全流通背景下控股股东增减持行为与绩效关系研究

发布时间：2018-05-13 02:27

本文选题：全流通 + 内部人交易　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：股权分置是2005年之前中国股票市场特有的现象,曾在股票市场设立之初对保护国有资产起到了积极的作用,但随着市场的发展,股权分置逐渐成为证券市场健康发展最大的制度障碍,非流通股和流通股同股不同权不同价,扭曲了两大类股东利益关系,公司治理架构形同虚设,治理效率严重受阻。2005年的股权分置改革为这种特殊的股权制度划上了句号,使原先占比约三分之二的非流通股逐渐通过对价获得了流通权,但随之也引来了一系列如“大小非”减持解禁股等新的问题。大股东特别是控股股东作为企业实际控制人,对企业运营掌握着绝对的信息优势。因此对大股东行为的研究一直是公司治理学术研究的热点之一,在国外,由于大小股东其股权都可上市流通,市场成熟度比较高,法律基础设施健全,市场作为外部治理机制,对包括大股东在内的内部人集团形成较强的约束力。然而在国内,特别是股权分置改革之前,大股东作为企业实际控制人,其股权一般不可上市流通,他并不太关注公司股票在资本市场上的表现,并且具有较强的掏空上市公司资产的动机。当大股东需要转让股份时,一般只能通过公开市场外私底下协议转让,转让价往往以每股净资产为基础,价格通常远低于流通股股价。这种现象使得外部市场对公司治理起不到约束和监督作用,包括大股东在内的内部人集团可以利用信息优势在公开市场上进行内幕交易,在场外对上市公司进行挖空,加剧了与外部投资者的利益冲突。尤其在国有控股上市公司,产生的代理问题更为复杂。股权分置改革之后,包括控股股东在内的大股东股票逐步获得上市流通权,同股不同价的状况逐渐改善,一定程度上缓解了其与外部中小投资者的利益冲突。以大股东为代表的内部人集团通过场外关联交易的行为成本增加,必须真正改善公司治理和提高公司业绩才能在二级市场获得回报。但是,新的治理问题也随之而来。由于股改前积累了较强的套现需求等因素,股改之后的近几年时间里出现了许多“大小非”减持解禁股的现象。学术界围绕股权分置改革、限售股解禁、以及“大小非”减持动机及其绩效影响等进行了广泛和深入的研究。随着三一重工最后一批限售股在2008年得到解禁,意味着全流通时代的真正到来。大股东特别是控股股东作为特殊的投资者,开始越来越频繁地在公开市场进行交易。笔者认为,全流通背景下大股东的交易行为和后股权分置改革时期的减持套现不能相提并论。如果依据国内学者的研究结论,原非流通股股东在获得流通权后,通过操纵市场抬高股价进行高位减持以套现为目的,那么,在全流通时代的交易行为则更多是基于对公司业绩变好或变差的预期、或股票估值偏差等因素所导致。基于西方对内部人交易的研究成果,包括控股股东在内的内部人往往利用信息优势进行交易以获利,那么我国现阶段(即全流通时代)控股股东在二级市场上的交易行为是否因为得到了企业未来业绩向好或向坏预期的优势信息?本文将对这些问题进行研究,试图找出其基于企业运营情况的交易行为影响因素、并对交易前后公司绩效的变化进行分析研究。本文分为六个部分,第一部分是绪论部分。提出文章的研究背景与研究意义,并阐述研究的思路、方法和文章的框架结构。第二部分是本文的文献综述部分。包括国外和国内对于包括控股股东在内的大股东交易行为、以及大股东行为与公司治理、公司绩效的关系方面的研究现状和主要成果。第三部分是本文的理论分析部分。主要从委托代理视角下分析包括控股股东在内的大股东行为效应、以及基于信息非对称理论下的信号传递假说,分析大股东在公开市场交易行为的由来,并对我国公司治理结构和控股股东增减持行为现状进行了简要的描述分析,为下文的实证研究奠定基础。第四部分为本文的理论假设和研究设计部分。本部分基于第二部分相关的研究成果和第三部分的理论基础,从业绩因素、估值因素、发展因素等方面对控股股东增减持行为与公司绩效的关系提出假设,并分别对增减持和减持组进行回归模型设计。第五部分是本文的实证研究部分。本章主要包括对控股股东增减持行为信息优势动因的实证分析、以及控股股东增减持后样本公司短、中、长期绩效变化的统计分析和检验。第六部分是本文的主要研究结论与启示。通过理论和实证分析,本文得出了以下主要结论：一、控股股东增持股票更多地基于企业长期发展能力而非短期业绩波动,体现了一种维持资本市场稳定性和保持投资者信心的“家长”心态和政策因素。而控股股东减持公司股份主要基于较差的业绩前景预期、股东获利不足等方面来考虑,企业估值因素并非控股股东增减持的首要动因。二、在较短时间内(前后10日),控股股东增持或减持行为具有显著的市场反应,表现为增持组股票平均超额收益AR显著提高,减持组股票平均超额收益AR显著下降。三、将时间放到增减持的当年与上一年度比较,发现增持组在成长性、盈利能力以及现金创造能力上有显著提高,而减持组的盈利能力以及资本使用效率则显著降低。四、从较长时间看,控股股东增持后样本公司绩效提升的显著性得到持续,而减持组业绩下降的趋势却得到了改善,并表现出比较好的业绩前景和发展性。对于投资者来说,理性和区分看待控股股东交易行为,充分了解各方面信息,才能避免各种风险的冲击,对于政策制定者来说,应加大对上市公司信息披露的监管力度和对中小投资者的保护力度,强化对内幕交易的惩罚制度建设,避免上市公司大股东利用内幕消息为自己谋利,损害中小股东的利益。
[Abstract]:The share separation is a special phenomenon in the Chinese stock market before 2005, and it played a positive role in protecting the state-owned assets at the beginning of the establishment of the stock market. However, with the development of the market, the separation of shares has gradually become the biggest institutional obstacle to the healthy development of the stock market. The different prices of the non circulation shares and the shares of the shares are different, and the two major distortions are distorted. In the interests of shareholders, the corporate governance structure is in the same shape, and the equity split reform in.2005 years has been blocked for this special equity system. The non tradable shares, which originally accounted for about 2/3, gradually gained the right to circulation through the price. Wait for a new problem.
The large shareholders, especially the controlling shareholders as the actual controller of the enterprise, have absolute information superiority to the operation of the enterprise. Therefore, the study of the behavior of the large shareholders has always been one of the hot spots in the academic research of the corporate governance. In foreign countries, because the shareholders of the large and small shareholders can be listed in circulation, the market maturity is relatively high, the legal infrastructure is sound and the market is sound. As an external governance mechanism, it forms a strong binding force for the internal group including the large shareholders. However, in the country, especially before the split share reform, the large shareholders, as the actual controller of the enterprise, are generally not available in circulation. He does not pay much attention to the performance of the company's stock in the capital market, and has a strong hollowing out. The motive of the assets of a listed company. When the large shareholders need to transfer their shares, it is generally transferable only through private agreements outside the open market. The transfer price is often based on the net assets per share, and the price is usually far below the circulation share price. This phenomenon makes the external market not restricted and supervised by the corporate governance, including the large shareholders. The insider group can make use of the information advantage to carry on the insider trading on the open market, excavate the listed company out of the field, aggravate the conflict with the external investors, especially in the state holding listed companies, the agency problem is more complex.
After the split share reform, the shares of the large shareholders, including the controlling shareholders, gradually gain the right to market circulation, and the different prices of the same share gradually improve, to a certain extent, it alleviates the conflict of interests with the external medium and small investors. Good company governance and improvement of the company's performance can be rewarded in the two level market. However, new governance problems are also followed. Due to the accumulation of strong cash demand and other factors before the stock reform, many "size and non" reduction and unrestricted shares have emerged in the last few years after the stock reform. A wide and in-depth study has been made on the lifting of the ban and the motivation and performance impact of "size and non" reduction.
