地方政府对煤炭市场失灵进行宏观调控的对策研究
发布时间:2018-10-10 15:12
【摘要】:煤炭产业作为我国工业化进程的主要基础能源,是我国国民经济的支柱产业且具有重要的战略地位,也为我国社会经济的迅猛发展发挥了巨大作用。然而,自2008年的国际金融危机以来煤炭行业也随即出现多重危机,诸如煤炭供需不平衡,煤炭行业结构性产能过剩、产品供过于求、进口煤冲击等一系列问题日益凸显。近年来,我国不断出台一系列抑制产能过剩的相关政策,各地方政府也采取一系列紧急救市措施以缓解煤炭行业危机带来的地方经济衰退,然而该问题仍未有效解决。煤炭市场作为市场经济运行体制中一只“看不见的手”,通常无法有效调节其自身缺陷去解决市场失灵问题,而地方政府作为社会经济发展中一只“看得见的手”,究其内在性及决策失败等非市场因素的原因,遏制了市场的调节,没有起到补充市场机制的作用,对煤炭市场干预失灵。本文采用政府干预理论及政府经济学中的市场失灵、过度竞争理论、过度进入、过度投资等基本研究方法为理论基础,从地方政府宏观调控的角度研究我国现阶段的煤炭市场失灵问题。通过分析市场失灵及地方政府宏观调控现状,从地方政府财政问题、官员利益问题、政府职能问题及政策制定问题、中央监管与地方政府行为间博弈等问题分析地方政府宏观调控失败的原因。最后本文从健全政府官员的晋升体制和财政制度,完善中央政府的规制,明确地方政府角色定位三个方面提出缓解煤炭市场失灵问题的具体对策,从而为缓解当前煤炭市场下行等问题做出借鉴,促进煤炭产业及国民经济更好更快的发展。
[Abstract]:The coal industry, as the main basic energy in the industrialization process of our country, is the pillar industry of our national economy and has an important strategic position. It also plays a great role in the rapid development of our country's social economy. However, since the 2008 international financial crisis, the coal industry has also appeared multiple crises, such as coal supply and demand imbalance, coal industry structural overcapacity, oversupply of products, imported coal shocks and a series of increasingly prominent problems. In recent years, China has continuously issued a series of policies to curb overcapacity, and local governments have also taken a series of emergency measures to alleviate the local economic recession caused by the coal industry crisis, but the problem has not yet been effectively solved. As an invisible hand in the market economy system, the coal market is usually unable to effectively adjust its own defects to solve the market failure problem, while the local government, as a "visible hand" in the development of social economy, is unable to effectively adjust its own defects to solve the problem of market failure. The reasons of non-market factors, such as its inherent nature and the failure of decision making, have restrained the adjustment of the market, failed to supplement the market mechanism and failed to intervene in the coal market. Based on the theory of government intervention and the basic research methods of market failure, excessive competition theory, excessive entry and excessive investment in government economics, this paper uses the basic research methods, such as government intervention theory, excessive competition theory, excessive entry and excessive investment, as the theoretical basis. This paper studies the problem of coal market failure in China at present from the angle of local government macro-control. Based on the analysis of market failure and the current situation of local government macro-control, the problems of local government finance, officials' interests, government functions and policy making are discussed. This paper analyzes the reasons for the failure of macro-control of local government, such as game between central supervision and local government. Finally, this paper puts forward concrete countermeasures to alleviate the problem of coal market failure from three aspects: perfecting the promotion system and financial system of government officials, perfecting the regulation of central government, and defining the role of local government. In order to alleviate the current coal market downtrend and other issues to make reference to promote the coal industry and the national economy better and faster development.
【学位授予单位】:内蒙古大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F426.21;D630
本文编号:2262248
[Abstract]:The coal industry, as the main basic energy in the industrialization process of our country, is the pillar industry of our national economy and has an important strategic position. It also plays a great role in the rapid development of our country's social economy. However, since the 2008 international financial crisis, the coal industry has also appeared multiple crises, such as coal supply and demand imbalance, coal industry structural overcapacity, oversupply of products, imported coal shocks and a series of increasingly prominent problems. In recent years, China has continuously issued a series of policies to curb overcapacity, and local governments have also taken a series of emergency measures to alleviate the local economic recession caused by the coal industry crisis, but the problem has not yet been effectively solved. As an invisible hand in the market economy system, the coal market is usually unable to effectively adjust its own defects to solve the market failure problem, while the local government, as a "visible hand" in the development of social economy, is unable to effectively adjust its own defects to solve the problem of market failure. The reasons of non-market factors, such as its inherent nature and the failure of decision making, have restrained the adjustment of the market, failed to supplement the market mechanism and failed to intervene in the coal market. Based on the theory of government intervention and the basic research methods of market failure, excessive competition theory, excessive entry and excessive investment in government economics, this paper uses the basic research methods, such as government intervention theory, excessive competition theory, excessive entry and excessive investment, as the theoretical basis. This paper studies the problem of coal market failure in China at present from the angle of local government macro-control. Based on the analysis of market failure and the current situation of local government macro-control, the problems of local government finance, officials' interests, government functions and policy making are discussed. This paper analyzes the reasons for the failure of macro-control of local government, such as game between central supervision and local government. Finally, this paper puts forward concrete countermeasures to alleviate the problem of coal market failure from three aspects: perfecting the promotion system and financial system of government officials, perfecting the regulation of central government, and defining the role of local government. In order to alleviate the current coal market downtrend and other issues to make reference to promote the coal industry and the national economy better and faster development.
【学位授予单位】:内蒙古大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F426.21;D630
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