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金字塔结构特征对上市公司现金股利政策影响的研究

发布时间:2018-01-30 09:24

  本文关键词: 金字塔结构 现金股利政策 终极控制人 出处:《中南大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:自La Porta等(1999)提出终极控制人概念以来,国内外学者发现除英美等普通法系国家外,公司治理的主要矛盾不是管理者与所有者之间的矛盾,而是控股股东与中小股东之间的矛盾;控制股东实际上又由终极控制人控制,终极控制人的隐蔽性和复杂性使其尽一切手段最大化自身利益,造成对中小股东的利益侵占。我国终极控制人通过金字塔结构控制上市公司的情况普遍存在,而现金股利政策是各利益相关主体在股东大会上相互博弈的结果,所以现金股利政策与金字塔股权结构紧密相关。本文通过上市公司控制链关系图追溯至其终极控制人,从金字塔结构特征的五个方面——终极控制人性质、现金流权、控制权、两权分离度与金字塔结构复杂性着手,研究其对现金股利政策的影响。这对切实保护中小股东利益,完善公司治理机制,具有重要的学术价值和现实意义。 为研究金字塔结构特征对现金股利政策的影响,本文使用2004-2010年连续7年非金融行业的715家上市公司的面板数据进行实证研究。研究结果表明:终极控制人的产权性质与现金股利支付倾向显著负相关,即受非国有产权的终极控制人控制的上市公司派发现金股利的可能性更大;终极控制人的集团性质与现金股利支付倾向显著负相关;终极控制人的控制权和现金流权与现金股利支付倾向及支付力度均显著正相关;终极控制人的两权分离度与现金股利支付倾向显著正相关;金字塔结构复杂性与现金股利支付倾向及支付力度均显著负相关。
[Abstract]:Since La Porta et al. 1999) put forward the concept of ultimate controller, scholars at home and abroad have found that except for common law countries such as the United States and the United States. The main contradiction of corporate governance is not between the manager and the owner, but between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholder. The controlling shareholder is actually controlled by the ultimate controller, and the hidden and complex nature of the ultimate controller makes him maximize his own interests by all means. The ultimate controller of our country through the pyramid structure to control the situation of listed companies, and the cash dividend policy is a result of the stakeholders in the shareholders' general meeting of the game. So the cash dividend policy is closely related to the pyramid ownership structure. This paper traces the relationship diagram of the listed company control chain to its ultimate controller from five aspects of the pyramid structure characteristics-the nature of the ultimate controller. Cash flow right, right of control, separation degree of two rights and the complexity of pyramid structure start to study its influence on cash dividend policy, which can effectively protect the interests of minority shareholders and improve the corporate governance mechanism. It has important academic value and practical significance. In order to study the influence of pyramid structure on cash dividend policy. This paper makes an empirical study using the panel data of 715 listed companies in the non-financial sector from 2004 to 2010. The results show that:. The property right of ultimate controller is negatively correlated with the tendency of cash dividend payment. That is, listed companies controlled by the ultimate controller of non-state-owned property rights are more likely to distribute cash dividends; The group nature of the ultimate controller is negatively correlated with the tendency of cash dividend payment; The ultimate controller's right of control and cash flow are positively correlated with the tendency of cash dividend payment and the intensity of cash dividend payment. The degree of separation of the two rights of the ultimate controller is significantly positively correlated with the tendency of cash dividend payment; The complexity of pyramid structure is negatively correlated with the tendency and intensity of cash dividend payment.
【学位授予单位】:中南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F275;F832.51;F224

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