上市公司股利政策对盈余管理的影响及相应的市场反应

发布时间：2018-02-25 17:29

本文关键词： 盈余管理股利政策操控性应计利润信息传递　出处：《东北财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着公司盈余管理行为的日趋频繁,盈余管理问题日益受到社会各方面的关注。上市公司的盈余管理行会影响会计准则的制定、投资者利益的保护、监管部门的监管政策、甚至是证券市场资源优化配置功能等诸多方面,因此对盈余管理问题的研究有重要意义。总体来说,盈余管理行为可以划分为两种类型,机会主义型盈余管理和传递私有信息型盈余管理,但是国内外学者对于盈余管理的研究多数集中于机会主义型盈余管理,尤其是上市公司从资本市场融资及保牌等原因引起的盈余管理,这种盈余管理多是由监管政策引起的,具有政策导向性。而本文则站在传递私有信息的角度,探讨了股利政策对盈余管理的影响及相应的市场反应。之前的研究文献证实,公司管理层有用盈余管理来传递积极私有信息的动机,但是市场往往会认为用盈余管理工具进行调控盈余是管理层的机会主义行为,所以公司管理层可能会将盈余管理工具与其它信息传递工具结合使用,来增强私有信息的可信性,其中一个可以选择的信息传递工具就是股利政策工具。根据股利信号理论,上市公司会利用股利政策向外部投资者传递有关公司未来良好发展前景的私有信息。但是由于我国股票市场有效性水平不高,上市公司的发放股利所载有的这种管理者对未来积极预期的私有信息,不能完全被市场识别到。所以上市公司管理层有动机配合其他途径将积极的私有信息有效地传递出去。本文认为,管理层会将股利政策工具与盈余管理叠加在一起使用,以强化私有信息传递效率。盈余管理行为生成的操控性应计利润会增强股利信号的强度,而发放的股利信号会增强操控性应计利润的可信度。从而有效降低上市公司管理层和投资者间的信息不对称程度,提高投资者对公司股票价值的预期。本文的研究以2003-2010年发放股利的沪市A股上市公司为研究样本,首先使用调整Jones(1991)模型及拓展的调整Jones(1991)模型估计出可操控性总应计利润和可操控性流动应计利润,作为盈余管理程度的替代变量,然后分别检验了发放不同类型股利的公司操控性应计利润的显著性,实证结果显示发放股利的公司盈余管理程度显著为正,且发放股票股利的上市公司盈余管理程度要大于发放现金股利的公司。这就表明发放股利的上市公司有进行盈余管理的动机,且不同类型的股利政策对盈余管理造成的影响不同。在此基础上,本文还检验了发放股利公司盈余管理的市场反应。我们将上市公司年度分红预案公告发布当天及前后三天股票的累积异常收益率作为市场反应的替代变量,将净利润的各组成部分(操控性应计利润、非操控非预期净利润、预期净利润)作为市场反应的解释变量,进行回归分析。实证结果显示发放股利的公司,股票的累计异常收益率与操控性应计利润是显著正相关的,且发放股票股利的公司操控性应计利润引起的市场反应要大于发放现金股利的公司。这说明市场对于上市公司的盈余管理行为是持积极态度的,并且市场对于发放不同股利的公司的盈余管理行为反应是有差异的。分析师关注度代表了一个公司的信息环境的丰富程度,本文还对分析师关注度对盈余管理市场反应的影响作了实证研究。我们将发放股利的公司按分析师关注度高低程度分为两组,并分别利用股票市场反应回归模型进行回归分析。实证结果显示,相对于低分析师关注度的公司,高分析师关注度的公司盈余管理的市场反应更大。这意味着证券分析师在降低上市公司管理层与中小投资者之间的信息不称程度、提高证券市场效率方面起着重要作用。根据本文的研究角度和结论,本文从抑制上市公司的过度盈余管理行为及大力发展专业的投资分析机构两个方面提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:With the company's earnings management behavior is becoming more frequent, the problem of earnings management has been the concern of all sectors of society. The influence of earnings management of listed companies' Guild accounting standards, to protect the interests of investors, regulators, and even many aspects of securities market resource allocation function, therefore, to study the earnings management problem is important. Overall, the behavior of earnings management can be divided into two types, the opportunistic earnings management and earnings management of private information transfer, but for the majority of domestic and foreign scholars research on earnings management focus on the opportunistic earnings management, especially the earnings management of listed companies from the capital market caused by financing and insurance cards and other reasons, the earnings management is caused by regulatory policy, with policy guidance. But this is standing on the transfer of private information of angle. The influence of dividend policy on earnings management and the corresponding market reaction.
Previous literature confirms that the management of the company use earnings management to transfer positive private information motivation, but the market will often think of earnings management tools to control the earnings management is the opportunism behavior, so the management of the company may be earnings management tools and other information tools used in combination to enhance the credibility of private information. One can choose the information transfer tool is the dividend policy tool. According to the dividend signal theory, dividend policy of listed companies will use the transfer of private information about the company's future good development prospects to external investors. But the efficiency of China's stock market is not high, the listed company dividend contained in the management of the future is expected to actively private information, can not be fully recognized by the market. So the management of listed companies have the motivation with him The way of positive private information effectively to pass out. This paper argues that the management will be the dividend policy and earnings management tools superimposed together, to signal private information. Manipulation of earnings management behavior generated accrued profits will increase the dividend signal strength, while the dividend signaling can enhance the discretionary accruals profit credibility. So as to effectively reduce the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors of listed companies, improve the expectations of investors on the company's stock value.
This paper takes 2003-2010 years of dividend Shanghai A shares of listed companies as the research sample, the first use of adjusted Jones (1991) model and Jones (1991) to adjust the development model to estimate discretionary total accruals and discretionary accruals liquidity, as an alternative to the variable degree of earnings management, and then test the company was handling different types of payment of dividend accruals, the empirical results show that the degree of earnings management company dividend is significantly positive, the degree of earnings management of listed companies and stock dividends than the cash dividend. This shows that the dividend of the listed companies have the motivation of earnings management, influence and different types of dividend policy on earnings management caused by the different.
On this basis, this paper also examines the market reaction to earnings management issued dividend company. We will notice the cumulative abnormal returns of listed companies annual bonus plan released the same day and three days before and after the stock market reaction rate as a proxy, the net profit of each part (discretionary accruals, non discretionary non expected net profit the expected net profit), as the market reaction to explanatory variables for regression analysis. The empirical results show that the dividend of the company, the stock cumulative abnormal returns and discretionary accruals are significantly correlated, the market reaction and companies on stock dividend accruals caused greater than the cash dividend company. This shows that the market is a positive attitude to the earnings management, and the market is bad for the behavior of earnings management of the company dividend paid different reaction Different.
The richness of analyst's attention on behalf of a company's information environment, the analysts concerned about the impact of reaction degree of earnings management of the market. We will do empirical research on dividend company according to the analyst's attention level divided into two groups, and respectively use the stock market response regression model empirical. The results showed that compared with the low degree of concern, analysts, analysts are concerned about the market reaction to high degree of earnings management of the company more. This means that securities analysts in reducing between the management of listed companies and small investors the information is not known, plays an important role in improving the efficiency of the stock market.
According to the research perspective and conclusion, this paper puts forward policy recommendations from two aspects: inhibiting the excessive earnings management behavior of listed companies and vigorously developing professional investment analysis institutions.

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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