交叉持股对公司治理影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-01 09:40

本文选题：交叉持股　切入点：公司治理　出处：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：在国外资本市场中,企业为了进行资本运作和扩张,往往采用交叉持股的手段。在我国,交叉持股的发展历史并不长,但速度却非常快。随着我国经济的飞速发展,交叉持股在未来很长一段时间内将会越来越广泛地得到应用。发达国家的历史经验告诉我们,交叉持股在给企业带来莫大好处的同时,也带来了一些弊端,如控制权扭曲、损害股东及债权人权益等。因此,应当对交叉持股进行有效地引导规制,否则不但无法充分发挥其积极的作用,还会对资本市场带来弊端,进而对社会经济的稳定发展产生影响。而由于交叉持股在我国的发展历史并不长,因此对交叉持股的研究还不够成熟,从目前的研究文献来看,对交叉持股的理论综述较多,但实证上的研究范围不及国外的广,深度也不及国外的高。本文回顾了国内外交叉持股现象的有关理论,总结了相关的实证研究,根据我国上市公司所处的制度环境,从理论上对上市公司交叉持股与公司治理的关系进行了阐述,并从实证上进行了全面、系统的分析,希望能够对我国上市公司交叉持股对公司治理的影响有一个全面的认识。本文的具体研究内容如下：首先,文章的开篇是导论。这一部分主要介绍本文的研究目的及意义,研究内容,本文所使用的研究方法以及本文的亮点。在导论的基础上,本文对交叉持股进行了简单的概括,即文章的第二章,主要包括交叉持股的涵义和分类、起源和发展、利弊分析以及我国上市公司交叉持股的现状。同时,在该部分对交叉持股的不同解释进行了总结,并对本文所研究的交叉持股的范围进行了界定。在文章的第三章,本文对有关交叉持股方面的现有文献进行了综述。国外学术界对交叉持股的研究己经进入全面展开的阶段,尤其在日本公司治理结构中交叉持股现象理论及实证研究方面取得了丰富的成果。而国内的研究则偏重于法律法规上的完善和补充,以及从会计学角度看交叉持股对上市公司财务记账方面的影响,近年来也有少数的实证分析。因此,本章主要对国外的研究进行综述,并对国内的研究进行了总结。第四章是理论分析与假设的提出。本章是全文的理论依据,主要阐述了与本文研究内容及方法相关的理论知识,分为三部分：首先,对公司治理理论以及交叉持股对公司治理结构的影响进行了论述,主要指交叉持股对公司治理的影响,包括交叉持股带来的少数股权控制问题(Controlling-minority structure,简称CMS)1和内部人控制问题,并得出,交叉持股可以使企业以较少的资金来控制更多的股份,从而有利于资本运作；其次,阐述了信息不对称理论,并分析了交叉持股对信息不对称程度的影响,包括对持股集团内部和外部两个角度,并进一步企业的融资决策产生一定的影响；最后,对代理理论以及交叉持股对代理成本的影响进行分析,包括交叉持股对股东与债权人之间的代理问题的影响和对股东与管理层之间的代理问题的影响,并得出交叉持股使得代理成本增加的结论。在理论分析的基础上,该部分分别针对交叉持股在这三方面的影响提出了三个重要的假设。在理论分析的基础上,文章的第五部分进行了实证检验：第一,提出研究假设；第二,样本划分和数据的选取,根据我国上市公司交叉持股比例普遍较低的特殊情况,将样本公司分为两个子样本,交叉持股比例在10%以上的为高持股比例样本,10%以下的为低持股比例样本,以此完善模型；第三,研究设计,变量的定义、预期符号及假设以及回归模型的建立,明确指出采用变量及回归模型的原因；第四,模型运行结果的分析,主要包括描述性统计、相关性分析以及模型的运行结果分析,根据运行结果分析各个变量的显著性及模型的拟合优度,从数理角度对运行结果是否符合研究假设给予评价,并解释其符合或者不符合假设的原因。基于本文的理论探讨和实证分析,对交叉持股对公司治理的影响有以下几点总结： (1)上市公司交叉持股,对成员企业之间的公司治理产生显著的影响。交叉持股有进一步加大控制权与现金流权2的分离程度的作用,使得“CMS”问题和内部人控制问题更加严重,在此情况下,交叉持股的公司可以用较少的资本来控制更多的股份,从而达到“四两拨千斤”的效果,有利于进行资本运作。 (2)上市公司交叉持股,对信启、不对称程度并没有显著的影响。交叉持股促使参与持股的企业形成企业联盟,不易于出售股票,外部企业的信息不对称程度增加,外部融资成本增加,企业倾向于股权投资。同时,交叉持股可能会加重“CMS”问题,这可能缓解外部企业的信息不对称程度,外部股权流动性较强,外部融资成本降低,企业优先选择债务融资。因此,交叉持股对集团外部的信息不对称程度有一定的影响,但由于的本文研究方法及数据有限,其综合表现还无法确定。 (3)上市公司交叉持股比例较低时对代理成本的影响并不显著,而在交叉持股比例较高时,企业经理层相互之间的监督作用被弱化,企业内外部的治理机制不能有效地发挥其效用,进而代理问题变得更加严重,代理成本增加。本文是一篇关于上市公司交叉持股对公司治理的影响的实证研究,在现有文献的基础上,选择了几个比较有新意的角度进行了研究,主要有以下几点： (1)本文对交叉持股的研究角度比较新颖。