控股股东与银行债权人合谋的影响因素研究

发布时间：2018-05-03 12:30

本文选题：控股股东 + 银行债权人　；参考：《东北大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：控股股东的利益侵占问题已经成为国内外学者研究的重点,目前国内外现有的文献大多研究控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占,部分学者开始关注控股股东对债权人的利益侵占,认为由于信息不对称,控股股东可能利用已签订的债务契约中的不完善条款来损害债权人的利益,例如通过资产转移、资产替代等手段进行利益侵占。已有的研究大都将债权人和中小股东共同作为外部投资者,作为控股股东利益侵害的对象。实际上,在控股股东保障债权人债务安全的前提下,债权人会对控股股东的利益侵占行为听之任之,甚至会与控股股东合谋来侵占中小股东的利益,进而影响企业价值。本文主要从理论和模型两个方面探讨控股股东与银行债权人合谋存在的可能性,对控股股东与银行债权人合谋的影响因素进行了理论分析,并通过实证对合谋的影响因素进行了检验。这将为探讨控股股东新的利益侵占方式、有效约束控股股东的利益侵占、切实保护中小股东利益、进而完善公司治理机制提供了一个新的视角。本文首先界定了合谋的含义、合谋理论基础,并将债权人分为银行债权人和中小债权人,主要研究控股股东与银行债权人合谋的利益侵占问题。本文不仅从理论上说明了控股股东与银行债权人合谋的可能性,而且通过模型分析得到控股股东与银行债权人存在合谋的可能性。对于控股股东与银行债权人合谋的影响因素,主要从公司治理因素和外部环境因素进行理论分析,并且根据2007年至2011年我国上市公司财务数据进行了实证检验,结果表明：(1)控股股东持股比例越高,控股股东与银行债权人合谋程度越高。(2)控股股东为企业集团的股东时,控股股东与银行债权人合谋程度越高。(3)控股股东为国有企业股东时,控股股东与银行债权人合谋程度越低。(4)独立董事比例越高,控股股东与银行债权人合谋程度越低。(5)政府干预程度越高,控股股东与银行债权人合谋程度越高。(6)投资者保护越好,控股股东与银行债权人合谋程度越低。(7)审计机构为四大会计事务所时,控股股东与银行债权人合谋程度越低。最后根据已证实的影响因素并结合我国实际,提出了抑制控股股东与银行债权人合谋的建议。
[Abstract]:The interest encroachment of controlling shareholders has become the focus of scholars at home and abroad. At present, most of the existing literature at home and abroad has studied the interests of controlling shareholders on minority shareholders, and some scholars have begun to pay attention to the interests of controlling shareholders encroaching on creditors. Because of the asymmetric information, the controlling shareholder may use the imperfect clause in the signed debt contract to damage the interests of the creditor, such as through asset transfer, asset substitution and other means of interest usurpation. Most of the existing studies take creditors and minority shareholders as external investors and as the object of interest infringement of controlling shareholders. In fact, on the premise that controlling shareholders guarantee the creditor's debt safety, the creditor will let the controlling shareholder's interest encroach on it, even conspire with the controlling shareholder to encroach on the interests of the minority shareholder, and then affect the enterprise value. This paper mainly discusses the possibility of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors from two aspects of theory and model, and analyzes theoretically the influencing factors of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors. And through the empirical evidence of the influence of collusion factors were tested. This will provide a new angle of view for exploring the new ways of controlling shareholders' interest encroachment, effectively constraining the interests of controlling shareholders, protecting the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, and then perfecting the corporate governance mechanism. This paper first defines the meaning of collusion and the theoretical basis of collusion and divides creditors into bank creditors and small and medium creditors. This paper not only explains theoretically the possibility of collusion between controlling shareholder and bank creditor, but also obtains the possibility of collusion between controlling shareholder and bank creditor through model analysis. The influencing factors of controlling shareholders' collusion with bank creditors are theoretically analyzed from corporate governance factors and external environmental factors, and empirical tests are made according to the financial data of listed companies from 2007 to 2011. The results show that the higher the proportion of controlling shareholders is, the higher the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors is. (2) when controlling shareholders are shareholders of enterprise groups, the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors is higher. (3) when controlling shareholders are shareholders of state-owned enterprises, The lower the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors, the higher the proportion of independent directors, the lower the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors, the higher the degree of government intervention, and the higher the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors. The lower the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors is, the lower the degree of collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors is when the audit institution is the four major accounting firms. Finally, according to the confirmed influencing factors and the reality of our country, the paper puts forward some suggestions to restrain the collusion between controlling shareholders and bank creditors.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】