基于产业政策的分析师盈余预测研究

发布时间：2018-01-15 20:37

本文关键词：基于产业政策的分析师盈余预测研究　出处：《南京大学》2012年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国证券分析师行业经过十几年从无序到有序的发展,在普及市场知识、引导投资理念、推动市场创新等方面发挥了重要作用,证券投资咨询机构在经营方式、管理水平和制度建设等方面取得了很大进步。但是,与发达国家成熟市场相比,中国证券分析师行业总体水平仍然是比较落后的。这主要表现在以下两个方面：(一)在分析手段方面,主要以技术分析手段为主,几乎没有运用理论模型和统计预测等方法；(二)在信息获取方面,中国证券分析师较少直接接触上市公司,如通过公司新闻发布会、电话或走访等方式获取资料。他们更倾向于关注简单易取的公共信息。而在公开信息中,政策信息又是中国证券分析师所专注的重点。那么为什么中国的证券分析师会对政策信息给与如此大的关注?政策信息是如何影响证券分析师的决策与行为?对政策信息的关注如何影响证券分析师的预测业绩?对政策信息的关注又会对证券分析师行为产生怎样的经济后果?本文以产业政策作为切入点,对分析师的盈余预测进行了理论的分析和实证的检验,以期回答上述问题。首先,本文结合中国转型经济下特殊的制度背景,对中国特色产业政策的设立与落实进行了系统的现实回顾,对产业政策在中国的必要性与矛盾性进行了深入的理论探讨。作为经济结构调整主要手段的产业政策,是目前我国政府宏观调控的重要方面。产业政策作为一种高度综合的政策手段,是为实现某种经济和社会目标而制定的有特定产业指向的政策总和。它作为一种间接调控方式,充分结合了计划经济和市场调节的优点,帮助政府实现计划调控大幅缩小情况下的有效宏观调控。由于产业政策对经济发展的作用主要集中于从产业层次促进经济增长,因此,在经济起飞阶段,产业政策的影响力就十分明显,对经济发展的必要性也特别显著,因而在整个政府基本经济政策体系中的地位也就显得颇为重要。另外,在发展中国家经济“起飞”初期,通常遇到基础设施和基础工业等“瓶颈”限制,它们投资大、回收期长,对经济发展有带动作用,这些领域“外部性”明显,靠市场机制难以在短期内解决,需要产业政策的倾斜与支持才能对经济起飞发挥推动作用。然而,由于产业政策具有内在的矛盾性,如促进产业结构高级化与缓解国内就业压力的矛盾、充分发挥本国比较优势与增强国际竞争优势的矛盾、建立相对完整的国民经济体系和积极参与国际分工的矛盾、国内产业政策的倾斜性与国际经济规则要求的公平性之间的矛盾,使得政策制定者往往在两难之间难以取舍,政策左右摇摆,使得产业政策的效应无法得以保证。而在中国“政策市”的背景下,摇摆不定的产业政策对中国证券市场的影响不可忽视,这更促使中国的证券分析师增加了其工作模型中产业政策的权重。其次,本文基于政府行为影响企业行为、企业行为影响企业价值、分析师关注企业价值的逻辑线条对分析师关注产业政策并根据产业政策调整其盈余预测的行为进行了理论分析。政府通过宏观政策以及政府管制等行为对经济的发展进行宏观调控已经是一种普遍存在的现象。事实上,政府对经济生活的干预构成了转型时期我国社会主义市场经济的一个重要特征。而企业作为经济活动的主要参与者,是政府宏观政策、政府管制等手段发挥作用的微观载体。政府通过导向性的政策手段来合理引导企业决策、行为等实际生产运营进而影响企业的就业、产出等经济指标。其中,财政政策主要通过收入、支出工具影响社会总需求和供给,从而影响宏观经济水平,并通过数量和价格两大中间变量影响企业的融资、投资和营运活动,最终影响企业的现金流；货币政策对微观企业的影响主要体现在融资活动方面,包括融资成本和融资规模；产业政策与财政政策、货币政策是并行的政策,均是国家宏观调控的手段和工具。但是,产业政策要点及政策手段中必然要涉及财政政策、货币政策的内容,特别是税收手段和信贷政策。因此,产业政策在某种程度上被看作是税收优惠、财政补贴等政府行为在某一产业的具体落实,从而影响企业行为；与此同时,企业行为与企业价值间确实存在着错综复杂的关系和影响机制。进一步的,由于各类政府行为在多方面对微观企业行为产生重要价值,那么包括宏观政策、直接管制在内的政府行为必然会由此影响企业价值。因而政府行为与公司价值之间具有逻辑上的内在关联,而作为最为关注企业价值的人群之一的证券分析师将政策研究作为研究中国市场的重要内容。然后,本文通过实证检验对以上理论进行了检验。本文使用2006年至2010年五年的数据作为研究样本,以产业政策作为解释变量对分析师盈余预测进行了一系列研究。