我国上市公司控制权私人收益的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-13 20:22

本文选题：控制权私人收益　切入点：影响因素　出处：《北京交通大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：公司所有权的集中治理结构以及公司内部大股东的普遍存在使得公司治理研究的焦点由Berle和Means(1932)所强调的传统意义上的股东与经理之间的委托代理问题转向大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题,大股东利用手中的控制权采取有利于自己从而独享不能为中小股东享受的额外利益即控制权私人收益。本文以我国股权分置改革完成为契机,利用2008-2011年度我国上市公司公开披露的数据为基础,对我国A股上市公司的控制权私人收益的整体概况以及控制权私人收益的影响因素进行了实证研究,得到以下结论： (1)股权分置改革以后,控制权发生变更的股份的转让价格比相应的控制权未发生变更的股份的转让价格高出4%,即公司控制权的私人收益依然存在。 (2)公司控股股东的控制力与控制权私人收益之间存在显著的正相关关系,即公司大股东的控制力越强,受到外部的控制权竞争将越小,控制权私人收益水平将越高。 (3)公司的财务杠杆与控制权私人收益之问存在显著的负相关关系,即债权人的监督和债务的约束可以抑制大股东的私利行为。 (4)公司的规模与控制权私人收益之间无显著的相关关系,即公司规模并不是我国大股东购买控制权时主要关注的因素。 (5)公司的财务状况与控制权私人收益之间呈显著的负相关关系,即大股东更倾向于购买财务状况较差的上市公司的控制权,因为其付出的成本低,而且获取潜在的改善公司资产管理效率的收益较大,控制权私人收益水平较高。
[Abstract]:The centralized governance structure of corporate ownership and the widespread existence of large shareholders within the company make the focus of corporate governance research shift from the traditional principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers emphasized by Berle and means 1932) to the majority shareholders. Agency issues with minority shareholders, Large shareholders use the control right in their hands to take advantage of their own interests, which can not be enjoyed by small and medium shareholders, namely, private benefits of control rights. This paper takes the completion of the reform of China's split share structure as an opportunity to use the publicly disclosed data of China's listed companies in 2008-2011 as the basis. This paper makes an empirical study on the general situation of the private income of the control right and the influencing factors of the private income of the control right of the A-share listed companies in China, and draws the following conclusions:. 1) after the reform of split share structure, the transfer price of the shares whose control right has changed is 4% higher than that of the shares whose control right has not changed, that is, the private income of the control right of the company still exists. 2) there is a significant positive correlation between the controlling power of the controlling shareholder and the private income of the control right, that is, the stronger the controlling power of the majority shareholder, the smaller the external competition of the control right, and the higher the level of the private income of the control right. 3) there is a significant negative correlation between the financial leverage of the company and the private income of control, that is, the supervision of creditors and the restraint of debt can restrain the self-interest behavior of large shareholders. 4) there is no significant correlation between the size of the company and the private income of the control right, that is, the size of the company is not the main factor that the major shareholders pay attention to when buying the control right in our country. 5) there is a significant negative correlation between the financial status of the company and the private income of control, that is, the majority shareholders are more inclined to buy the control rights of the listed companies with poor financial position because of their low cost. Moreover, the potential gains of improving the efficiency of asset management are higher, and the level of private income of control is higher.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F224

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