As the last group of Limited shares of Sany was banned in 2008, it meant the real arrival of the full circulation era. The large shareholders, especially the controlling shareholders, as special investors, began to trade more and more frequently in the open market. If it is based on the research conclusions of domestic scholars, the original non tradable shareholders, after obtaining the circulation right, carry on the high position reduction by manipulating the market to raise the stock price, then, the transaction behavior in the full circulation era is based on the expectation that the performance of the company is better or worse, or the stock valuation is biased. Based on the research results of insider trading in the west, insiders, including controlling shareholders, often use information advantage to make a profit, then whether the trading behavior of the controlling shareholders in the two level market at the present stage (the full circulation era) is due to the good or bad expectation of the future performance of the enterprise. The advantage information? This article will study these problems, try to find out the influencing factors of the transaction behavior based on the business operation, and analyze the changes of the company performance before and after the transaction.
This article is divided into six parts. The first part is the introduction part. It puts forward the research background and significance of the article, and expounds the thinking, method and frame structure of the research. The second part is the literature review part of this article. It includes the foreign and domestic large shareholders' trading behavior including the controlling shareholders, as well as the behavior and the public of the large shareholders. The third part is the theoretical analysis part of this article. From the perspective of principal-agent, it analyzes the behavior effect of large shareholders including controlling shareholders and the false theory of signal transmission under the asymmetric information theory, and analyzes the behavior of large shareholders in the open market. The fourth part is the theoretical hypothesis and the research design part of this article. This part is based on the research results of the second parts and the theoretical basis of the third parts, from the performance factors and estimates. The fifth part is the empirical research part of this article. This chapter mainly includes the empirical analysis of the motivation of holding shareholders to increase or decrease the interest and the controlling shareholders, as well as the controlling shareholders. The sixth part is the main conclusions and implications of this study. The last part is the statistical analysis and test of the short, medium and long term performance changes of Sample Firms.
Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper draws the following main conclusions: first, the holding shareholder's stock increase is more based on the long-term development ability of the enterprise rather than the short-term performance fluctuation, which embodies a "parent" mentality and policy factors to maintain the stability of the capital market and maintain the investor confidence. On the basis of the poor performance prospect expectation and the lack of shareholders' profit, the enterprise valuation factor is not the primary driver of the holding shareholder. Two, in a short time (10 days before and after), the holding or reduction of holding shareholders has a significant market reaction, which shows a significant increase in the average excess return AR of the stock holding group and the reduction group stock. The average excess income AR decreased significantly. Three, compared with the previous year, it was found that the increase group was significantly improved in growth, profitability and cash creation ability, while the profit ability and capital use efficiency of the reduction group decreased significantly. Four, from a long time, the holding shareholders increased the sample public. The significant performance improvement of the company has been sustained, while the decline in the reduction group has improved, and shows a better performance prospects and development. For investors, rational and differentiated views on controlling shareholders' transaction behavior and fully understanding all aspects of information can avoid the impact of various risks, for policy makers, We should strengthen the supervision of the information disclosure of listed companies and the protection of small and medium investors, strengthen the construction of the punishment system for insider trading, avoid the big shareholders of listed companies to make use of the insider information for their own profit, and damage the interests of the small and medium shareholders.

【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224

【参考文献】