终极控制权、两权分离对我国上市公司非效率投资影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-04 23:30

本文选题：现金流权 + 控制权　；参考：《山东财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：投资行为是公司发展和成长的重要基础，它直接影响公司的融资决策和分配政策，间接影响宏观经济的平稳运行。而过度投资和投资不足等非效率投资行为将影响公司的正常发展，导致公司资源的浪费。传统公司治理理论主要是围绕第一类委托代理问题，是建立在股权结构分散的基础之上。然而大量的研究表明，我国上市公司的股权结构高度集中，并且存在着终极控股股东。一部分上市公司中终极控股股东控制权与现金流权偏离，控股股东以较低的现金流权拥有较大的控制权。这种两权分离现象的存在使得终极控股股东更有能力和动机去侵害中小股东利益攫取控制权私有收益，这就使得我们研究终极控股股东控制权以及控制权与现金流权两权分离对企业非效率投资行为的影响具有重要的现实意义。为了考察终极控股股东的控制权和两权分离度对企业非效率投资的影响，本文以代理理论、信息不对称理论等为基础，建立预期投资模型，通过相关性检验、描述性分析、多元回归分析等方法，，对我国上市公司数据进行研究。研究结果表明：上市公司的两权分离度与过度投资呈显著正相关关系，但对投资不足有抑制作用。上市公司的控制权与过度投资和投资不足都显著正相关。另外，本文按照终极股权性质分组发现只有在非国有控股的上市公司，控制权与现金流权的分离度与非效率投资显著正相关；在地方控股上市公司，两权分离度仅与投资过度存在显著正相关关系，对投资不足的影响不显著。而在中央控股的上市公司中，两权分离度对投资不足和过度投资的影响都不显著，对投资不足在一定程度上还有抑制作用，说明两权分离度对上市公司可能还存在一定的保护性机制。
[Abstract]:Investment behavior is an important basis for the development and growth of a company. It directly affects the financing decision and distribution policy of the company and indirectly affects the smooth operation of the macro economy. The inefficient investment behavior, such as overinvestment and underinvestment, will affect the normal development of the company and lead to the waste of the company's resources. The traditional corporate governance theory mainly revolves around the first kind of principal-agent problem, which is based on the dispersion of ownership structure. However, a large number of studies show that the ownership structure of listed companies in China is highly concentrated and there are ultimate controlling shareholders. In some listed companies, the ultimate controlling shareholder's right of control deviates from the right of cash flow, and the controlling shareholder has greater control right with lower cash flow right. The existence of this phenomenon of separation of two rights makes the ultimate controlling shareholder more capable and motivated to encroach on the interests of small and medium shareholders to seize the private benefits of control. This makes us to study the ultimate controlling shareholder control and the separation of control and cash flow rights on the impact of inefficient investment behavior has an important practical significance. In order to investigate the influence of the ultimate controlling shareholder's control right and the degree of separation of two rights on the enterprise's inefficient investment, based on the agency theory and the information asymmetry theory, this paper establishes the expected investment model, and through the correlation test, describes the analysis. This paper studies the data of listed companies in China by multiple regression analysis. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of separation of two rights and overinvestment, but it can restrain the underinvestment. The control rights of listed companies are significantly positively correlated with overinvestment and underinvestment. In addition, according to the nature of ultimate equity, this paper finds that only in non-state-owned holding listed companies, the separation of control and cash flow rights is significantly positively related to inefficient investment, while in local holding listed companies, there is a significant positive correlation between the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. There is only a significant positive correlation between the degree of separation of the two rights and the investment overinvestment, but the effect on the underinvestment is not significant. However, in the centrally held listed companies, the degree of separation of the two rights has little effect on the underinvestment and overinvestment, and to a certain extent, the degree of the separation of the two rights also has a restraining effect on the underinvestment. It shows that the degree of separation of the two rights may also have a protective mechanism for listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：山东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】