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我国上市公司股权激励绩效实证研究

发布时间:2018-01-02 18:11

  本文关键词:我国上市公司股权激励绩效实证研究 出处:《山东农业大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 上市公司 股权激励 事件研究法 绩效


【摘要】:股权激励制度是解决现代企业委托与代理关系的重要途径,它有助于解决股东与经营者的代理问题,促使公司管理层规避短期行为而使其更多地关注公司的长期持续发展。根据现代激励理论,股权激励是一种有效的长期激励方式,是适合现代企业长期发展的激励手段。在国外成熟市场,股权激励是促进公司经营者与股东形成利益共同体的有力手段。但是,由于我国市场经济所处的阶段不同,这种激励机制在我国所面临的环境和条件不同,激励机制所产生的绩效受其所在的环境和条件影响。正是基于这样的思考,本文对我国上市公司股权激励的绩效进行了实证研究。 本文以2006年至2010年之间实施股权激励的我国上市公司为研究对象,旨在通过实证研究揭示我国上市公司股权激励的市场绩效和业绩绩效。首先,采用了事件研究法来研究我国上市公司股权激励的市场绩效。其次,选取反映上市公司经营业绩全貌的营运能力、发展能力、偿债能力和盈利能力的财务指标,利用SPSS软件进行因子分析,得到一个综合反映公司经营业绩的指标,以此作为因变量表示股权激励业绩绩效,以企业用于股权激励的股份比例作为自变量来进行线性回归研究股权激励的业绩绩效。 本文的研究结果表明:我国上市公司股权激励的市场绩效并不显著,,并且对经营业绩无明显的改善。股权激励在事件日有短暂的超额收益率,但仅在股权激励事件日当日产生了积极的市场绩效;而且,实行股权激励后,上市公司的经营业绩并无显著的变化,公司的经营业绩未得到明显的改善。 通过实证分析结果可见,我国的上市公司在制定经营者股权激励计划过程中确实还存在一些问题。针对这些问题,本文最后提出了完善上市公司经营者股权激励公司内部环境和改善公司外部环境方面的建议。 本文共八章,各章主要内容如下: 第一章引言。介绍了本文的选题背景及意义,回顾了该领域国内外相关的研究文献,并简要概述了本文的主要研究内容、研究框架以及采用的研究方法。 第二章理论研究部分。该部分首先对包括委托代理理论和人力资本理论等在内的股权激励相关理论基础进行了回顾,为后续实证研究树立理论框架。其次,介绍了股权激励相关基本概念,并介绍了股权激励的方式。 第三章我国上市公司实施股权激励的制度背景及现状分析。首先展示了我国上市公司实施股权激励的制度背景;其次对我国已推出股权激励方案的上市公司进行总体考察,包括我国上市公司已推出股权激励方案在不同年份的统计、所处的行业分布、公司的类型、股权激励方式的选择、股权激励股票的来源及其实施股权激励的力度。 第四章股权激励绩效的度量及评价方法。首先介绍了股权激励绩效的度量标准,包括抽象的、无法量化的标准和实际的、可以量化的标准两类;其次介绍股权激励绩效的度量标准选择,绩效评价的常用方法包括托宾Q值法、经济增加值法、平衡积分卡法、财务指标法;最终选择财务指标法作为本文的绩效评价方法。 第五章我国上市公司股权激励的市场绩效。首先介绍了事件研究法的研究方法,其次介绍了事件研究法的具体步骤:第一,定义事件与时间窗口。第二,构造样本。第三,正常收益模型的介绍。第四,计算超额收益率与累积超额收益率。最终得出实证结果为市场对股权激励计划的实施的反应总体上是不显著的,即认为实施股权激励计划的公司并不能对其公司股价产生明显积极的作用,投资于该类公司并不能够获得一定的超额收益。同时也说明了投资者对于上市公司实施股权激励的反应并不一致,市场对推出股权激励计划的公司的反应并不是很积极。 第六章我国上市公司股权激励的业绩绩效。该部分首先选取了能够反映上市公司盈利能力、偿债能力、成长能力、资产运营能力的四个方面八个财务指标作为因子分析的起点。然后运用因子分析法得出衡量企业的业绩绩效的综合因子。本文以上市公司业绩指标的综合因子得分作为因变量,以用于激励的股份占总股本的比例为自变量,采用一元回归分析模型进行回归分析。得出我国上市公司业绩绩效和股权激励并不相关。 第七章结论与建议。提出了建立健全股权激励公司内部环境的建议和建立健全股权激励公司外部环境的建议,得出了我国上市公司股权激励的市场绩效不显著,并且对经营业绩无明显的改善的研究结果。最后提出了论文的进一步的研究方向。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive system is an important way to solve the modern enterprise principal-agent relationship, it is helpful to solve the agency problem between shareholders and operators, prompting the short-term actions of managers to pay more attention to the company's long-term sustainable development. According to the modern incentive theory, stock ownership incentive is an effective long-term incentive mode is for the long-term development of the modern enterprises incentive means. In the mature foreign markets, equity incentive is a powerful means of promoting the interests of the community, shareholders and managers. However, due to China's market economy at different stages, this kind of incentive mechanism in our country faces different environments and conditions, from the incentive system performance influence of the environment and conditions. It is based on this thinking, this paper on China's listed companies equity incentive performance by empirical research.
The implementation of equity incentive of Listed Companies in China from 2006 to 2010 this paper as the research object, through empirical research reveals the equity incentive of Listed Companies in China market performance and performance. First, using the event study method to study the listed company's equity incentive market performance. Secondly, selected to reflect the performance of listed companies. The operation ability, development ability, financial solvency and profitability index, factor analysis by SPSS software, get the operating performance of a comprehensive reflection of the company's index as the dependent variables are expressed in the performance of equity incentive, equity incentive for enterprises the proportion of shares as independent variables to the linear regression analysis of equity incentive performance.
The results of this study show that: the equity incentive of Listed Companies in China market performance is not significant, and there is no obvious improvement of business performance. In the event of equity incentive on transient excess return, but only in the equity incentive event day had a positive market performance; moreover, the implementation of equity incentive of listed companies after the change the operating results are significant, the company's operating performance has not been significantly improved.
