公共服务“逆市场化”问题研究
发布时间：2018-12-15 14:02
【摘要】：20世纪90年代后,西方国家的市场化发展速度渐趋缓和,并出现了“逆市场化”现象,即政府部门收回外包的公共服务自主经营的现象,进入了后市场化时代。而这一现象近年来在我国的公共服务市场化改革中也出现了。考察这一现象,对我国公共服务市场化改革具有重要的战略意义。本文通过考察D县污水处理厂“逆向合同外包”的过程发现:交易成本和官僚组织中的激励结构是“逆市场化”的主要原因,而政府官僚组织的激励结构起着更为基础性的作用。虽然市场化在一定程度上可以摆脱自主经营的内部生产成本,但它同样也会带来额外的交易成本。如果不能发展出降低交易成本的有效机制,政府部门就有可能做出“逆市场化”的政策选择。但相较于私企的管理者,政府部门的管理者并不会那么关心成本问题。基层政府官员的行为在很大程度上是对其所在环境和制度的投影,政府官僚组织的激励结构影响了他们的制度选择行为。在D县污水处理厂“逆市场化”案例中,从微观层面上看,D县政府部门基层官员的行为选择受到了组织内部绩效激励的影响;从宏观层面上看,无论是D县地方政府选择引进民间资本进行外包经营,还是选择收回外包自主经营,组织内部的财政激励是隐藏在政府行为背后的最重要的因素。而交易成本正是建立在这样的激励结构基础上才发挥作用。因此基层官员的财政激励结构是影响“逆市场化”这一行为的关键。
[Abstract]:After the 1990s, the speed of the western countries' market-oriented development was gradually relaxed, and the phenomenon of "counter-marketization" appeared, that is, the government took back the self-management of the outsourced public services, and entered the post-market-oriented era. In recent years, this phenomenon has also appeared in the reform of public service marketization. The investigation of this phenomenon is of great strategic significance to the market-oriented reform of public service in China. By investigating the process of "reverse contract outsourcing" in county D sewage treatment plant, this paper finds that transaction cost and incentive structure in bureaucracy are the main reasons of "reverse marketization". The incentive structure of the government bureaucracy plays a more basic role. Although marketization can get rid of the internal production cost of independent operation to some extent, it will also bring extra transaction cost. If we fail to develop an effective mechanism to reduce transaction costs, government departments may make "counter-market" policy choices. But government managers are less concerned about costs than private managers. To a large extent, the behavior of grass-roots government officials is the projection of their environment and system, and the incentive structure of government bureaucracy affects their institutional choice behavior. In the case of "inverse marketization" of county D sewage treatment plant, from the micro level, the behavior choice of grass-roots officials in D county government department is affected by the internal performance incentive of the organization. From the macro level, whether it is the D county local governments choose to introduce private capital for outsourcing operations, or choose to withdraw outsourcing autonomy, the financial incentives within the organization is the most important factor hidden behind the government behavior. The transaction cost is based on this incentive structure to play a role. Therefore, the financial incentive structure of grassroots officials is the key to the anti-market behavior.
【学位授予单位】：华侨大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D630
本文编号：2380785
[Abstract]:After the 1990s, the speed of the western countries' market-oriented development was gradually relaxed, and the phenomenon of "counter-marketization" appeared, that is, the government took back the self-management of the outsourced public services, and entered the post-market-oriented era. In recent years, this phenomenon has also appeared in the reform of public service marketization. The investigation of this phenomenon is of great strategic significance to the market-oriented reform of public service in China. By investigating the process of "reverse contract outsourcing" in county D sewage treatment plant, this paper finds that transaction cost and incentive structure in bureaucracy are the main reasons of "reverse marketization". The incentive structure of the government bureaucracy plays a more basic role. Although marketization can get rid of the internal production cost of independent operation to some extent, it will also bring extra transaction cost. If we fail to develop an effective mechanism to reduce transaction costs, government departments may make "counter-market" policy choices. But government managers are less concerned about costs than private managers. To a large extent, the behavior of grass-roots government officials is the projection of their environment and system, and the incentive structure of government bureaucracy affects their institutional choice behavior. In the case of "inverse marketization" of county D sewage treatment plant, from the micro level, the behavior choice of grass-roots officials in D county government department is affected by the internal performance incentive of the organization. From the macro level, whether it is the D county local governments choose to introduce private capital for outsourcing operations, or choose to withdraw outsourcing autonomy, the financial incentives within the organization is the most important factor hidden behind the government behavior. The transaction cost is based on this incentive structure to play a role. Therefore, the financial incentive structure of grassroots officials is the key to the anti-market behavior.
【学位授予单位】：华侨大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D630
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