我国上市公司股权激励方式选择的影响因素研究

发布时间：2018-01-08 05:09

本文关键词：我国上市公司股权激励方式选择的影响因素研究　出处：《湖南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国经济高速发展，现代公司制度建立，企业所有权与经营权分离导致的代理问题日益严重。起源于上世纪50年代的股权激励制度，历经几十年的发展，证明能够对管理层起到长期激励作用，，已成为激励代理人的行为与委托人利益一致、调和委托人和代理人两权分离矛盾的有效手段。在我国证券市场日臻成熟的今天，已有越来越多的上市公司进行股权激励，运用最多的是股票期权和限制性股票这两种激励方式。本文主要研究股票期权和限制性股票这两种股权激励方式，比较了股票期权和限制性股票的制度异同，选取2010年1月1日至2013年2月28日我国公布过股权激励预案的上市公司为样本，建立logistic模型，分析了各种公司特征变量对股权激励标的选择倾向变量的影响，发现企业成长性、企业盈利情况是影响股权激励方式选择的主要因素，高成长性、盈利情况好的企业，分别以显著性水平5%和10%倾向于选择股票期权方式；企业现金流动性、行业性质、控股股东性质、高管年龄与高管持股比例对企业选择股权激励方式的影响不显著；企业现金流动性高、国有企业更倾向于选择股票期权的激励方式，但并不显著。股权集中度、独立董事比例、董事长与总经理兼任与否这三个公司治理特征对企业选择股权激励方式的影响不显著。因此，为充分发挥股权激励的激励作用，企业应优化股权结构，加强独立董事和监事会对股权激励的监督制衡，并设置专门的薪酬委员会，结合实际，选择恰当的股权激励方式，形成企业特有的激励模式，并逐步扩大企业股权激励的接受面。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of our economy, the establishment of modern company system, the agency problem caused by the separation of enterprise ownership and management rights is becoming more and more serious. The equity incentive system, which originated in -50s, has experienced decades of development. Proved to be able to play a long-term incentive role to the management, has become an incentive agent behavior consistent with the interests of the principal. The effective means of reconciling the contradiction between the principal and the agent. Nowadays, more and more listed companies have carried out equity incentive in the stock market of our country. Stock options and restricted stocks are the two most widely used incentive methods. This paper mainly studies the stock option and restricted stock, and compares the institutional similarities and differences between stock option and restricted stock. From January 1st 2010 to February 28th 2013, the listed companies with stock incentive plan were selected as samples, and the logistic model was established. This paper analyzes the influence of various company characteristic variables on the choice tendency variable of the stock right incentive target, and finds that the growth of the enterprise and the profit of the enterprise are the main factors affecting the choice of the equity incentive mode, and the high growth is the main factor. Enterprises with good profitability tend to choose stock options with significant levels of 5% and 10% respectively; The cash liquidity, industry nature, controlling shareholder nature, senior executive age and the proportion of executive stock ownership have no significant influence on the choice of equity incentive mode. Because of the high cash liquidity, state-owned enterprises prefer to choose the incentive mode of stock option, but it is not significant. The degree of equity concentration, the proportion of independent directors. The three corporate governance characteristics of chairman and general manager have no significant influence on the choice of equity incentive. Therefore, in order to give full play to the incentive role of equity incentive, enterprises should optimize the ownership structure, strengthen the independent director and board of supervisors of the supervision and balance of equity incentive, and set up a special compensation committee, combined with the reality. Choose the appropriate equity incentive mode, form a unique incentive model, and gradually expand the acceptance of corporate equity incentive.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

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