实际权力结构与地方政府行为:理论模型与实证研究

发布时间：2019-01-14 07:02

【摘要】：本文研究了地方政府内部利益分化和实际权力结构对于政府行为的影响。我们首先构建了一个政府内存在分工时的最优授权模型,推导出部门间的利益偏差会扭曲政府政策,而实际权力结构会放大效率损失。基于省委常委会内部组成情况,我们构建了利益分化指标来衡量地方领导班子内部的利益偏差和实际权力结构。基于1992—2011年的省级面板数据的实证研究表明,平均而言,如果省委常委会分化指标增加1个标准差,则次年该省公共部门人员规模增加1%,民营经济投资降低4.4个百分点,同时,次年该省土地违法面积增加12.5%。这表明利益分化通过实际权力结构使政府行为和政策更加偏向"内部人",导致政府从市场经济中攫取更多资源,降低了资源配置效率。因此,加强制度建设,约束政府权力,促进决策过程的公开透明是全面深化改革,推动经济发展的需要。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the influence of internal interest differentiation and actual power structure of local government on government behavior. Firstly, we construct an optimal delegation model with the division of labor in government, and deduce that the deviation of interest between departments will distort government policy, and the actual power structure will enlarge the loss of efficiency. Based on the internal composition of the standing Committee of the Provincial CPC Committee, we have constructed the benefit differentiation index to measure the deviation of interests and the actual power structure within the local leadership. Empirical research based on provincial panel data from 1992 to 2011 shows that, on average, if the differentiation index of the standing Committee of the provincial party committee increases by one standard deviation, the size of the provincial public sector personnel will increase by 1 percent the following year. Private economic investment dropped 4.4 percent, and the illegal land area in the province increased by 12.5 percent the following year. This indicates that the differentiation of interests makes the government's behavior and policy more inclined to the "insiders" through the actual power structure, which leads the government to grab more resources from the market economy and reduce the efficiency of resource allocation. Therefore, it is necessary to deepen the reform and promote the economic development by strengthening the system construction, restricting the government power and promoting the openness and transparency of the decision-making process.
【作者单位】：中山大学中国公共管理研究中心、政治与公共事务管理学院;中南财经政法大学文澜学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金2015年青年科学基金项目(基金项目号:71503208)的资助
【分类号】：D630

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