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政策执行中乡镇政府的自主性研究

发布时间:2019-06-08 19:10
【摘要】:随着行政分权体制与财税体制的改革,地方政府在管理社会公共事务上的权力也逐渐扩大,其自主性空间也日益扩大。一方面,地方政府自主权的扩大确实能够充分刺激地方政府的积极性与能动性,促进地方经济增长与地方其他事务的发展;另一方面,地方政府自主权的扩大使地方政府发展成为具有自主意志的利益主体,容易异化为损害公共利益的力量。地方政府的行为活动特别是乡镇政府的行为活动集中表现为公共政策的执行,乡镇政府处于公共政策执行链条的末端,几乎没有什么政策决策的权力,然而由于政策执行链条漫长带来的政策传递问题、政策环境无时不刻处于变动之中,政策目标的完美实现在一定程度上依赖于乡镇政府政策执行的有效性与回应性。因此,政策执行中乡镇政府的问题就是其自主性的约束与激励问题。本文想要探讨的问题是在具体的政策执行过程中,乡镇政府的自主性空间究竟有多大?其约束机制与激励机制是什么,即上级政府对乡镇政府的自主性采取了何种约束措施和激励措施?是什么原因使得出现这样的约束机制和激励机制?有什么地方可以改进的?本文主要在考察政策执行和地方政府自主性的相关研究文献的基础上,从政策执行者的角度来看,认为政策执行至少包括三个方面的内容:第一,未出现预见之外的情况,诚实地执行政策;第二,出现预见之外的情况,转化为问题的分析者,界定问题并解决问题;第三,政策执行者缺乏必要的知识与能力时,确保"信息向上"流动。将地方政府自主性界定为"拥有相对独立利益结构的地方政府,按照自己的意志自我设计、自我管理、自我发展的能力及其活动",具有"独立性"和"创新性"的双重特征。文章第三部分通过对人的本质分析,指出地方政府自主性具有"善"与"恶"二重性,政策执行中的执行主体问题就是其自主性的约束与激励问题,并得出这样一个结论:政策执行中乡镇政府自主性的应然逻辑就是强约束与强激励,即强约束能够有效遏制乡镇政府自主性"恶"的一面,强激励能够有效张扬乡镇政府自主性"善"的一面,强约束与强激励的合力能促进政策目标的有效实现。文章第四部分则以新村基础设施建设为例,分析政策执行中乡镇政府自主性的约束机制与激励机制,认为乡镇政府的自主性空间还是比较大的,对其的约束机制主要从横向和纵向两个维度来考察,横向约束机制包括召开村民代表大会、成立监督委员会以及实行公告公示制度。纵向约束机制包括财政限制、明确完成时限和任务指标、考核验收三个方面;对其的激励机制则主要包括以奖代补和资金分配承诺、表彰奖励两个方面。总体上,乡镇政府自主性的约束机制与激励机制存在"约束形式多样、约束效果不强"、"激励途径偏少、激励效果欠佳"的问题。第五部分则在政策执行中乡镇政府自主性的现状阐释分析的基础上,提出相关建议。在约束机制上:第一,基于地区的共性,尽量缩减政策执行主体的自主性空间,建立起"原则性要求—强制性规定—禁止性规定"三位一体的约束机制;第二,从政策执行时期上,建立起执行前期方案审核、中期检查、后期考核验收的约束机制;第三,从政策执行内容上,建立其财政控制与事务执行质量并重的约束机制。在激励机制上:第一,树立对具体政策执行的激励理念,完善对成员个体的激励机制;第二,在政治激励上,建立职务晋升机制与专业人才的层级流动机制;第三,在经济激励上,可以引入企业激励手段,给予一定的物质激励。
[Abstract]:With the reform of the administrative decentralization system and the fiscal and taxation system, the power of the local government to manage the public affairs of the society is also gradually expanded, and the autonomous space of the local government is also expanding. On the one hand, the expansion of local government's autonomy can fully stimulate the initiative and initiative of local governments, and promote the development of local economic growth and local other affairs; on the other hand, the expansion of local government ownership has made local government develop into the main body of interest with independent will, It is easy to dissimilate to the power of harm to the public interest. The activities of the local government, in particular the government's activities, are focused on the implementation of the public policy. The government is at the end of the public policy implementation chain, and has little power to make policy decisions. However, the policy implementation chain is a long-term policy delivery problem. The perfect realization of the policy objective depends to some extent on the effectiveness and responsiveness of the implementation of the government's policy. Therefore, the problem of the government in the implementation of the policy is the restraint and incentive problem of its autonomy. What is the problem of the government's autonomy in the process of specific policy implementation? What is the restraint mechanism and the incentive mechanism, that is, what kind of restraint measures and incentive measures are taken by the higher-level government to the government's autonomy? What causes such restraint mechanisms and incentives? Where can I improve it? On the basis of examining the relevant research literature of policy enforcement and local government autonomy, this paper, from the point of view of the policy implementer, is of the opinion that the policy implementation includes at least three aspects: the first, the unforeseeable circumstances and the honest implementation of the policy; and secondly, In addition to the unforeseen circumstances, the author of the problem is transformed into a problem and the problem is defined and the problem is solved; and thirdly, when the policy executor lacks the necessary knowledge and capability, the "information up" is ensured to flow. The local government's autonomy is defined as the "Local governments with relatively independent interests, self-designed, self-managing, self-developed, and their activities in accordance with their will" and has the dual characteristics of the "independence" and the "innovativeness". The third part of the article, through the analysis of the human nature, points out that the local government's autonomy has the "good" and the "evil" duality, and the main problem in the implementation of the policy is the restraint and the incentive problem of its autonomy, and the conclusion is drawn: The independent logic of the government's autonomy in the implementation of the policy is the strong restriction and strong incentive, that is, the strong restraint can effectively restrain the one side of the autonomous "evil" of the government, and the strong incentive can effectively publicize the one side of the autonomous "good" of the government. The combination of strong and strong incentive can promote the effective realization of policy objectives. The fourth part of the article, taking the construction of the new village infrastructure as an example, analyzes the restraint mechanism and the incentive mechanism of the government's autonomy in the implementation of the policy. The lateral restraint mechanism includes the holding of the villagers' congress, the establishment of the supervision committee and the implementation of the public announcement system. The mechanism of the longitudinal restraint includes the financial limitation, the clear completion time limit and the task index, the examination and acceptance of the three aspects, and the incentive mechanism to the system mainly includes the commitment of the award and the fund distribution, and the recognition of the two aspects. In general, there are the "The constraints are diverse, and the constraint effect is not strong." and the "less incentive means and poor incentive effect" of the restraint mechanism and the incentive mechanism of the government's autonomy. The fifth part, based on the analysis of the present state of government autonomy in the implementation of the policy, puts forward relevant suggestions. in that constraint mechanism, the first, base on the commonness of the region, reduce the autonomous space of the main body of the policy as much as possible, establish a three-in-one constraint mechanism of the mandatory provision of the principle of principle, and the second, from the time of policy execution, establish a pre-implementation plan review and a medium-term check, The third part, on the content of the policy implementation, establishes the constraint mechanism of the financial control and the execution quality of the transaction. On the incentive mechanism, the first is to set up the incentive concept for the implementation of the specific policies and to improve the incentive mechanism for the individual members; secondly, on the political incentive, the mechanism of post promotion and the level flow mechanism of the professionals should be established; and thirdly, on the economic incentive, the enterprise incentive means can be introduced. A certain material stimulus is given.
【学位授予单位】:南京大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D63

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