我国上市公司治理结构对企业现金持有影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-02-26 02:33

本文关键词： 治理结构现金持有现金价值终极控股股东　出处：《南京航空航天大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现金持有决策是企业重要的财务决策，因为它不仅反映了一个企业的经营战略和财务战略，还与公司治理状况紧密相关。而现金持有为企业带来的经济后果到底是“价值创造”还是“价值毁灭”也是投资者最为关心的问题之一。本文首先结合国内外形势，提出研究主题，并分析了该项研究的重要意义。在第二章，对现金持有的理论基础和重要文献进行了系统的梳理和回顾，以代理理论为核心对现金持有问题进行深入的讨论，辅之以交易成本理论、信息不对称理论、权衡理论和融资优序理论进行阐述。在第三章中，笔者根据前述的各种理论研究以及各种文献的总结，提出了影响企业现金持有的治理因素，包括股权集中度指标、终极控股股东指标、管理层持股指标、股东保护指标以及董事会指标，根据理论分析和前人的研究经验提出了本文的假设，并确定了研究样本和数据来源。在第四章中运用spss11.0软件对2005-2010年我国上市公司的数据进行了回归分析和T检验，不仅对现金持有量进行了考察，更进一步的从终极控股股东的角度的现金持有的价值进行进一步的深入分析。本文经过实证研究发现，现金持有量随着治理结构的变化而呈现出的变化趋势：我国上市公司现金持有量随第一大股东的持股比例的提高而先升后降，随终极控股股东控制权的提高而下降，随终极控股股东现金流权比例的提高而下降，随着管理层持股比例的增加而上升，随着股东保护程度的提高而增加，随着独立董事比例的提高而下降，但独立董事对现金持有量的影响并不显著。为了进一步探讨终极控股股东两权分离对企业现金持有产生的影响，笔者进一步从现金持有价值，即1元现金持有对企业价值贡献角度对不同企业进行了分类研究。经过实证分析发现，终极控股股东存在控制权与现金流权发生分离的企业中现金持有价值要低于未发生分离的企业；在两权发生分离的情况下，，终极控制人为自然人或民营企业的公司其现金持有价值要远高于其他企业。笔者认为这是由于在两权发生分离的企业中,终极控股股东的利益已经不仅仅是通过所有权而取得的利益，其利益实现往往会通过其对目标公司的终极控制来实现，而其所承受的风险却与其他股东相同，因此风险和收益的不对等往往会造成其对公司利益的损害来达到自身利益最大化的目的，而现金资产作为比较容易控制的资产成为这种利益侵占行为的重要手段。此外，国有企业相对于民营和自然人终极控股股东往往会有更强的利益侵占动机，而国有企业这样的利益侵占行为往往会伤害到上市公司自身的价值。
[Abstract]:Cash holding decision is an important financial decision of an enterprise, because it not only reflects the management strategy and financial strategy of an enterprise, It is also closely related to corporate governance, and whether the economic consequences of cash holdings for companies are "value creation" or "value destruction" is also one of the most concerned questions for investors. In the second chapter, the theoretical basis and important literature of cash holding are systematically reviewed and reviewed. Taking agency theory as the core, the paper discusses the cash holding problem in depth, supplemented by transaction cost theory, information asymmetry theory, tradeoff theory and financing priority theory. According to the theoretical research and the summary of various literatures, the author puts forward the governance factors that affect the cash holding of enterprises, including the index of ownership concentration, the index of ultimate controlling shareholder, the index of managerial ownership. According to the theoretical analysis and the previous research experience, the author puts forward the hypothesis of this paper, which is based on the index of shareholder protection and the index of board of directors. In chapter 4th, we use spss11.0 software to do regression analysis and T test on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2010, not only the cash holdings, but also the cash holdings. Further analysis of the value of cash holdings from the perspective of the ultimate controlling shareholder. Through empirical research, this paper finds that cash holdings show a changing trend with the change of governance structure: the cash holdings of listed companies in China rise first and then decrease with the increase of the proportion of the largest shareholders. With the increase of the controlling right of the ultimate controlling shareholder, the proportion of cash flow right of the ultimate controlling shareholder decreases, the proportion of the management holding shares increases, and the degree of shareholder protection increases. With the increase of the proportion of independent directors, the influence of independent directors on cash holdings is not significant. In order to further explore the impact of the separation of the ultimate controlling shareholders' two rights on the cash holdings of enterprises, the author further discusses the value of cash holdings. That is, from the perspective of the contribution of cash holdings to the value of enterprises, the paper makes a classification study on different enterprises. The value of cash holding in the enterprise in which the ultimate controlling shareholder has the separation of control right and cash flow right is lower than that of the enterprise without separation; in the case of separation of the two rights, The value of cash holding in the ultimate control of natural person or private enterprise is much higher than that of other enterprises. I think this is due to the separation of the two rights in the enterprise. The interest of the ultimate controlling shareholder is not only obtained through the ownership, but also realized by the ultimate control of the target company, but the risk it bears is the same as that of the other shareholders. Therefore, the non-equivalence of risk and income often results in the harm to the interests of the company to achieve the goal of maximizing their own interests, while the cash assets, as the more easily controlled assets, become an important means of this kind of profit encroachment. Compared with private and natural person ultimate controlling shareholders, state-owned enterprises often have stronger motive of interest encroachment, while state-owned enterprises often harm the value of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：南京航空航天大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275.1;F832.51;F224

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