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上市公司信息透明度抑制大股东侵占资金研究

发布时间:2018-02-28 02:36

  本文关键词: 上市公司 信息透明度 大股东侵占资金 信息不对称 信息操纵 出处:《首都经济贸易大学》2013年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:在我国一股独大、股权集中的情况下,代理问题是大股东利用信息优势对中小股东的利益侵占问题。以往关于大股东侵占资金影响因素的研究很少考察上市公司信息透明度对大股东侵占资金行为的抑制作用。本文认为信息透明度是公司治理机制的重要组成部分,能够发挥抑制大股东侵占资金的作用。本文运用规范研究、案例研究和实证研究相结合的方法,根据信息不透明的两个表现:信息不对称和信息操纵的具体表现,并结合实际的案例,论证了信息不透明对大股东侵占资金行为的作用,从而得出提高信息透明度将会抑制大股东侵占资金行为的结论。并据此提出了提高信息透明度,能够起到抑制大股东侵占上市公司资金行为的假设。 为了验证假设的可靠性,本文以在深圳证券交易所上市的2009年-2011年除金融类上市公司以外的中国上市公司为研究对象,用深交所的信息披露考核结果为信息透明度的衡量变量、审计意见类型作为稳健性检验时的信息透明度替代变量和自己定义的两个大股东侵占资金的指标设了两个模型,并进行了实证分析。实证结果显示:信息透明度与大股东侵占资金负相关,即提高公司信息的透明度,能够有效的抑制大股东侵占上市公司资金的行为。并结合结论提出了相关的政策建议:及时、完整、真实的披露关联交易的相关信息,增加对大股东关联投资消息的披露,鼓励媒体信息披露以发挥其监督作用,强化对信息透明度的各环节的联动监管,加强外部审计监督;提高独立董事比例以及独立董事的独立性;加强投资者教育以提高其自我保护意识和能力等。 本文的创新点在于:首先,从反面的角度分析信息透明度对大股东侵占资金的抑制作用,即从信息不透明的两个表现(信息的内生性不对称和操纵性不对称)结合相应的具体案例分析了信息不透明对侵占行为的影响;其次,创新性的定义了大股东侵占资金的两个变量,OCCUP1=(与大股东相关)其它应收款/年平均资产总额与OCCUP2=(与大股东相关)应收账款+应收票据+预付账款+其他应收款-应付账款-应付票据-预收账款-其他应付款,若大于0则取1,否则取0。并且首次提出了审计意见类型也可作为信息透明度的衡量指标。本文的不足之处在于:将关联交易形成的应收款项一概认为是出于侵占资金的目的是片面的,应区分降低企业成本的关联交易和属于利益侵害的关联交易,且没有关注大股东通过非关联交易实施的利益侵害行为。
[Abstract]:In our country, with one dominant share and concentrated equity, The agency problem is the problem of the large shareholders taking advantage of the information advantage to encroach on the interests of the minority shareholders. Previous studies on the factors affecting the large shareholders' encroachment on funds seldom investigated the inhibition of the information transparency of listed companies on the large shareholders' embezzlement of funds. This paper holds that information transparency is an important part of corporate governance. This paper uses the methods of normative study, case study and empirical study, according to the two manifestations of information opacity: information asymmetry and information manipulation. Combined with actual cases, the paper demonstrates the effect of information opacity on the behavior of large shareholders' embezzlement of funds, and concludes that increasing information transparency will restrain the behavior of large shareholders' embezzlement of funds. Can play the supposition that the large shareholder encroaches on the capital behavior of the listed company. In order to verify the reliability of the hypothesis, this paper takes the Chinese listed companies except financial listed companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011 as the research objects. Using the result of information disclosure assessment of Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the measure variable of information transparency, the type of audit opinion is used as the alternative variable of information transparency in the robustness test and the two indexes defined by themselves for the embezzlement of funds by major shareholders, and two models are set up. The empirical results show that the information transparency is negatively related to the embezzlement of funds by large shareholders, that is, to improve the transparency of corporate information. It can effectively restrain the behavior of large shareholders encroaching on the funds of listed companies. In combination with the conclusion, the paper puts forward relevant policy recommendations: timely, complete and true disclosure of related party transactions, increase the disclosure of related investment information of large shareholders, To encourage the media to disclose information in order to play its supervisory role, to strengthen the linkage supervision of various links of information transparency, to strengthen the external audit supervision, to improve the proportion of independent directors and the independence of independent directors; Strengthen investor education to improve their self-protection awareness and ability. The innovation of this paper lies in: first of all, the paper analyzes the inhibition of information transparency on the embezzlement of large shareholders from a negative angle. That is, from the two manifestations of information opacity (endogenous asymmetry of information and manipulative asymmetry) combined with the corresponding specific cases to analyze the impact of information opacity on the behavior of encroachment; secondly, Innovative definition of the two variables in which large shareholders encroach on funds / other receivables / annual average total assets of OCCUP1 (related to large shareholders) and OCCUP2A (related to large shareholders) accounts receivable notes receivable other receivables-. Accounts payable-notes payable-accounts received in advance-other accounts payable, If it is greater than 0, take 1, otherwise 0. And the type of audit opinion can also be used as a measure of information transparency for the first time. The shortcoming of this paper is that the receivables formed by related party transactions are generally considered to be due to usurpation. The purpose of the fund is one-sided. We should distinguish the related party transaction which reduces the enterprise cost and the related party transaction which belongs to the interest infringement, and does not pay attention to the interest infringement behavior of the large shareholder through the non-affiliated transaction.
【学位授予单位】:首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F275;F832.51

【引证文献】

相关硕士学位论文 前1条

1 王怡;上市公司信息披露的投资者保护效应研究[D];山西财经大学;2015年



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