Through the empirical analysis shows that China's Listed Companies in the formulation of executive equity incentive plan in the process there still exist some problems. To solve these problems, this paper finally puts forward suggestions of listed companies and improve the company's internal environment, the external environment is proposed.
This paper consists of eight chapters. The main contents of the chapters are as follows:
The first chapter is introduction. It introduces the background and significance of this topic, reviews the related research literatures in the field, and briefly summarizes the main research contents, research framework and research methods.
Part of the second chapter. The first part including the theory of principal-agent theory and human capital theory, equity incentive related theories are reviewed, establish a theoretical framework for the following empirical research. Secondly, introduces the basic concepts related to equity incentive, and introduces the way of equity incentives.
Analysis of institutional background and current situation of implementing equity incentive of Listed Companies in China. The third chapter first introduces the institutional background of Chinese Listed Companies in the implementation of equity incentive; secondly, the overall inspection of China has launched equity incentive plan in listed companies, including listed companies in our country have been pushed out of equity incentive programs in statistics in different years, the distribution of the industry, company type, equity incentive options, equity incentive stock sources and the implementation of equity incentive efforts.
The fourth chapter equity incentive effectiveness measurement and evaluation methods. First introduced the measure of equity incentive performance, including abstract, unable to quantify the standard and actual, measurable standard for class two; followed by the introduction of equity incentive performance metrics selection, commonly used methods of performance evaluation include Tobin Q value method, economic value added method, the balanced scorecard method, financial index method; finally choose financial index as the performance evaluation method in this paper.
The fifth chapter of equity incentive of Listed Companies in China market performance. First introduced the research method of the event study method, then introduces the specific steps of the method of event study: first, the definition of event and time window. Second, third. The sample structure, introducing the normal revenue model. Fourth, calculate the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return the empirical results obtained. Finally the overall implementation of the market reaction for the equity incentive plan on is not significant, that the implementation of equity incentive plan of the company does not have a positive effect on the company's share price, investment in the company is not able to obtain a certain excess returns. At the same time also shows that the implementation of equity incentive for investors the reaction of listed companies are not the same, the market to launch equity incentive plan of the company's response is not very positive.
The sixth chapter of equity incentive of Listed Companies in China. The first part of the performance is selected that can reflect the profitability of listed companies, debt paying ability, growth ability, analysis ability of asset operation starting point in four aspects of the eight financial indicators as the factors. Then use the comprehensive factor analysis method to get a measure of the performance of enterprises based on performance. Comprehensive factor score of listed company performance indicators as the dependent variable, for incentive shares in the proportion of the total share capital as independent variables, using a regression analysis model for regression analysis. The performance of Chinese listed companies performance and equity incentive are not related.
The conclusion and suggestion. The seventh chapter proposed to establish equity incentive company internal environment to establish and perfect the equity incentive proposals and the external environment of the company, the equity incentive of Listed Companies in China market performance is not significant, the results of research and substantial improvement in the performance. Finally, the further research direction of the thesis presents.

【学位授予单位】:山东农业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F272.92;F832.51;F224

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