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信托型私募股权投资基金上市退出的法律障碍分析

发布时间:2018-02-04 18:23

  本文关键词: 信托型PE 上市退出 法律障碍 对策 协调监管 出处:《华东政法大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:银监会2008年6月25日印发的《信托公司私人股权业务操作指引》第15条规定,“信托公司在管理私人股权投资信托计划时,可以通过股权上市、协议转让、被投资企业回购、股权分配等方式,实现投资退出。”1然而目前现实中境内信托制私募投资股权通过被投资企业上市方式实现退出的道路却并不畅通。分析其上市退出产生障碍的原因,主要包括五个方面: 一、信托型PE中投资顾问法律地位与现实需求不符。实践中由于信托公司股权投资经验往往不足,所以要引入独立第三方作为投资顾问。某些情况下投资顾问实际上担任了信托基金投资管理人的角色,然而由于法律对投资顾问的角色定位与现实情况不符,造成了某些情况下对投资顾问的监管不足;但同时《信托公司私人股权投资信托业务操作指引》对投资顾问成立门槛的过高规定又可能将一些专业能力强而资金实力一般的管理公司拒之门外。 二、信托型PE缺乏有效的信托财产登记、公示制度。根据我国目前法律规定,信托财产登记并不是在信托型PE设立时的强制义务,但是如果不对信托资金进行登记,信托公司的信托财产的范围就难以确定,从而导致关联交易认定上的困难,进而影响了信托型PE作为上市公司合格发起人的主体适格性。 三、对信托型PE的被投资企业的实际控制人的披露可能存在障碍。一种观点认为《信托法》与《信托公司管理办法》中规定的受托人对委托人的保密义务与《证券法》等上市规则中对拟上市企业实际控制人进行披露的要求相冲突。因此信托型PE被排除在上市公司合格发起人门外。 四、信托公司关联交易难以控制。相比于一般公司,信托公司存在两类特的关联方——信托公司自有财产和信托公司信托财产,而信托登记制度的不完善又使得在信托公司内部对这两类关联方以及存在于他们之间的关联交易的界定变得更加困难。 五、投资人变化失控。一种观点认为,赋予信托型PE投资主体地位会可能导致对上市公司投资人变化的监管失控,进而形成一个在上市公司股东层面之上的交易市场,投资人会以此规避对于上市公司股东、实际控制人持股锁闭期的规定。2上市公司发起人、高管、控股股东以及实际控制人还会借此以规避法律对于上市公司股权转让限制的规定。 面对上市退出的重重障碍,现实中产生了许多变通的应对措施,然而却也是各有弊端。本文对信托制PE上市退出障碍产生的原因进行了逐个分析,并提出了应对的建议。 最后,笔者提出,问题的最终解决仍有赖于建立多部门协调监管体系。在目前国内金融市场分业监管的既定格局下,笔者提出从建立不同监管机构间协调机制和不同监管机构间监管信息共享平台两方面入手。各金融监管机构应主动联手,尽快达成共识,,将监管的目标聚焦于利用信托外壳规避法律的行为上来。3同时,可以根据国内学者的提议,由央行牵头建立金融监管信息共享平台,从而利用信息技术加快金融业发展,维护金融市场稳定。
[Abstract]:The CBRC issued the "June 25, 2008 business of private equity trust company operating guidelines > fifteenth provisions," trust in the management of private equity investment trust plan, by listing the transfer agreement, the invested enterprises repurchase, equity allocation mode, realize the investment exit. "1 however the current domestic private equity investment trust system equity investment companies listed by way exit road was not smooth. Analyzing the reasons of listed exit barriers, mainly includes five aspects:
A type of PE, trust the legal status of the investment advisers and the reality does not meet the requirements of practice. Because of the trust equity investment experience is often inadequate, so the introduction of an independent third party as an investment adviser consultant. Actually served as the role of trust fund investment managers investment in some cases, however, because the role of law on investment advisers and the reality does not match, resulting in a lack of regulation of investment under certain conditions; but at the same time "for the private equity investment trust business operation guidelines > of investment advisers and high threshold established provisions may be some professional ability and financial strength of the general management of the company shut out.
Two, the lack of effective trust based PE trust property registration and publicity system. According to the present law, compulsory trust property registration is not set up in trust PE, but without the trust fund registration, the scope of the trust property is difficult to determine, which leads to difficulties related transaction identification the main body, thereby affecting the trust PE listed companies as a qualified sponsor eligibility.
Three, the actual control of the trust type PE invested enterprise disclosure may exist obstacles. One view is that "Regulations" and "management trust trust > the trustee of the disclosure of the actual control of listed companies to client confidentiality obligations and Securities Law > listing rules requirements etc. conflict. Therefore trust PE promoters were excluded outside the qualified listed companies.
Four, related party transactions trust is difficult to control. Compared to the general company, there are two kinds of special related party -- the trust's own property and trust property trust, and the trust registration system is not perfect and the trust company of the two types of related party and related transactions between them are defined. It becomes more difficult.
Five, investors change out of control. One view is that, given the trust based PE investment status may lead to the change of the listed companies, investors and the formation of a regulatory control, shareholders of the listed company above the level of the market, investors in order to avoid the shareholders of listed companies, the actual control of shares locking period requirement of.2 listed companies the sponsors, executives, regulations of controlling shareholders and actualcontroller will take in order to circumvent the law to the listed company equity transfer restrictions.
Facing many obstacles in the market exit, there are many flexible Countermeasures in reality. However, there are also some drawbacks. This paper analyzes the causes of the withdrawal of trust PE, and puts forward some suggestions.
Finally, the author proposes that the final settlement of the problem still depends on the establishment of multi sectoral coordination supervision system. In the established pattern of the current domestic financial market supervision, the author puts forward the coordination mechanism and the different regulatory agencies regulatory information from the establishment of different regulatory agencies sharing platform in two aspects. The financial regulators should take the initiative to reach a consensus. As soon as possible, will focus on the goal of supervision with the trust the behavior of circumventing the law of.3 at the same time, according to the domestic scholars proposed by the central bank led the establishment of financial supervision and information sharing platform, and the use of information technology to accelerate the development of the financial industry, to maintain financial market stability.

【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:D922.28;F832.51

【引证文献】

相关硕士学位论文 前1条

1 姚强;我国信托型股权与创业投资的法律问题研究[D];吉林大学;2013年



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