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首次公开发行限售、道德风险与企业绩效

发布时间:2018-04-25 04:05

  本文选题:首次公开发行限售 + 道德风险 ; 参考:《南京大学》2012年硕士论文


【摘要】:在股权分置改革基本完成“新老划断”后,为了保护市场和投资者的利益,A股市场开始实施首次公开发行限售制度。其中,对发行人的主要控股股东和实际控制人所持有的股份规定了3年的限售期。该项制度旨在保持公司治理结构和经营管理的稳定,防范管理团队频繁变动影响公司经营管理和业务的持续性所带来的风险。 国外的相关研究发现,首次公开发行限售制度通常被作为一种降低道德风险的承诺机制,潜在的道德风险越高的企业其原股东股份的限售期越长。不过国外的限售期限一般为12至18个月,不到A股市场控股股东股份限售期的一半。那么,中国这种由制度统一规范的更加严格的限售制度是否能更有效的解决道德风险问题呢?公司治理的改善将有助于提升企业绩效,同时内部人为避免限售期内的市场过度反应可能进行正向转移利润的盈余管理活动。那么,首次公开发行限售制度的实施究竟是提升了企业绩效还是刺激了公司的盈余管理行为?对上述问题的考察还要考虑所有权性质的影响。 本文以A股市场2006年至2008年执行新股发行限售制度后上市的公司为样本,检验中国资本市场新股发行限售制度对公司行为以及企业绩效的影响。研究结果发现,首次公开发行限售制度对不同所有权性质的公司产生的影响存在差异。在实施限售制度后,国有企业并未表现出显著的业绩变化或盈余管理行为,而非国有企业则在限售期内的业绩以及操控性应计利润均显著高于限售期外的值,非国有企业的这种较高的盈利能力可能主要是盈余管理驱动的结果。本文的研究结论可以提供IPO限售制度对公司行为和业绩影响的实证证据,丰富了国外的相关理论,同时也为我国的新股发行政策制定提供了政策依据。 本文后续内容安排如下:第一章为引言,阐述了研究的背景、意义以及文章的主要研究思路;第二章分别对国内外的首次公开发行限售制度进行了介绍,并对该项制度的理论基础进行了梳理;第三章为文献回顾和假设推导;第四章为研究设计,包括样本选择、变量设计和研究方法;第五章是实证检验结果及分析;第六章为研究结论。
[Abstract]:In order to protect the interests of the market and investors, the A-share market began to implement the restriction system of initial public offering after the reform of split share structure basically completed the "new and old cut off" in order to protect the interests of the market and investors. Among them, the issuer's main controlling shareholder and the actual control of the shares held by the fixed period of 3 years. The purpose of this system is to maintain the stability of the corporate governance structure and management, and to prevent the risk that the frequent changes of the management team will affect the company's management and business continuity. Foreign studies have found that the initial public offering restriction system is usually used as a commitment mechanism to reduce moral hazard, and the higher the potential moral hazard is, the longer the restriction period of the original shareholders is. But foreign restrictions typically range from 12 to 18 months, less than half of those of controlling shareholders in the A-share market. So, can China's more strict restriction system, which is regulated by the unified system, solve the moral hazard problem more effectively? The improvement of corporate governance will help to improve corporate performance, while insiders may carry out positive profit transfer earnings management activities to avoid market overreaction during the restricted period. So, does the implementation of the initial public offering restriction system improve the corporate performance or stimulate the earnings management behavior of the company? The impact of the nature of ownership should also be taken into account in the examination of the above-mentioned issues. This paper takes the A share market as a sample of companies listed after implementing the IPO restriction system from 2006 to 2008 to examine the impact of the IPO restriction system on corporate behavior and firm performance in China's capital market. The results show that the initial public offering restriction system has different effects on different ownership companies. After the implementation of the restricted sale system, the state-owned enterprises did not show significant changes in performance or earnings management behavior, while the non-state-owned enterprises showed significantly higher performance and operating accrued profits during the restricted period than those outside the restricted period. The higher profitability of non-state-owned enterprises may be mainly driven by earnings management. The conclusions of this paper can provide empirical evidence of the impact of IPO restriction on corporate behavior and performance, enrich the relevant theories abroad, and provide policy basis for the formulation of new issue policy in China. The following contents are arranged as follows: the first chapter is the introduction, which describes the background, significance and main research ideas of the research; the second chapter introduces the domestic and foreign initial public offering restriction system. The third chapter is literature review and hypothesis deduction, the fourth chapter is research design, including sample selection, variable design and research methods, the fifth chapter is empirical test results and analysis; Chapter six is the conclusion of the research.
【学位授予单位】:南京大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F832.51;F276.6;F224

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