研究结论表明,分析师在做盈余预测时,对有产业政策的公司给与了极大的关注,说明产业政策是分析师工作模型中的重要输入内容；但是,虽然分析师更喜欢跟踪有产业政策的公司并更为频繁的出具盈余预测报告,但是他们的盈余预测偏差却更大,具有明显的乐观性倾向,说明分析师的输出内容并不有效。究其原因,是因为分析师为了获取很多的佣金收入而刺激更大的交易量,所以分析师更有动机去跟踪那些有政策的公司。研究结论表明,中国证券分析师偏向选择跟踪有产业政策的公司,并对该类公司出具明显偏正的乐观性盈余预测报告,以刺激该类公司产生相对更大的交易量,从而获取更多的佣金收益。这从另一个角度说明了,中国缺乏分析师声誉回报机制,因此导致我国的分析师可以在利益的驱动下盲目的夸大其所跟踪企业的未来盈余,而不用担心其自身的职业生涯。因此,本文建议建立健全中国分析师行业的声誉回报机制,为中国证券分析师行业健康规范的发展提供保证。
[Abstract]:China after the securities industry analyst from disorder to order more than ten years of development, the popularization of knowledge of the market, guide the investment philosophy, has played an important role in promoting market innovation, securities investment consulting agencies in the management way, management level and system construction has made great progress. However, compared with the mature markets in developed countries, the overall level of Chinese securities analyst industry is still relatively backward. This is mainly manifested in the following two aspects: (a) in the analysis means, mainly in technical analysis methods, almost no use of theoretical models and statistical forecasting methods; (two) in terms of access to information, Chinese securities analyst less direct contact with the listed company, such as through the company news conference to obtain information or telephone interviews. They tend to focus on public information is simple and easy to take. But in the public information policy. Information is the key China securities analyst focus. So why Chinese securities analysts will so much attention to policy information to policy information? How to influence the decision and behavior of securities analysts? How to care about the information of policy impact prediction performance of securities analyst? The information of policy attention will produce what kind of economic consequences the Securities analyst behavior? This paper industry policy as a starting point, earnings forecasts of analysts of theoretical analysis and empirical research, in order to answer the above questions.
