控股股东及机构投资者对定向增发价格的影响研究
发布时间:2018-03-25 05:35
本文选题:定向增发价格 切入点:影响因素 出处:《重庆大学》2012年硕士论文
【摘要】:自2006年以来,我国上市公司定向增发的热情空前高涨,,定向增发成为近几年我国上市公司再融资的重要手段之一。定向增发之所以受到上市公司和机构投资者的青睐主要是因为它有诸多优势,不仅发行程序简单、融资门槛较低、发行费用较低;而且可以为上市公司引入战略投资者、吸收大股东的资产实现整体上市。在定向增发实施的案例中,普遍存在着增发折价的现象。一些研究认为,我国上市公司定向增发中存在大股东的利益输送现象。控股大股东或降低增发股份的价格,或者以一定的资产认购更多的股份。 本文结合目前一些与定向增发相关的理论分析与实证结果对我国上市公司定向增发的价格影响因素进行了研究分析。主要从定向增发主要参与人的利益倾向和行为特征的角度,研究作为主要参与人的控股股东和机构投资者对增发价格的影响。本文以2006年—2011年完成定向增发的上市公司为样本,研究发现,控股股东的参与及认购方式将通过“隧道效应”降低增发价格,实现利益转移;而机构投资的参与则将通过“降低监督与调查成本”、“积极参与监督和管理”和“信号效应”等机制,促使增发价格提高。并且,二者对价格的影响存在交互作用:机构投资者的参与将加强增发参与人之间的竞争,从而抑制控股大股东对增发价格的人为压低。 经实证分析得出以下结论:(1)控股股东参与定向增发,会使增发价格的较低,有更多的折扣;(2)控股股东以现金方式认购,增发价格较高;以非现金方式认购,增发价格就较低;(3)机构投资者参与定向增发,会促使增发价格提高;(4)机构投资者的参与会削弱控股股东的“隧道挖掘”行为。因此,本文比较详细的分析了主要参与人对增发价格的影响,为投资者以后更好的投资以及证券监管部门加强定向增发的监管具有非常积极的意义。
[Abstract]:Since 2006, there has been an unprecedented surge in the enthusiasm of China's listed companies for additional directional offerings. Directional additional issuance has become one of the important means of refinancing of listed companies in China in recent years. The main reason why directional additional issuance is favored by listed companies and institutional investors is that it has many advantages, not only simple issuance procedures, but also low threshold of financing. The issuing cost is low, and the strategic investors can be introduced to the listed company, and the assets of the large shareholders can be absorbed to realize the overall listing. In the case of the implementation of the directional additional offering, the phenomenon of additional offering and discount generally exists. There exists the phenomenon of large shareholders' interest transmission in the directional additional issuance of listed companies in China. The controlling majority shareholders either reduce the price of the additional shares or subscribe for more shares with certain assets. Based on some theoretical analysis and empirical results, this paper analyzes the factors that affect the price of private placement of listed companies in China. The angle of behavior characteristics, This paper studies the effect of controlling shareholders and institutional investors as the main participants on the price of additional offerings. This paper takes the listed companies that completed the placement from 2006 to 2011 as a sample, and finds that, The participation and subscription of controlling shareholders will reduce the price of additional issue and realize the transfer of benefits through "tunnel effect"; Participation in institutional investment will increase the price of additional offerings through mechanisms such as "reducing the cost of supervision and investigation", "active participation in supervision and management" and "signal effect." The participation of institutional investors will strengthen the competition among the participants, thus restrain the majority shareholders from holding down the price of the additional offering. Through the empirical analysis, the following conclusions are drawn: the participation of the controlling shareholder in the directional additional offering will make the price of the additional offering lower, and more discounts will be given to the controlling shareholder by way of cash, and the price of the additional offer is higher. The participation of institutional investors in targeted placement will increase the price of additional offerings. The participation of institutional investors will weaken the "tunneling" behavior of controlling shareholders. This paper makes a detailed analysis of the influence of the main participants on the price of additional offerings, which has a very positive significance for investors to invest better in the future and for the securities regulatory authorities to strengthen the supervision of directional placement.
【学位授予单位】:重庆大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F832.51;F224
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