管理者过度自信对公司融资决策影响的研究

发布时间：2018-05-02 19:23

本文选题：行为金融 + 管理者过度自信　；参考：《河北经贸大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：管理者过度自信是一种主观情绪。适度的自信可以给公司带来好处,但是过度的自信会影响公司的金融决策,尤其是管理者过度自信很有可能引起非理性融资行为,损害公司的长期利益和价值。本文试图研究,我国上市公司管理者过度自信对融资决策的影响及在我国制度安排和股权背景下,公司治理结构对管理者过度自信引起的非理性融资的影响。本文首先梳理和评述了国内外管理者过度自信对上市公司融资决策影响的相关研究,界定了管理者过度自信和融资的概念,从优序融资和控制权角度分析我国上市公司存在管理者过度自信偏向于债务融资的可能。本文用盈余预告水平高于实际收益水平或是乐观预测事后不一致作为管理者过度自信的衡量指标,选取2008～2010年沪深两市A股主板披露第三季度盈余报告且报告类型为预增的上市公司为研究对象,剔除金融行业、ST、*ST、资产负债率大于100%和数据不全的样本,得到645家上市公司作为研究样本,主要采取描述性统计分析和线性回归分析等方法。本文将公司治理结构的两个变量：第一大股东持股比例和董事会规模作为主要变量引入到模型中,分析了管理者过度自信公司的治理结构对融资决策的影响,以此来观察我国公司治理结构是否能抑制管理者过度自信引发的非理性融资。本文研究结论表明,我国上市公司中确实存在管理者过度自信的现象,管理者过度自信与资产负债率正相关,且管理者过度自信公司的第一大股东持股比例与资产负债率负相关,董事会规模与资产负债率正相关。即管理者过度自信的公司中第一大股东持股比例越高,董事会规模越小,管理者越不倾向于债务融资。可见,改善公司治理结构可以抑制管理者过度自信引发的高负债融资决策。
[Abstract]:Manager overconfidence is a subjective emotion. Moderate confidence can bring benefits to the company, but overconfidence will affect the financial decision of the company, especially the manager overconfidence may lead to irrational financing behavior, and damage the long-term interests and value of the company. This paper attempts to study the influence of overconfidence of managers on financing decisions and the influence of corporate governance structure on irrational financing caused by overconfidence of managers under the background of institutional arrangements and equity rights in China. Firstly, this paper reviews the research on the influence of manager overconfidence on the financing decision of listed companies at home and abroad, and defines the concepts of manager overconfidence and financing. This paper analyzes the possibility of overconfidence of managers in China's listed companies from the perspective of priority financing and control rights. In this paper, the level of earnings forecast is higher than the actual income level or the optimistic forecast is inconsistent afterwards as a measure of overconfidence of managers. In this paper, we select the listed companies whose earnings report of the third quarter of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares are disclosed by the main Board of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2010 and the report type is a pre-increase. The sample with assets and liabilities ratio greater than 100% and incomplete data is excluded from the financial industry. A total of 645 listed companies were selected as research samples, mainly by descriptive statistical analysis and linear regression analysis. This paper introduces two variables of corporate governance structure: first, the proportion of shareholders holding shares and the size of board of directors as the main variables in the model, and analyzes the influence of corporate governance structure on financing decision. In order to observe whether the corporate governance structure of our country can restrain the irrational financing caused by manager overconfidence. The conclusion of this paper shows that there is a phenomenon of overconfidence of managers in Chinese listed companies, and there is a positive correlation between the overconfidence of managers and the ratio of assets and liabilities. Moreover, the proportion of the largest shareholder is negatively correlated with the asset-liability ratio, and the size of the board of directors is positively correlated with the asset-liability ratio. That is, the higher the holding ratio of the largest shareholder in the overconfident company, the smaller the board size, and the less inclined the manager is to debt financing. Therefore, the improvement of corporate governance structure can restrain the high debt financing decision caused by overconfidence of managers.
【学位授予单位】：河北经贸大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272;F832.51;F224

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