全流通时代大股东与中小股东的利益博弈研究

发布时间：2018-05-21 15:03

本文选题：全流通 + 大股东　；参考：《陕西科技大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：大股东与中小股东的利益冲突问题一直都是公司治理领域研究的热门课题。股权分置改革改变了我国上市公司中流通股东和非流通股东“同股不同权”的怪状，全流通的到来使得二级市场股价成为连接大股东与中小股东利益的纽带，中小股东获得和大股东对话的权力，并可以通过手中的资本投票权威慑大股东。所以在全流通时代大股东与中小股东才能形成一种真正的利益博弈格局，通过本文的研究旨在找出全流通后影响大股东与中小股东之间利益博弈的主要因素、博弈的均衡解以及建议和对策。而研究这一课题对于完善我国公司治理结构，促进证券市场健康发展和保护投资者利益都有着重要的意义。本文将大股东与中小股东的利益冲突置于全流通这一时代背景之下，利用理论分析和案例分析相结合的方法进行研究。首先通过文献综述系统阐述了国内外学者关于股权集中度与公司治理绩效之间关系的研究成果：股权高度集中可以解决经理人代理问题，但同时也导致大股东和中小股东之间的利益冲突问题，通过控制权溢价等方法可以测度大股东对公司的侵害程度。本文结合股权分置改革带来的政策效应，分析了全流通时代大股东的新侵害行为和趋势特征及其影响因素：“一股独大”依然存在、大股东拥有信息和筹码双重优势、监督管理层的公共品属性尚未改变和违规信息披露。在此分析基础上构建了两个博弈模型，在大股东与中小股东关于监督管理层的智猪博弈中得出博弈的纳什均衡是：大股东监督，中小股东不监督。而在大股东与中小股东利益较量的完全信息静态博弈中得到纳什均衡是：大股东不侵害，中小股东持有股票。通过双汇发展股权转让的案例分析加以证实。本文研究认为：首先，公司存在着有控制权的大股东时候，一方面，公司的股权结构对公司的治理和绩效有着利益趋同效应。另一方面大股东持股比例较大时候，所有权与现金流权分离程度较低，大股东出于自身利益的考虑会减少对中小股东的侵害，此时公司价值上升，中小股东权益能得到更好的保护；其次，在大股东与中小股东的利益博弈中，大股东是否选择侵害行为与股票市场的法制环境息息相关。如果法律越完善执法越严格，，那么大股东的违法成本会提高，对于遏制大股东的侵害行为意义重大。然而目前我国股市的法制建设还不完善，对大股东的侵害行为的处罚成本比较低，而大股东的侵害收益高于处罚成本时，容易形成大股东侵占效应。实践表明，全流通时代，大股东对中小股东的侵害行为依然存在并表现出新的特征和趋势，不过中小股东也可以在这场利益博弈中利用具有法律意义的“用手投票”和市场行为的“用脚投票”来抵制并惩罚大股东的侵害行为。最后笔者提出完善公司治理结构、继续推进信息披露制度建设和加强投资者立法保护以及提高大股东违法成本、增强打击力度等政策建议。以期能为相关问题的研究和解决提供一些思路和借鉴。
[Abstract]:The issue of interest conflicts between big shareholders and small and medium - sized shareholders has always been a hot topic in the field of corporate governance . The reform of equity division has changed the right of the tradable shareholders and the non - tradable shares in China ' s listed companies to " share the different powers " . In this paper , the stock price of the secondary market becomes the bond between big shareholders and small and medium - sized shareholders , and the balance solution of the game and the suggestions and countermeasures can be adopted . The research of this paper is of great significance to improve the corporate governance structure of our country , promote the healthy development of the securities market and protect the interests of investors .

This paper studies the relationship between large shareholder and medium and small shareholders by means of theory analysis and case analysis .

First , when there is a large shareholder with control right , on the one hand , the ownership structure of the company has the same effect on the corporate governance and performance . On the other hand , when the shareholding ratio of the big shareholder is large , the separation degree of ownership and cash flow right is low , and the big shareholder ' s consideration of its own interests can reduce the infringement on the small and medium shareholders . At this time , the value of the company rises , and the minority shareholder ' s equity can be better protected ;
Secondly , in the interests game of big shareholders and small and medium shareholders , it is closely related to the choice of infringement behavior and the legal environment of stock market . If the law is more and more strict , the illegal cost of big shareholders can be improved . However , the legal construction of the big shareholders is not perfect . However , the penalty cost of the infringement behavior of big shareholders is low , and the infringement benefit of big shareholders is higher than the penalty cost , and the encroachment effect of large shareholders is easy to form .

The practice shows that the abuse of small and medium - sized shareholders still exists and shows new features and trends in the whole circulation era . However , small and medium - sized shareholders can resist and punish the infringement behaviors of large shareholders by using " voting " and " voting " of market behavior in the game of interest . Finally , the author puts forward some suggestions on improving corporate governance structure , promoting the construction of information disclosure system and strengthening investor ' s legislation protection and enhancing the illegal cost of large shareholders , and enhancing the countermeasures . It can provide some ideas and reference for the research and solution of the relevant issues .
【学位授予单位】：陕西科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F224.32

【参考文献】