关于交叉持股,无论是理论还是实证,国内外学者都进行了广泛且大量的研究,但关于交叉持股对公司治理等方面的影响,国外研究成果较多,而国内研究很少。本文从公司治理、信息不对称以及代理理论出发,针对我国上市公司交叉持股的现状,采用理论与实证研究相结合的方法,系统地研究了上市公司交叉持股对公司治理的影响。 (2)研究样本的划分方法比较新颖。对于交叉持股的实证研究,当前的学者采用最多的就是选择配对样本进行对比检验,但这种选择样本的方法得到的实证结果仅仅反映了交叉持股公司与非交叉持股公司在所研究问题上的表现是否有区别,不能反映交叉持股比例高低对所研究问题的影响程度。因此,本文在全样本的基础上,根据我国上市公司交叉持股的持股比例普遍较低(绝大部分在10%以下)的特点,对全样本进行了划分,将持股比例在10%以上的公司划分为高持股比例样本,否则为低持股比例样本。但本文的研究也存在着局限性： (1)研究的样本空间较小。本文对上市公司加以条件限制进行筛选之后,最终只有139家上市公司满足限制条件,尽管文章研究了三年的数据,但有些重要指标的回归结果仍然不太理想。另外,本文的部分数据完全靠手工收集,在收集的过程中可能会有遗漏,导致回归结果出现一定的偏差。 (2)回归模型的设计相对单一。本文在实证中运用了SPSS统计软件,对模型的样本数据进行了普通最小二乘法(OLS)回归分析,而针对研究假设所设计的模型也是简单的线性回归模型,并没有考虑到其他相关的模型,研究结果受到了一定的限制。 (3)研究方法相对较少。本文仅仅采用了普通最小二乘法(OLS)对模型的样本数据进行了简单的回归,尽管对样本进行了分类,分别讨论了两种不同情况下交叉持股对公司治理的影响,但研究方法的单一使得所得出的研究结果的准确性受到一定的影响。基于文章分析探讨以及所得出的结论,我国上市公司在进行交叉持股的时候,应该合理利用其优势,避免其弊端,同时,政府应对上市公司交叉持股应该给予足够的重视与合理的监督,正确的引导其健康发展,避免其不利影响：对于上市公司,在进行交叉持股的时候应该严格控制持股比例；对于监管部门,应当完善信息披露制度,规定上市公司交叉持股的信启、应当进行披露。
[Abstract]:In the overseas capital market, enterprises in the capital operation and expansion, often using cross shareholding means. In China, the history of cross shareholding is not long, but the speed is very fast. With the rapid development of China's economy, cross shareholding for a long period of time will be applied more and more widely in the future. The historical experience of the developed countries tells us that cross shareholdings in great benefits to enterprises, it also brings some drawbacks, such as control of distortion, damage the rights and interests of shareholders and creditors. Therefore, cross shareholding should be effectively guide the regulation, otherwise not only can not fully play its positive role, but also bring disadvantages on the capital market, and the stability of social and economic development impact. Because cross shareholding in our country's history is not long, so the research on cross shareholding is not mature enough, from the current According to the research literature, there are many theories about cross shareholding, but the scope of empirical research is less than that of foreign countries, and the depth is not as high as that of foreign countries.
