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我国上市公司关联方交易的监管研究

发布时间:2018-04-26 06:12

  本文选题:上市公司 + 关联交易 ; 参考:《天津财经大学》2012年硕士论文


【摘要】:1997年琼民源公司的董事在操纵股市使股价异常升高后卷资集体辞职,经过长达一年的调查发现琼民源公司利用与关联方公司签订无效合同虚构5.4亿元利润,调查结果引起社会一片哗然,影响极其恶劣。据统计,每年有90%左右的上市公司存在关联交易行为,为了引导关联交易公平进行,防止上市公司利用不公允的关联交易操纵利润、公司被内部人控制、公司资产流失,保护股东的权益,1997年5月财政部颁布的《企业会计准则-关联方关系及其交易的披露》应运而生。此后,税务部门、证券交易所和证监会等监管部门都陆续出台了对关联方交易披露的规定,同时上市公司内部也通过改善公司治理结构,逐渐加强了对关联交易的监管。 首先,论文在对关联交易监管的目标、体系以及现在我国关联交易监管中存在的问题进行分析的基础上,通过对2003-2010年沪深两市A股上市公司关联方交易的信息披露情况、交易方向、事项分类及行业特征等进行描述性统计,根据其变化规律分析外部法律法规对关联交易的监管效果,得出90%以上的公司存在关联交易行为、信息披露情况得到改善但是涉及交易的最关键的定价方法披露情况还有待改进、交易事项中担保、资金及商品交易所占比重较大、工业行业所占比重最大的结论。然后,论文对2010年沪深两市A股制造业公司的关联交易规模与第一大股东持股比例、董事会、监事会、独立董事规模、股权制衡度等分别进行多元回归,分析公司内部治理机构对关联交易的监管效果。得出第一大股东持股比例、董事会与关联交易的规模正相关。股权制衡度与关联交易的规模负相关、独立董事和监事会不能显著影响关联交易的结论。最后,论文针对研究发现的问题提出了完善会计信息披露制度、重点监管重大交易事项、加大违规成本、提高董事会、独立董事和监事会独立性、鼓励自愿披露关联交易信息等建议,以期减少不公允的关联交易发生,为相关监管部门提供理论建议与数据支持。
[Abstract]:In 1997, the directors of Qiong Minyuan Company resigned collectively after manipulating the stock market and causing the stock price to rise unusually. After a year's investigation, it was found that Qiong Minyuan Company used an invalid contract with a related party company to fabricate 540 million yuan of profits. The results of the investigation caused a social uproar and an extremely bad impact. According to statistics, about 90% of listed companies have related party transactions every year. In order to guide the fair conduct of related party transactions and prevent listed companies from manipulating profits through unfair related party transactions, companies are controlled by insiders and their assets are lost. To protect the rights and interests of shareholders, the Accounting Standards for Enterprises-Disclosure of Relational parties and their transactions, issued by the Ministry of Finance in May 1997, emerged as the times require. Since then, the tax authorities, stock exchanges and the Securities Regulatory Commission and other regulatory authorities have issued regulations on the disclosure of related party transactions. At the same time, through improving the corporate governance structure, the listed companies have gradually strengthened the supervision of related party transactions. First of all, based on the analysis of the target, system and existing problems in the supervision of related party transactions in China, the information disclosure of related party transactions in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2010 is analyzed. According to the analysis of the regulatory effect of external laws and regulations on related party transactions, it is concluded that more than 90% of companies have related party transactions. The disclosure of information is improved but the most critical pricing method involved in the transaction is still to be improved. The conclusion is that the guarantee, capital and commodity exchanges account for a large proportion of the transactions, and the largest proportion of the industrial industry. Then, the paper carries on the multivariate regression to the related party transaction scale of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing companies in 2010 and the proportion of the largest shareholders, the board of directors, the board of supervisors, the scale of independent directors, the degree of equity balance and so on. Analysis of the regulatory effect of internal corporate governance on related party transactions. The proportion of the largest shareholders, the board of directors and the scale of related party transactions are positively related. The degree of equity balance is negatively related to the scale of related party transactions, and independent directors and board of supervisors can not significantly affect the conclusion of related party transactions. Finally, the paper proposes to improve the accounting information disclosure system, focus on the supervision of major transactions, increase the cost of violations, improve the independence of the board of directors, independent directors and the board of supervisors, and improve the independence of the board of directors, independent directors and the board of supervisors. Suggestions such as voluntary disclosure of related party transaction information are encouraged in order to reduce the occurrence of unfair related party transactions and provide theoretical advice and data support for relevant regulatory authorities.
【学位授予单位】:天津财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F832.51;F224

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