股权分置改革对股权结构与代理成本关系的影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-04 07:50

本文关键词： 股权结构股权分置改革公司治理股权代理成本　出处：《湖南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股权结构与代理成本一直是公司治理研究的热点。股权代理成本可以分为两类，一类是管理者与股东之间的代理成本；另一类是大股东与中小股东之间的代理成本。在我国，有关这两类代理问题的案例层出不穷。股改前，股权高度集中以及股权分置的存在，使得非流通股股东能够轻而易举攫取小股东的利益；而国有股所有者虚位现象，也为管理层侵占公司资源提供了便利。股改后，非流通股股东取得了流通权，上市公司的股权流动性提高，股权集中度下降，利益制衡机制逐渐完善。基于以上变化，本文试图分析股改对代理成本的影响机理，并实证检验股权分置改革对股权结构与代理成本的关系变迁的影响。本文以代理理论为基础，首先从理论上分析股权分置改革对代理成本的影响以及对股权结构与代理成本关系变迁的影响，然后运用2004-2011年制造业上市公司的数据，实证检验了股权分置改革前后股权结构与代理成本的关系变迁。实证结果表明，，股改对上市公司股权结构和代理成本产生了显著影响；股改后，两类代理成本都明显的降低了；股权集中度、机构投资者持股比例与两类代理成本的关系得到优化；而在非国有控股公司中，股权制衡度没能对降低代理成本产生显著影响，在国有控股公司中，股权分散是导致股权制衡度与代理成本呈正相关关系的原因。最后，本文提出了巩固制度变革后期成果、构建适当的股权集中度、继续减持国有股份建立制衡结构和逐步加大机构投资者比例等政策建议。
[Abstract]:Ownership structure and agency costs has been the study focus of corporate governance. The equity agency cost can be divided into two categories, one is the agent costs between shareholders and managers; the other is the agency cost between large and small shareholders. In our country, the two kinds of agency problems emerge in an endless stream of the case before., ownership concentration and equity division, the non tradable shareholders can be an easy job to do to grab the interests of small shareholders; and state-owned stock owners phantom phenomenon, it also provides convenience for resource management. The occupation of the company after the share reform, the non tradable shareholders have the right to circulate, the liquidity of shares of listed companies, ownership concentration the degree of decline, interest balance mechanism has been gradually perfected. Based on the above changes, this paper tries to analyze the influence mechanism of the reform of the agency cost, and the empirical test of equity division reform on ownership structure and agency cost The influence of the change of the relationship.
This dissertation firstly theoretically influence analysis of equity division reform on the agency cost and the relationship between ownership structure and agency costs of changing, and then listed company with 2004-2011 years of manufacturing data, the empirical test of the non tradable shares the relationship between equity structure and agency cost before and after the reform. The empirical results show that the reform, have a significant influence on the equity structure of listed companies and agency costs; after the reform, the two types of agency costs are significantly reduced; the ownership concentration, the relationship between institutional investors and the two agency to optimize; while in non state-owned holding companies, equity balance degree did not have significant influence on the to reduce the agency cost, in the state-owned holding companies, dispersed ownership is the cause of equity balance degree and agency costs are positively related. Finally, proposed to consolidate In the late stage of institutional reform, we should set up appropriate concentration of ownership, continue to reduce state shareholdings, establish checks and balances and gradually increase the proportion of institutional investors.

【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

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