This paper reviews the related theories of domestic and foreign cross shareholdings, summarizes the relevant empirical research, according to the institutional environment of Chinese listed companies, from the theory of cross shareholding and corporate governance of listed companies is discussed, and from the demonstration of a comprehensive, systematic analysis, hope to be able to have a a comprehensive understanding of the impact of cross shareholding of listed companies on corporate governance. The main research contents of this paper are as follows:
First, the introduction of the article is an introduction. This part mainly introduces the purpose and significance of the research, the research contents, the research methods and highlights of this article.
On the basis of introduction, this paper gives a brief introduction on cross shareholding, namely the article second chapter, mainly including the definition and classification of the cross shareholding, origin and development, as well as the current situation analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of cross shareholding of Listed Companies in China. At the same time, the different explanation in this part of the cross shareholding are summarized. The scope of the cross ownership and studies are defined.
In the third chapter, this paper reviews the existing literature on cross shareholding. Foreign academic research on cross shareholding has entered the stage in full swing, especially in the Japanese corporate governance structure in cross shareholding phenomenon theory and empirical research has made great achievements. But the perfection and supplement of domestic research the emphasis on laws and regulations, as well as from the accounting perspective of cross shareholding effect on financial accounting of the listed company, in recent years there have been few empirical analysis. Therefore, this chapter mainly summarizes the foreign research and domestic research are summarized.
The fourth chapter is the theoretical analysis and assumptions. This chapter is the theoretical foundation of this thesis, mainly expounds the related theories and research contents and methods of this paper, divided into three parts: firstly, the influence of corporate governance theory and cross shareholding on corporate governance structure are discussed, mainly refers to the influence of cross shareholding of companies governance, including minority ownership control problems brought by cross shareholding (Controlling-minority structure, referred to as CMS) and 1 internal control issues, and that the cross shareholding can make enterprises with less money to control more shares, which is conducive to the operation of the capital; secondly, expounds the theory of asymmetric information, and analyzes the impact of cross shareholding the degree of information asymmetry, including the ownership of the group's internal and external two aspects, and further affect the enterprise financing decision; most of the agency theory, And the theory of cross shareholding to analyze the impact on agency costs, including the impact of Cross Shareholding on the agency problem between shareholders and creditors and the impact on the agency problem between shareholders and managers, and the cross shareholdings increase the agency cost of the conclusion. Based on theoretical analysis, this part respectively according to the impact of cross shareholding in this three aspects put forward three important assumptions.
On the basis of theoretical analysis, the fifth part of the article makes an empirical test: first, put forward the research hypothesis; second, sample selection and data classification, according to the special situation of China's listed company cross shareholding ratio is generally low, the Sample Firms will be divided into two sub samples, cross shareholding ratio of more than 10% for the high stake the proportion of sample, below 10% for the low stake samples, in order to improve the model; third, study design, variable definitions, symbols and expectations hypothesis and establish regression model, clearly pointed out by reason of variables and regression model; fourth, analysis of model results, including descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and model analysis the operation results, according to the operation results of fitting analysis of significant variables and model goodness, from the perspective of mathematical operation results are consistent with the hypothesis evaluation And explain why it conforms to or does not conform to the hypothesis.
