我国PPP模式权力寻租预防机制构建

发布时间：2018-08-12 08:13

【摘要】：近年来,PPP模式在我国的发展势头迅猛,国内外的学者们对于PPP模式的研究也愈演愈烈。但是纵观近二十年来PPP模式研究领域,发现学界内对于PPP权力寻租防治的研究甚少,另一方面PPP项目过程中的权力寻租问题屡见不鲜且目前我国PPP权力制约机制尚不健全,事前、事中和事后监督皆不完善,而事前预防机制尤为缺失。因此本文中对PPP项目权力寻租预防机制进行研究并且提出新思路具有重要的理论意义和指导价值。本文中以权力寻租理论、委托代理理论和权力制约理论以及PPP模式相关理论为基础,首先,分析沈阳第九水厂BOT项目和长春汇津污水处理厂PPP项目,并且结合相关研究总结出PPP模式权力寻租的表现形式,提出PPP项目权力制约的必要性和紧迫性;其次,分析北京地铁4号线PPP项目和广西来宾B电厂BOT项目,提出对PPP项目运行过程中的权力寻租进行预防的可能性和重要性,同时通过北京地铁4号线案例的监管系统提出问题:政府项目监管权的集中是否合理?如何对PPP项目监管权力进行监管?以及PPP项目的监管权归属哪一个主体?最后,通过对英国森德兰市街道照明和公路标志PPP项目的分析,总结英国PPP项目的监管经验。通过案例分析和相关研究,总结出我国PPP项目权力寻租的具体表现和我国PPP权力寻租监管的现状,借鉴国内外先进PPP监管经验,合理定位政府在PPP项目中的角色,完善立法机关、司法机关、社会监督主体乃至第三方监督主体对于PPP项目的监督,强化司法惩戒预防权力寻租功能,加强政府公职人员的思想道德建设,实现我国PPP项目权力寻租预防机制构建,为我国PPP项目运行的规范有序发展奠定基础。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the PPP model is developing rapidly in our country, and scholars at home and abroad are also increasing the research on it. However, in the field of PPP model research in the past two decades, it is found that there are few researches on the prevention and cure of PPP power rent-seeking in academic circles. On the other hand, the problem of power rent-seeking in the process of PPP project is common and the power restriction mechanism of PPP in our country is not perfect at present. In advance, both in the event and after the supervision are imperfect, and the prevention mechanism is particularly lacking. Therefore, it is of great theoretical significance and guiding value to study the mechanism of power rent-seeking prevention of PPP project and put forward new ideas in this paper. Based on the theory of power rent-seeking, principal-agent theory, power restriction theory and PPP model theory, this paper firstly analyzes the BOT project of Shenyang Ninth Waterworks and the PPP Project of Changchun Huijin sewage treatment Plant. And combined with relevant studies summed up the PPP model of power rent-seeking form, put forward the necessity and urgency of power restriction of PPP project. Secondly, the analysis of Beijing Metro Line 4 PPP project and Guangxi Laibin B Power Plant BOT project, This paper puts forward the possibility and importance of preventing the power of rent-seeking in the course of PPP project operation. At the same time, through the supervision system of the case of Beijing Metro Line 4, this paper raises the question: is the centralization of government project supervision power reasonable? How to supervise the supervision power of PPP project? And the PPP project regulatory authority to which the main body? Finally, through the analysis of the PPP project of street lighting and highway signs in Sundlun, the supervision experience of the PPP project in England is summarized. Through case analysis and related research, the paper summarizes the concrete performance of power rent-seeking of PPP project in our country and the current situation of power rent-seeking supervision of PPP in our country, draws lessons from the domestic and foreign advanced PPP supervision experience, and reasonably orientates the role of government in PPP project. We should improve the supervision of PPP projects by legislative organs, judicial organs, social supervisors and even third party supervisors, strengthen the function of judicial discipline, prevent the power of rent-seeking, and strengthen the ideological and moral construction of government officials. The realization of PPP project power rent-seeking prevention mechanism will lay a foundation for the normal and orderly development of China's PPP project operation.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630

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