上市公司资本结构与产品市场竞争契约理论研究

发布时间：2017-12-31 14:33

本文关键词：上市公司资本结构与产品市场竞争契约理论研究　出处：《燕山大学》2012年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现代契约理论，以新古典契约理论与现实不一致的假设条件入手，通过引入信息不对称、有限理性和不完全竞争假设，由外生转向内生性研究范式。在此背景下的资本结构理论，也由注重税收、破产因素的现代资本结构理论体系，发展为以公司契约缔结体中股东、经理及债权人之间代理冲突为核心的新资本结构理论体系。资本结构的产品市场竞争理论，作为新体系的一个重要分支，以公司资本结构决策与公司产品市场竞争决策的互动关系为主线，将资本结构的代理冲突问题反映到产品市场，开辟资本结构影响企业价值的新渠道，成为资本结构契约理论的前沿领域。但目前对该领域的研究，尚需理论基础的分析和实证检验的丰富。有鉴于此，本文致力于这一互动关系的实质，通过理论模型构建及相应的实证分析，试图对我国上市公司的实际，做出合理的解释，提供理论指导。在文献研究的基础上，本文指出资本结构与产品市场竞争产生联系的契约理论基础，即以企业契约属性为基础，以股东价值最大化为目标，反映现代契约理论的委托代理和控制权转移思想，是资本结构代理成本理论在企业产品市场的延伸。本文分别从产品市场竞争、资本结构以及代理冲突三个角度考察资本结构与产品市场竞争的互动关系。首先，建立资本结构决策弹性期权模型，新“优序”融资理论合理解释了我国上市公司股权融资偏好行为，线性固定效应回归结果支持了模型结论，非线性回归结果则进一步表明，不同行业产品市场竞争因素对资本结构决策的作用程度不同，是融资弹性和融资成本权衡的结果；其次，延伸产品市场竞争资本结构理论的B-L经典模型，建立长期负债需求不确定条件联立方程，相应的实证结果表明，长期负债融资能够强化上市公司价格竞争能力，并通过价格与产量间的正向传递关系，同时强化其产量竞争能力，从而成为缓解煤炭行业过度竞争问题的新思路；最后，兼顾公司股东与债权人以及公司股东与经理间两类冲突，，建立资本结构双重效应模型，引入交叉项的实证研究表明，资本结构与产品市场竞争及其互动关系都对公司代理成本具有重要影响，互动关系中，公司股权集中度越高，产品市场竞争的激励效果越弱，产品市场竞争与股权代理成本互补而与负债代理成本替代，结论对我国上市公司治理改革的实践具有重要理论指导作用。资本结构与产品市场竞争联系的实质是代理冲突，契约冲突理论与转轨经济制度背景下的我国上市公司实际相联系，对企业行为、行业及公司治理问题进行了深刻剖析，给出了增加企业价值及深化市场体制改革的理论指导和政策建议，丰富了资本结构与产品市场竞争领域的研究。
[Abstract]:The modern contract theory starts with the assumption that the neoclassical contract theory is inconsistent with the reality, and introduces the hypothesis of information asymmetry, limited rationality and incomplete competition. From exogenous to endogenous research paradigm, the capital structure theory under this background has also developed from the modern capital structure theory system, which focuses on taxation and bankruptcy factors, to shareholders in the conclusion of corporate contract. The new capital structure theory system with agency conflict between manager and creditor as the core. As an important branch of the new system, the theory of product market competition of capital structure is based on the interactive relationship between corporate capital structure decision and product market competition decision. The agency conflict of capital structure is reflected in the product market, and the new channel of capital structure affecting the value of enterprise is opened up, which becomes the frontier field of capital structure contract theory. In view of this, this article devotes to the essence of this interactive relationship, through the theoretical model construction and the corresponding empirical analysis, attempts to our country listed company's reality. Make reasonable explanation and provide theoretical guidance. On the basis of literature research, this paper points out that capital structure and product market competition produce the contract theory basis, that is, based on the enterprise contract attributes, with shareholder value maximization as the goal. The principal-agent theory and the transfer of control rights, which reflect the modern contract theory, are the extension of the capital structure agency cost theory in the enterprise product market. This paper examines the interaction between capital structure and product market competition from the perspectives of product market competition, capital structure and agency conflict. Firstly, a capital structure decision elastic option model is established. The new "superior order" financing theory reasonably explains the stock financing preference behavior of listed companies in China. The linear fixed effect regression results support the conclusion of the model, and the nonlinear regression results further show that. The competition factors of product market in different industries play a different role in capital structure decision, which is the result of financing elasticity and financing cost tradeoff. Secondly, the B-L classical model of competitive capital structure theory in product market is extended to establish the simultaneous equation of uncertain conditions of long-term debt demand, and the corresponding empirical results show that. Long-term debt financing can strengthen the price competitiveness of listed companies, and through the positive transfer relationship between price and output, at the same time, strengthen their production competitiveness. Therefore, it becomes a new way to alleviate the excessive competition in coal industry. Finally, considering the conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and between shareholders and managers, a dual effect model of capital structure is established. Capital structure and product market competition as well as their interaction have an important impact on the agency cost. In the interactive relationship, the higher the concentration of corporate equity, the weaker the incentive effect of product market competition. The product market competition and equity agency cost complement each other and replace the debt agency cost. The conclusion has an important theoretical guidance function to the practice of listed company governance reform in our country. The essence of the relationship between capital structure and product market competition is agency conflict. The theory of contract conflict is related to the actual situation of listed companies in China under the background of transitional economic system. The problems of industry and corporate governance are deeply analyzed, and the theoretical guidance and policy suggestions for increasing the value of enterprises and deepening the reform of market system are given, which enriches the research on the field of capital structure and product market competition.
【学位授予单位】：燕山大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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