Based on the theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper, the effects of Cross Shareholding on corporate governance are summarized as follows:
(1) the cross shareholding of listed companies have a significant impact on corporate governance between member enterprises. With further increase the degree of Cross Shareholding Separation of control rights and cash flow rights 2 the role of making the "CMS" problem and the problem of internal control is more serious, in this case, cross shareholding companies can use less the capital to control more shares, so as to achieve the "42 pounds" effect, is conducive to capital operation.
(2) cross shareholdings of listed companies, the information asymmetry, and no significant impact. Cross shareholding participation in the ownership of the enterprise to form the enterprise alliance, not easy to sell the stock, the degree of information asymmetry outside the enterprise increasing external financing costs increase, enterprises tend to equity investment. At the same time, cross shareholding may increase CMS "problem, which may alleviate the degree of information asymmetry outside the enterprise, external equity strong liquidity, reduce external financing costs, corporate debt financing preference. Therefore, have a certain impact on cross shareholding group external information asymmetry degree, but the research methods of this paper and due to the limited data, the overall performance is uncertain.
(3) the listed company cross shareholding is low influence on the agency cost is not significant, but in the cross shareholding ratio is high, enterprise managers mutual supervision function is weakened, the internal and external governance mechanism can not effectively play its effectiveness, and agency problems become more serious, the increase of agency costs.
This paper is an empirical research on the impact of cross shareholdings on corporate governance. Based on the existing literature, several innovative perspectives are selected.
(1) the research angle of cross shareholding is relatively new. About the cross shareholding, whether theoretical or empirical, domestic and foreign scholars have carried out extensive and a lot of research, but on the impact of Cross Shareholding on corporate governance and other aspects, many foreign research results, but the domestic research is few. From the corporate governance of information. Asymmetry and agency theory, in view of the current situation of cross shareholdings of Listed Companies in China, using the method of combination of theory and empirical research, systematic study of the influence of cross shareholdings of listed companies on corporate governance.
(2) the research sample division method is novel. The empirical research on cross shareholding, the scholars using the most is the choice of paired samples for comparison test, but the empirical sample selection method to get the results reflect only cross Holding Company and non cross Holding Company in the research on the question of whether there are differences in performance, can not reflect cross shareholding ratio of the level of influence on the study. Therefore, based on the full sample, according to the shareholding proportion of cross shareholding of Listed Companies in China are generally low (mostly below 10%) characteristics of the whole sample were divided, the shareholding of more than 10% companies into high stake the proportion of the sample, or for the low stake samples.
However, there are limitations in this study.
(1) small samples. After the research of the listed company to limit the final screening, only 139 listed companies meet the conditions, the article studied three years of data, but the regression results of some important indicators still not ideal. In addition, this part of the data collected in the collection entirely by hand. The process may be missed, leading to the regression results there is a certain deviation.
(2) the design of regression model is relatively simple. This paper uses SPSS statistical software in the empirical research, the sample data model of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, linear and according to the research hypothesis design model is the simple regression model, and do not take into account other relevant research results by the model. A limit.
(3) research methods are relatively few. The paper only adopted the ordinary least squares (OLS) model of the sample data of a simple regression, although the samples were classified, two different cases of Cross Shareholding on corporate governance are studied, but the research method makes the accuracy of results obtained from a single the affected.
The analysis and conclusions based on Chinese Listed Companies in cross shareholdings, should make use of its advantages, avoid the disadvantages, at the same time, the government should cross shareholdings of listed companies should be given sufficient attention and reasonable supervision, the right to guide its healthy development, to avoid the adverse effect of the listed: companies should strictly control the shareholding ratio when cross shareholding; for regulators should improve the information disclosure system, regulations of cross shareholdings of listed companies on the information, and shall be disclosed.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】