地方官员晋升激励、产业政策与资源配置效率

发布时间：2018-06-27 09:06

本文选题：晋升激励 + 新结构经济学　；参考：《经济评论》2017年03期

【摘要】：本文基于地方政府之间竞争的逻辑与新结构经济学的分析框架,结合2000-2007年中国工业企业数据库与2000-2007年中国地级市党委书记数据库,实证检验地方官员晋升激励如何影响本地产业政策指向与当地生产性结构之间的一致性程度,以及这种一致性程度如何进一步影响当地的资源配置效率。研究发现,一方面,市委书记晋升激励越强的地级市,越有可能去扶持中央政府鼓励发展但并不一定与本地生产性结构一致的产业。并且,晋升激励对产业政策的这种扭曲性影响在国有经济占比高与经济落后地区更明显;而剔除了国家《五年规划纲要》重点鼓励的产业后,这一扭曲明显减少。另一方面,产业政策偏向与本地生产性结构之间的一致性程度越高时,行业的全要素生产率越高。
[Abstract]:Based on the logic of competition among local governments and the analytical framework of new structural economics, this paper combines the database of China's industrial enterprises from 2000 to 2007 and the database of party secretaries of prefecture-level cities from 2000 to 2007. The empirical study examines how the promotion incentives of local officials affect the consistency between the direction of local industrial policy and the local productive structure, and how this consistency further affects the efficiency of local resource allocation. On the one hand, prefecture-level cities with stronger incentives for party secretaries are more likely to support industries encouraged by the central government but not necessarily consistent with local productive structures, the study found. Moreover, the distorting effect of promotion incentive on industrial policy is more obvious in the high proportion of state-owned economy and backward areas, but after excluding the industries which are encouraged by the National Five-year Plan outline, this distortion is obviously reduced. On the other hand, the higher the consistency between industrial policy bias and local productive structure, the higher the total factor productivity.
【作者单位】：湘潭大学商学院;
【分类号】：D630.3;F127

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