管理层薪酬、股权激励与我国上市公司盈余管理的相关性研究

发布时间：2018-05-22 12:00

本文选题：管理层薪酬 + 股权激励　；参考：《云南财经大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着2005年上市公司股权分置改革的完成，资本市场快速而稳定的发展，在发展的过程中也会产生一些问题，上市公司内部普遍存在着盈余管理行为，且这些行为越来越受到股东，债权人等利益相关者的关注。2006年1月，我国证监会才颁布了有关股权激励政策的文件《上市公司股权激励计划的管理办法》，2006年9月国资委和财政部共同颁发了《国有控股上市公司股权激励试行办法》，自此股权激励政策才陆续在上市公司中实施，以往国内外的理论研究认为，股权激励政策的实施不仅能能起到降低代理成本，，优化改善公司治理结构的作用，还能提高公司的管理效率。本文从管理契约的角度，不仅考虑上市公司内部的股权激励对盈余管理的影响，还从管理层薪酬的角度对盈余管理进行分析，分别考察二者与盈余管理的相关性。本文首先对管理层薪酬以及股权激励的理论基础进行整理,然后对国内外相关的文献进行归纳总结,在此基础上,本文的后面章节对管理层薪酬、股权激励与盈余管理的相关性进行了实证分析检验。本文选取2008年至2010年深沪A股的所有上市公司作为初始样本,剔除ST等连年亏损的股票,剔除同时发行B股H股的上市公司以及由于信息披露原因造成的数据缺失的上市公司等,再对其进行随机抽样,最后得到600多个样本数据。本文选用可操作性应计利润作为后面章节回归模型的被解释变量，本文对现有的计量可操作性应计利润的模型进行了评述，最后选定修正的Jones模型来进行计量，然后对得到的结果按行业进行了统计划分并进行了T检验，发现2008年到2010年这三年都存在着严重的盈余管理行为。最后本文以管理层薪酬、股权激励作为解释变量，资产规模和资产负债率作为控制变量对样本数据进行了多元线性回归分析，得出管理层薪酬、股权激励与我国上市公司盈余管理的相关性分析结果。通过最后的实证结果本文得出结论：其一，管理层薪酬的大小与上市公司盈余管理程度不存在显著的相关关系，说明公司的管理层为了自身的利益增加自身薪酬而调整盈余的动机并不明显。其二，股权激励政策与盈余管理程度也不存在显著相关关系，究其原因，可能是管理层持股数量占总数量的比例非常小，并不能起到预想的激励管理层的效果。通过检验还发现：公司资产规模大小与盈余管理存在显著的负相关关系，即公司的规模越大，管理层进行盈余管理的动机越小；公司的资产负债率与盈余管理呈现非常显著的正相关关系，即随着资产负债率的上升，企业盈余管理的程度就越严重。最后对本文进行了概括总结并对以后的研究进行了展望。
[Abstract]:With the completion of the split share structure reform of listed companies in 2005, the capital market develops rapidly and steadily, and some problems will arise in the process of development. And these actions are getting more and more attention from shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. In January 2006, The Securities Regulatory Commission of our country has just promulgated the document on the stock incentive policy < measures for the Management of the Equity incentive Plan of listed companies. In September 2006, SASAC and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued the pilot measures for Stock incentive of State-owned holding listed companies. Since then, the equity incentive policy has been implemented in the listed companies one after another. Previous theoretical studies at home and abroad believe that the implementation of equity incentive policy can not only reduce agency costs, optimize and improve the corporate governance structure, but also improve the management efficiency of the company. From the perspective of management contract, this paper not only considers the impact of equity incentive on earnings management in listed companies, but also analyzes earnings management from the perspective of management compensation, and investigates the correlation between them and earnings management. In this paper, the management compensation and equity incentive of the theoretical basis of collation, and then the relevant literature at home and abroad are summarized, on the basis of this, the later chapters of this article on the management pay, The correlation between equity incentive and earnings management is tested by empirical analysis. This paper selects all the listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2008 to 2010 as the initial sample, excluding the stocks with annual losses such as St. After removing the listed companies that issue B shares H shares at the same time and the listed companies with missing data caused by information disclosure, the random sampling is carried out, and more than 600 sample data are obtained. In this paper, the operational accrual profit is chosen as the explained variable of the regression model in the following chapters. The existing models of the operational accrual profit are reviewed in this paper. Finally, the modified Jones model is selected to measure the accrual profit. Then, the results are divided by industry and T-test. It is found that there are serious earnings management behaviors in the three years from 2008 to 2010. Finally, this paper uses management compensation, equity incentive as explanatory variables, asset size and asset-liability ratio as control variables to carry out multiple linear regression analysis of sample data, and get management compensation. The results of correlation analysis between equity incentive and earnings management of listed companies in China. The conclusion is as follows: first, there is no significant correlation between the level of management compensation and earnings management degree of listed companies. It shows that the motivation of managers to adjust their earnings for their own benefit is not obvious. Second, there is no significant correlation between equity incentive policy and earnings management. The reason is that the proportion of management stock ownership is very small, which can not play the desired effect of encouraging management. It is also found that there is a significant negative correlation between the size of the company's assets and earnings management, that is, the larger the size of the company, the smaller the motivation of the management to carry out earnings management; There is a very significant positive correlation between the debt ratio of assets and earnings management, that is, with the increase of the ratio of assets and liabilities, the degree of earnings management becomes more serious. Finally, this paper is summarized and the future research is prospected.
【学位授予单位】：云南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】