创业板高管离职对公司影响的实证研究
发布时间:2018-05-24 14:45
本文选题:创业板 + 高管离职 ; 参考:《贵州财经大学》2013年硕士论文
【摘要】:在经济快速发展的要求下,我国创业板于2009年10月23日正式开板成立。经过三年多的茁壮成长,创业板上已有上市公司355家(截止2012年12月31日),已初具规模。创业板市场并不是次于主板市场的低级市场,也不是专门为一些朝向主板市场上市公司的“跳板”市场,它是和其他市场一样有着融资功能的并行市场。改革开放三十多年来,中国经济突飞猛进,已跃居全球第二大经济体,而在中国经济发展过程中,中国的民营企业做出了不可磨灭的贡献。但是,民营企业有着自己的发展瓶颈,融资困难。创业板的成立满足了一部分规模小但发展快的中小企业的融资需求,有力的支撑了中国经济的持续发展。 然而伴随创业板市场高速发展的同时,一系列问题也浮出了水面。其中,高管离职潮的现象始终是弥散在市场上的阴霾。根据深圳证券交易所公告显示,截止2012年12月31日,创业板高管离职公告已达434份,而2010年一年还不到50份。高管离职潮对创业板公司是否有影响?究竟有多大影响?这就是本文所要研究的问题。 本文主要以实证方法来研究创业板高管离职对公司的影响,选取2010年至2011年作为样本区间,运用事件分析法,通过建立以辞职高管的创业板公司股票价格为基础的计量经济学模型,研究不同样本归类下公司股价的变动规律,得出了以下结论:1、创业板高管离职只对一小部分企业产生重大的影响,而很大一部分高管离职是公司一种正常的人员流动现象,市场并没有引起强烈的反应;2、在一定条件下,一部分公司当中,高管离职对公司股价会产生重要的影响。 本文加上绪论共分为五个部分。第一部分:绪论。主要说明本文的研究意义、研究思路、研究方法、现阶段国内外对创业板高管离职潮的研究现状及本文的创新之处。第二部分:主要分析了创业板高管离职的相关理论。在理论分析中,首先列举了企业高管激励机制及相关理论,其次分析了创业板高管离职的动机及其效应。第三部分:研究方法设计。首先对本文的研究做了一个假设,然后详细介绍了本文所使用的研究方法—事件分析法,最后确立了本文最终的研究步骤。第四部分:实证过程与分析。该部分是本文的主体部分,首先根据描述性统计分析,得出了创业板高管离职对公司影响的初步结论,然后通过显著性单变量T检验分析进行实证分析来验证结论,最后以高管离职前后公司股价的变化程度来测度创业板高管离职对公司的影响程度。第五部分:根据实证分析结果,得出结论并提出政策性建议,为将来制定适宜市场发展的政策提供依据。 本文采用了创业板高管离职最新又最全的数据来进行实证分析,所得出的创业板高管离职对公司未产生显著的影响而很大一部分是公司人员的正常流动这一结论也是本文的一大亮点。然而,由于时间和资源的有限,本文没有将持股高管离职作为单独一部分研究。比起固定薪酬的高管,持股高管的活动更能激起公司股价的波动,因此,持股高管的离职对公司的影响相对较大。如果以后关于创业板高管离职的研究能以持股高管离职为重点,更加深入地揭开其对公司的影响规律,不仅对创业板的健康发展有所帮助,也可以为公司治理提供理论和实践上的经验。
[Abstract]:Under the demand of rapid economic development, China's GEM board was formally opened in October 23, 2009. After more than three years of vigorous growth, there have been 355 listed companies on the gem (as of December 31, 2012), and have begun to take shape. The GEM market is not a lower level market inferior to the main board market, and it is not specially directed to the main board market. The "springboard" market of the listed company is a parallel market which has the same financing function as other markets. Since the reform and opening up for more than thirty years, China's economy has leaped into the second largest economy in the world. In the course of China's economic development, Chinese private enterprises have made indelible contributions. However, private enterprises have their own own. The establishment of the gem has met the financing needs of small and fast small and medium sized enterprises, which strongly supports the sustainable development of China's economy.
However, along with the rapid growth of the gem, a series of problems have come to the surface. Among them, the phenomenon of high executive turnover has always been a haze on the market. According to the Shenzhen stock exchange bulletin, by December 31, 2012, 434 copies of gem executives have been resigned and less than 50 in 2010. Does tide have an impact on GEM companies? What are the major implications?
In this paper, we mainly study the impact of the turnover of gem executives on the company, select the sample interval from 2010 to 2011, and use the event analysis method to establish the econometric model based on the stock price of the gem company, which is based on the resignation of the executive board, and study the change law of the stock price under the same classification. The following conclusions: 1, the turnover of the gem executives only has a significant impact on a small number of enterprises, and a large part of the senior executive turnover is a normal turnover of the company, the market does not cause a strong reaction. 2, under certain conditions, the turnover of a part of the company will have an important impact on the company's stock price.
This article plus the introduction is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction. It mainly explains the significance of the research, the research ideas, the research methods, the current research status and innovation of the turnover tide at home and abroad at home and abroad. The second part mainly analyzes the related theories of the high management turnover of the gem. In the theoretical analysis, the first part is the theoretical analysis. This paper enumerates the incentive mechanism and related theories of enterprise executives, then analyzes the motivation and effect of the turnover of gem executives. The third part: research method design. First, a hypothesis is made on the study of this paper, and then the method of event analysis used in this paper is introduced in detail, and finally the final research steps are established. The fourth part: the empirical process and analysis. This part is the main part of this paper. Firstly, according to the descriptive statistical analysis, we get the preliminary conclusions of the impact of the turnover of gem executives on the company, and then verify the conclusion through the significant single variable T test analysis to verify the conclusion, and the change degree of the stock price of the company before and after the executive turnover is the most. The fifth part: according to the results of the empirical analysis, the conclusion is drawn and the policy suggestions are put forward to provide the basis for the future policy for the development of the market.
This paper uses the latest and the most complete data to analyze the turnover of the gem executives. The conclusion is that the turnover of the gem executives has not had a significant impact on the company and a large part is the normal flow of the company personnel. However, because of the limited time and resources, this paper does not hold high stock. Management turnover is a separate part of the study. Compared to the fixed salary executives, the activity of holding executives can arouse the volatility of the company's share price. Therefore, the turnover of the shareholding executives has a relatively large impact on the company. The law of influence not only helps the healthy development of gem, but also provides theoretical and practical experience for corporate governance.
【学位授予单位】:贵州财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F832.51;F272.91
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