我国上市公司大股东与盈余管理关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-02-11 07:10

本文关键词： 会计选择盈余管理真实活动盈余管理大股东两权分离度　出处：《东北财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国证券市场的不断发展,公司治理问题日益受到重视。我国上市公司的大股东在企业各项重大决策中处于优势地位,能够影响或控制上市公司。同时,我国上市公司的盈余管理行为是普遍的。基于此,我国随后对上市公司进行了诸如国有股减持和股权分置改革的诸多尝试,在股权分置改革背景下大股东与盈余管理之间的关系是值得探讨的。此外,盈余管理分为会计选择盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理。国内外大多从会计选择盈余管理的角度研究大股东的公司治理效应,真实活动盈余管理则很少有所涉及。随着证券监管的不断加强,会计选择盈余管理的空间越来越小,真实活动盈余管理隐蔽性更强的特点使其发挥的空间变大。因此,从真实活动盈余管理的角度研究大股东的治理效应具有理论和现实意义。本文采用经验研究的方法从第一大股东持股比例、性质或身份和两权分离度三个方面验证大股东与盈余管理(包括会计选择盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理)的关系。全文共分为六章：第一章简要的说明了文章的研究背景和研究意义,并提出文章的研究内容与框架。第二章主要从第一大股东持股比例、第一大股东的性质和两权分离度(现金流量权与控制权的分离)三个方面回顾了大股东与盈余管理关系的相关文献研究,并在此基础对现有文献做出评述。第三章阐述了大股东与盈余管理的理论基础。首先,本章从定义、手段和存在的基础条件对盈余管理进行全面解析。其次,运用不完全契约理论、委托代理理论和控制权价值理论深度剖析大股东与盈余管理的关系。第四章在理论分析的基础上从第一大股东持股比例、性质和两权分离度三个角度提出大股东与盈余管理关系的相关假设。第五章选取2009-2010年A股上市公司作为研究样本,引入研究变量,借鉴国内外研究对研究模型进行设定,运用多元回归分析大股东与盈余管理的关系。研究结果发现：第一大股东持股比例与盈余管理正相关；第一大股东为国有股时,上市公司盈余管理程度更低；两权分离度与盈余管理程度正相关。此外,稳健性测试的结果支持了本文研究结论的稳健性。第六章对全文做出了总结,指出本文的研究假设得到了验证,同时说明了文章的创新点和不足。本文的创新点在于利用经验研究的方法尝试性地验证了第一大股东性质和两权分离度对真实活动盈余管理的影响,较为全面地分析了大股东与盈余管理之间的关系,对第一大股东持股比例与盈余管理之间的关系做出了进一步解释。尽管如此,本文的局限性仍是显而易见的,即本文未能将大股东导致盈余管理的具体行为与盈余管理联系起来考察大股东与盈余管理的关系。利用大股东控制权价值(包括控制权共享收益和控制权私人收益)的研究似乎可以在一定程度上解决这个问题,但遗憾的是,目前还没有能够对控制权价值进行精确度量的有效方法,尤其是控制权私人收益的度量,因此大股东控制权价值与盈余管理的关系是一个值得尝试的领域。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of China's securities market, the problem of corporate governance has been paid more and more attention. Large shareholders of Listed Companies in China is in a dominant position in the major decisions in all enterprise, can influence or control the listed company. At the same time, the earnings management behavior of Listed Companies in China is widespread in China. Based on this, then made a number of attempts such as the reduction of state-owned shares and non tradable shares reform of listed companies, the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management reform under the background of the equity is worth exploring. In addition, the earnings management includes the choice of accounting earnings management and real earnings management activities. At home and abroad are mostly from the accounting choice effect of corporate governance on earnings management study of large shareholders, real earnings management activities are rarely involved. With securities regulators continue to strengthen, the accounting choice of earnings management space more and more small, real activities earnings The characteristics of the more implicit management make the space of its play bigger. Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the governance effect of large shareholders from the perspective of real activity earnings management.
In this paper, empirical research is used to verify the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management (including accounting choice earnings management and real activity earnings management) from three aspects of the largest shareholder's shareholding ratio, nature or status and the separation of two powers. The whole paper is divided into six chapters.
The first chapter gives a brief description of the research background and significance of the article, and puts forward the research content and framework of the article.
The second chapter reviews the related literature research on the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management from three aspects: the largest shareholder's shareholding ratio, the nature of the largest shareholder and the separation of the two powers (the separation of cash flow right and control right). Based on that, the existing literature is commented.
The third chapter introduces the theoretical basis of large shareholders and earnings management. Firstly, this chapter from the definition, methods and basic conditions for the existence of the comprehensive analysis on earnings management. Secondly, based on the incomplete contract theory, principal-agent theory and control theory of value depth analysis of the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management.
On the basis of theoretical analysis, the fourth chapter puts forward the hypothesis of the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management from the three perspectives of the largest shareholder's shareholding ratio, the nature and the separation of two powers.
The fifth chapter selects 2009-2010 A-share listed companies as A research sample, introduce the research variables, research from home and abroad to study the model was set, using multiple regression analysis of the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management. The results showed that: the proportion of the first shareholder and earnings management; the largest shareholder of state-owned shares of listed companies. The extent of earnings management is lower; the separation of two rights is positively related to the degree of earnings management. In addition, the robust test results support the conclusion of the study of robustness.
The sixth chapter makes a summary of the full text, pointing out that the research hypothesis of this paper has been verified, and at the same time, it shows the innovation and deficiency of the article.
The innovation of this paper is to use empirical research method to attempt to verify the nature of the largest shareholder and the two rights separation degree of influence on the real earnings management activities, comprehensively analyzes the relationship between large shareholders and earnings management, made a further explanation of the relationship between the proportion of the first shareholder and earnings management. Although so, the limitation of this paper is obviously, that this will lead to earnings management of large shareholders failed to link specific behavior and earnings management of large shareholders and earnings management. The control rights of large shareholders value (including the control of shared benefits and private benefits of control) research seems to solve this problem in a certain degree but, unfortunately, there is no effective method to measure the precise value of control, especially the measurement of private benefits of control rights, Therefore, the relationship between the value of the control rights of the large shareholders and the earnings management is a field worth trying.

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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