不同市场结构下质量规制与价格规制的社会福利效应分析

发布时间：2018-11-11 14:41

【摘要】：经济规制源于外部性、内部性、市场进入壁垒与市场势力等导致的市场失灵,经济规制的主要目标是纠正市场失灵,提高资源配置效率,增进社会福利。质量规制和价格规制是经济规制政策中两个重要的规制手段。然而,经济规制目标的实现取决于经济规制政策的实施效果,因此通过规制影响评价的研究来分析经济规制政策的实施效果,从而提高规制实施质量就显得尤为重要。论文基于中国国情,从不同市场结构的角度,研究了质量规制和价格规制的社会福利效应。其中,以食品行业为例研究了最低质量标准规制,以医疗服务市场为例研究了价格规制,并将政企行为纳入了研究框架对最低质量标准规制的研究进行了拓展。论文首先通过构建数理模型分别在竞争市场和垄断市场下研究最低质量标准规制介入前后,市场平均产品质量水平和社会福利效应的变化,对比分析不同市场结构对于最低质量标准阈值以及社会福利的影响。随后,将政府和企业的行为逻辑纳入博弈模型,对垄断市场下的最低质量标准规制进行了拓展研究,对比分析政府完全执行规制政策、政府不完全执行规制政策、政府与企业共谋三种情形下的市场均衡结果,剖析政府规制执行行为和企业遵从行为影响最低质量标准规制实施效果的机理。最后,结合我国医疗卫生改革的基本制度,采用Hotelling模型来研究医疗服务市场的价格规制,对比分析“政府单一化模式”、“完全市场化模式”和“多元化竞争模式”下的医疗服务市场均衡结果,以社会福利水平最大化为标准提出医疗服务市场结构优化的路径。论文研究结果表明:(1)最低质量标准规制提高了社会福利水平,但是在不同的市场结构中效应不同,政府应根据消费者和市场结构的特征,有针对性地制定适合的最低质量标准规制政策;(2)政府的规制执行和企业的遵从行为共同决定着最低质量标准规制的实施效果,政府不完全执行规制政策和企业的不遵从行为都会给社会福利造成损失;(3)单纯依靠价格规制或是完全放松规制都很难达到预期的规制效果,只有在充分发挥价格规制和竞争机制各自优势的基础上,通过政府与市场的有机结合,才能较大程度地提高社会福利水平。
[Abstract]:Economic regulation originates from the market failure caused by externality, internality, market barriers and market forces. The main goal of economic regulation is to correct market failure, improve the efficiency of resource allocation and promote social welfare. Quality regulation and price regulation are two important means of regulation in economic regulation policy. However, the realization of the goal of economic regulation depends on the effect of the implementation of economic regulation policy, so it is very important to analyze the effect of economic regulation policy through the research of regulation impact evaluation, so as to improve the quality of regulation implementation. Based on the situation of China, the social welfare effects of quality regulation and price regulation are studied from the perspective of different market structures. Among them, the food industry as an example to study the minimum quality standard regulation, the medical service market as an example to study the price regulation, and the government and enterprise behavior into the framework of the research on the minimum quality standard regulation has been expanded. Firstly, the paper studies the changes of market average product quality level and social welfare effect before and after the intervention of minimum quality standard regulation in competitive market and monopoly market by constructing mathematical models. The effects of different market structures on minimum quality threshold and social welfare are analyzed. Then, the behavior logic of government and enterprise is brought into the game model, and the regulation of minimum quality standard in monopoly market is studied. The comparison and analysis of the government's complete implementation of regulatory policy, the government's incomplete implementation of regulatory policy. The market equilibrium results of government and enterprise collusion are analyzed, and the mechanism of government regulation enforcement behavior and enterprise compliance behavior affecting the effect of minimum quality standard regulation is analyzed. Finally, combining with the basic system of health care reform in our country, we adopt Hotelling model to study the price regulation of medical service market, and compare and analyze the "government unifying mode". The equilibrium result of medical service market under "complete marketization mode" and "pluralistic competition mode" is put forward according to the criterion of maximization of social welfare level, and the way to optimize the market structure of medical service is put forward. The results show that: (1) the minimum quality standard regulation has improved the social welfare level, but the effect in different market structure is different, the government should according to the characteristics of consumer and market structure. To formulate appropriate minimum quality standard regulation policy; (2) the enforcement of government regulation and the compliance behavior of enterprises jointly determine the implementation effect of the minimum quality standard regulation, and the failure of the government to implement the regulation policy and the non-compliance behavior of the enterprise will cause losses to social welfare; (3) it is difficult to achieve the expected regulatory effect by simply relying on price regulation or completely relaxing regulation, only on the basis of giving full play to the respective advantages of price regulation and competition mechanism, through the organic combination of government and market. In order to raise the level of social welfare to a greater extent.
【学位授予单位】：江南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D632.1

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