First of all, based on the special institutional background Chinese economic transformation, the establishment and implementation of the system of review of industrial policy Chinese reality characteristics, the necessity and contradiction of industrial policy in the Chinese is discussed theoretically. The adjustment of economic structure as main means of industrial policy, is an important aspect of China's Government the present Regulation of industrial policy. As a kind of highly integrated policy measures is formulated to achieve certain economic and social objectives and the specific industrial policy. To sum it as an indirect control, fully combines the advantages of planned economy and market regulation, help the government to realize effective macro-control regulation plan significantly reduced the case. Because of the effects of industrial policies on economic development are mainly concentrated on the level of industry to promote economic growth, therefore, in the economic take-off stage, industry policy The influence is very obvious, the necessity of economic development is particularly significant, and so the whole government economic policy system in the position is very important. In addition, in developing countries "early, usually encountered in infrastructure and basic industries such as" bottleneck "restrictions, their large investment and long payback period. A leading role in the economic development of these areas, solve the" externality "obviously, rely on the market mechanism is difficult in the short term, tilt and support needed to industrial policy to play a role in promoting the economic take-off. However, due to the industrial policy has inherent contradictions such as contradiction, promote industrial structure upgrading and alleviate the domestic employment pressure give full play to their comparative advantage, and enhance the international competitive advantage of contradictions, contradictions to establish a relatively complete national economic system and actively participate in international division of labor, domestic and industrial policy The contradiction between fairness policy tilt and international economic rules, so that policy makers are often in a dilemma between the difficult trade-offs, policy swings, the effect of industrial policy cannot be guaranteed. In Chinese "policy market" in the background, effects of wavering industrial policy on the stock market is not China be ignored, this has prompted the securities analyst China increase the weight of industrial policy in the model.
Secondly, based on the government behavior and enterprise behavior, enterprise behavior influence enterprise value, enterprise value logic line analysts pay attention to analysts focused on industrial policy and industrial policy adjustment according to its earnings forecast behavior was analyzed. The macro control of the government through the macro policy and government behavior in the development of the economy is already a a common phenomenon. In fact, government intervention in economic life has become an important feature of the transition period of China's socialist market economy. And the enterprises as the main participants of economic activities, is the government's macroeconomic policies, the micro carrier of government control means to play the role of the government oriented policies. Through reasonable means to guide enterprises the actual production and operation behavior of decision-making, thereby affecting the company's employment, output and other economic indicators. Among them, the fiscal policy to pass Income, expenditure tools influence the total social demand and supply, thus affecting the macroeconomic level, and the effects of the quantity and price of the two intermediate variables of enterprise financing, investment and business activities, and ultimately affect the company's cash flow; the impact of monetary policy on micro enterprises is mainly reflected in the financing activities, including financing cost and financing scale; industrial policy and fiscal policy, monetary policy is a parallel policy, is the national macro-control means and tools. However, fiscal policy will inevitably involves the main points of the industrial policy and policy instruments, monetary policy, especially tax and credit policy. Therefore, industrial policy to some extent be regarded as tax incentives, financial subsidies and other government behavior in the implementation of a certain industry, thus affecting the behavior of enterprises; at the same time, enterprise behavior and enterprise value between the existence of a wrong The relationship between the complex and influence mechanism. Further, because all kinds of government behavior have an important value for micro enterprises in many aspects, so including macro policy, government behavior regulation, will directly affect the enterprise value. Therefore the inherent logic of the government behavior and the value of the company, as one of the most attention the value of the enterprise group securities analyst policy research as an important content of the China market.
Then, this paper empirically tests the above theory to the test. This paper use from 2006 to 2010 five years of data as the research sample, with industrial policy as explanatory variables are a series of research on analysts' earnings forecast. The conclusion of the study shows that analysts in earnings forecast, the industrial policies of the company to give more attention that shows that the industrial policy is an important input analyst working models; however, although analysts love tracking industrial policy company and more frequent earnings forecast report issued, but their earnings forecast deviation is larger, with optimistic tendency is obvious, that output is not valid. The analyst the reason because many analysts in order to obtain the commission income and stimulate the greater volume of transactions, so analysts who have more motivation to keep track of public policy Our research results show that Chinese securities analysts tend to choose the tracking industrial policies of the company, and the issue that company is obviously positive optimistic earnings forecasts, produce trading volume relatively greater to stimulate the company to get more revenue. This Commission explained from another angle, Chinese the lack of analysts'reputation return mechanism, thus resulting in our analyst can be driven by the interests of the blind exaggerating its tracking the future earnings, and do not worry about their own occupation career. Therefore, this paper proposes to establish a sound reputation in the country industry analysts return mechanism, provide a guarantee for the development of the securities industry analyst Chinese health standard.

【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

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