机。(2)具有以下特征的权力,分权往往比集权更优:下级政府的成本负担轻、连带惩罚力度小;权力实施时底层政府追求的目标差异程度小、彼此之间相互影响程度小。与历次国发文中下放的权力做了比对后发现,这些被下放的权力能够用上述的特征进行较好的解释。(3)各因素影响分权最优性的强弱关系是:信息成本和对中间政府滥用权力的惩罚力度这两个因素强于权力本身的若干特征,即带给下级政府的成本负担、连带惩罚程度;政策实施时底层政府追求的目标差异程度、外部性大小。
[Abstract]:The "decentralization of power and the combination of management" is one of the important contents of deepening the reform of the administrative system and changing the functions of the government. The "decentralization" policy embodies the transformation of the government's power distribution pattern from centralization to decentralization. Its essence is a kind of "administrative decentralization". The article is based on the perspective of improving the efficiency of economic operation, that is, maximizing the utility of the central government, and using modeling methods. A dynamic game model of three levels of government is established, the boundary of centralization and decentralization is given, and the logic of "decentralization" is revealed. Thus, it tries to provide a feasible way of thinking for the study of the optimal administrative decentralization of the government, and tries to provide a reasonable explanation for the "decentralization" policy. The results of the model analysis show that (1) decentralization can be found. Without changing the social welfare level, by reducing the cost burden of the central government to improve the efficiency of the economic operation, it is also the main purpose of the "decentralization" policy. At the same time, the decentralization of power may lead to the hidden danger of the lower government "Rent-seeking", and the punishment of this act should be strengthened. The establishment of the "power list" system is established. It has clearly defined the power range of the middle government, strengthened the supervision of the exercise of power in the middle government and weakened the motive for its abuse of power. (2) the power which has the following characteristics is often better than the centralization of power: the lower cost of the government is light, and the strength of the joint punishment is small; and the level of the goals pursued by the bottom government is small in the implementation of the power force, and each other is small. The degree of mutual influence is small. It is found that the delegated power can be explained better with the above characteristics. (3) the strong and weak relations between the factors which affect the optimality of decentralization are: the two factors are stronger than the power itself, the cost of information and the punishment of the abuse of power in the middle government. Several characteristics, namely, the cost burden to the lower government, the degree of joint punishment, and the magnitude of the objective difference pursued by the lower level governments in the implementation of policies.
【作者单位】: 中央财经大学中国财政发展协同创新中心;中央财经大学金融学院;
【基金】:国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CJL020) 国家自然科学基金委员会科学部主任基金项目(71350020)
【分类号】:D630


本文编号:2049189

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