最终控制人、制度环境与上市公司过度投资

发布时间：2018-02-10 21:34

本文关键词： 最终控制人制度环境过度投资　出处：《合肥工业大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：由于目前我国工业化尚未完成，所以在可预见的未来我国可能继续保持高投资率的状况。但是高投资率和经济飞速增长的背后，，却存在着重复建设和过度投资现象。一方面这种过度投资降低了企业的价值，影响企业的成长；另一方面而言，大量投资过度会使得经济过热导致生产能力过剩，阻碍我国经济的发展。随着现代企业制度的建立，我国逐步实现了政企分离、科学管理，以及国有企业股份制改革的推进，但是企业中仍然存在着严重的代理问题。所以研究中国上市公司的投资效率问题必须结合控制人背景和制度环境进行综合考虑。制度环境往往会影响代理人的理性行为，而公司的投资决策直接受到代理人的行为影响，从而产生了非效率投资。所以将最终控制人背景和制度环境对过度投资的影响纳入研究拓宽了现有的企业投资研究视角。本文的主要研究内容就是在我国特有的制度环境下，比较不同最终控制人的投资效率问题，尝试着用新制度经济学的理论来解释作用机理。具体利用Richardson(2006)模型测算得出样本的投资过度和投资不足，并且按照上市公司的最终控制人性质将样本公司划分为三个组别，同时引入制度环境衡量指标。在此基础之上，对制度环境与我国上市公司过度投资行为的相关性进行实证研究。结果表明：政府控制的上市公司比私人控制的上市公司发生过度投资的倾向更高，特别是地方政府控制的上市公司；制度环境的改善减轻了上市公司过度投资的严重程度；政府控制的上市公司中过度投资行为受政府干预的影响程度要高于私人控制的上市公司受影响程度，受金融环境影响的程度小于私人控制的上市公司受影响程度，受法律环境的影响程度与私人控制的上市公司不存在较大的差异。
[Abstract]:As China's industrialization has not yet been completed, China may continue to maintain a high investment rate for the foreseeable future. But behind the high investment rate and rapid economic growth, On the one hand, such overinvestment reduces the value of enterprises and affects their growth; on the other hand, overinvestment can cause overheating of the economy and lead to overcapacity. Hinder the development of our economy. With the establishment of modern enterprise system, China has gradually realized the separation of government and enterprises, scientific management, and the promotion of the reform of state-owned enterprises' stock system. However, there are still serious agency problems in enterprises. Therefore, in order to study the investment efficiency of listed companies in China, it is necessary to consider comprehensively the background of the controlling person and the institutional environment, which often affects the rational behavior of the agents. The investment decision of the company is directly influenced by the behavior of the agent, which leads to the inefficient investment. Therefore, the influence of the background of the ultimate controller and the institutional environment on the overinvestment is included in the study, which widens the existing perspective of the enterprise investment research. The main research content of this paper is to compare the investment efficiency of different ultimate controllers in the unique institutional environment of our country. This paper tries to use the theory of new institutional economics to explain the mechanism of action. The model of Richardson's 2006) is used to calculate the overinvestment and underinvestment of the sample, and the sample companies are divided into three groups according to the nature of the ultimate controller of the listed company. At the same time, the system environment measurement index is introduced. This paper makes an empirical study on the correlation between the institutional environment and the over-investment behavior of listed companies in China. The results show that the government-controlled listed companies tend to overinvest more than the privately controlled listed companies. Especially the listed companies controlled by the local government, the improvement of the system environment reduces the serious degree of excessive investment of the listed companies. The excessive investment behavior of the listed companies controlled by the government is affected more by government intervention than by the private listed companies, and the degree of financial environment is less than that of the private controlled listed companies. There is no significant difference between the degree of influence of the legal environment and the private-controlled listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：合肥工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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