机构投资者持股对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究

发布时间：2018-02-28 01:36

本文关键词： 机构投资者应计盈余管理真实盈余管理压力抵制型压力敏感型　出处：《中南大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：摘要：一直以来,盈余管理都是公司治理中的敏感问题,它在一定程度上扭曲了财务报表的真实性,降低了会计信息的有用性,严重误导利益相关者的决策。而机构投资者近年来逐渐成为资本市场中一股重要力量,它们的快速发展能否有效地抑制上市公司日益严重的盈余管理,还值得进一步研究。本文围绕机构投资者持股对上市公司盈余管理的影响这一问题展开研究。在委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、契约不完备理论、公司治理等相关理论的基础上,采用沪深A股上市公司2008-2012年较长周期的相关数据样本,运用多元线性回归模型实证检验了机构投资者持股对盈余管理的影响,并且依据机构投资者与被投资公司是否存在商业联系对机构投资者进行了分类以进一步检验不同类型机构投资者持股对不同盈余管理方式的影响。研究结果表明：机构投资者在总体上能有效的抑制上市公司的应计和真实盈余管理；不同类型的机构投资者对应计和真实盈余管理的影响不同,压力抵制型机构投资者能够在公司治理中发挥积极作用,有效的抑制应计和真实盈余管理,而压力敏感型机构投资者则对应计和真实盈余管理没有显著影响,不能起到积极的监督治理作用。本文的研究结论对于引导机构投资者的发展,提高会计盈余质量,促进资本市场健康发展有一定的现实指导意义。
[Abstract]:Abstract: earnings management has always been a sensitive issue in corporate governance, which to some extent distorts the authenticity of financial statements and reduces the usefulness of accounting information. Institutional investors have gradually become an important force in the capital market in recent years. Whether their rapid development can effectively restrain the increasingly serious earnings management of listed companies is worth further study. Based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, contract incomplete theory, corporate governance and other related theories, this paper focuses on the impact of institutional investors' shareholding on earnings management of listed companies, which is based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, contract incomplete theory, corporate governance and so on. Based on the data samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in a long period from 2008 to 2012, this paper empirically tests the effect of institutional investors' shareholding on earnings management by using multiple linear regression model. According to whether there is a business relationship between institutional investors and invested companies, institutional investors are classified to further test the effects of different types of institutional investors' holdings on different earnings management methods. Institutional investors can effectively restrain the accrual and real earnings management of listed companies; Different types of institutional investors have different effects on accrual and real earnings management. Pressure resistance institutional investors can play an active role in corporate governance and effectively restrain accrual and real earnings management. On the other hand, the stress-sensitive institutional investors have no significant influence on accounting and real earnings management, which can not play an active role in supervising and governing. The conclusion of this paper can guide the development of institutional investors and improve the quality of accounting earnings. To promote the healthy development of capital markets has a certain practical significance.
【学位授予单位】：中南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

【共引文献】