中国上市公司债务治理绩效的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-28 15:25

本文选题：上市公司 + 债务治理　；参考：《内蒙古农业大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：公司治理包括公司内部治理和公司外部治理,债务治理是公司外部治理的一种重要形式。公司治理效率的提高依赖于公司内外部治理效率的提高。然而,2008年席卷全球的金融危机验证了我国上市公司的内部治理不容乐观,甚至有专家认为此次金融危机的肇源即为公司内部治理机制失灵。那么公司外部治理是否发挥了其治理作用,债务治理作为公司外部治理的一种重要形式其治理现状如何,其发挥治理作用受哪些因素的影响,不同行业上市公司债务治理是否存在本质差别,这些问题是当前公司治理理论与实务领域亟待研究的课题。本文在对国内外债务治理相关文献研究的基础上,首先从财务契约理论、契约成本理论、相机治理理论、信号传递理论、产品市场理论和公司控制权理论等理论角度分析了公司债务融资的治理机制及作用；然后明确界定了债务治理的概念,即债务治理是一种激励、约束和协调机制；再次归纳总结出债务治理绩效的主要表现形式及影响因素；最后用我国沪深两市上市的A股上市公司2006-2010年的数据为样本,实证检验了债务治理的现状、影响因素及行业差别。本文创新性工作及形成的主要结论如下： (1)在前人研究基础上发展了债务治理的概念,并运用主成分分析法构建了代表债务治理的三个综合变量,而非直接采用某一个或几个财务指标来代替债务治理变量。 (2)系统地从各种理论角度推导出债务融资的治理作用机理,并描述了债务治理绩效的几种表现形式,其主要包括公司显性股权和债权代理成本的降低(以管理费用和财务费用两项费用占营业收入的比率代替,与前人不同)、过度投资的减少(以公司成长机会的函数确定过度投资变量,与前人不同)、经营绩效的提高和公司价值的增加,并从理论上系统分析了可能影响公司债务治理绩效的几个主要因素。 (3)得出银行借款不能发挥预期治理作用的结论。在第四章不考虑外部因素情况下以全部上市公司为样本进行实证检验时发现,银行借款比例的提高会降低公司经营绩效和公司价值,即没有起到促进公司经营绩效和公司价值提升的治理作用。为此本文在第五章进一步对削弱或促进银行借款治理功能的因素进行实证检验。 (4)得出企业政治关联会削弱银行借款治理功能,而地区金融发展水平可促进银行借款治理功能提高的结论。在总体样本检验得出的上述结论(3)的基础上,本文在第五章进一步检验造成银行借款不能发挥治理作用的因素,结果发现企业政治关联是造成其银行借款不能发挥治理作用的主要因素,而地区金融发展水平的提高可以显著提高银行借款的治理作用,并可减弱政治关联的负面影响。 (5)得出农业上市公司的债务融资程度、债务期限结构和债务类型结构的治理作用均在一定程度上显示出与其他行业上市公司之间存在显著差异。在债务融资程度治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：农业上市公司的债务融资程度不能降低代理成本,但可以显著提高公司绩效,而其他行业正好相反；在债务融资类型结构治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：银行借款比例与代理成本、过度投资、经营绩效和公司价值之间的关系方面,农业上市公司与其他行业均存在显著差异；在债务融资期限结构治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：农业上市公司的长期债务融资可以显著降低其过度投资,却与公司价值不存在显著的相关关系,这与其他行业截然不同。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance includes internal governance and external corporate governance, and debt governance is an important form of external governance. The improvement of corporate governance efficiency depends on the improvement of internal and external governance efficiency. However, the financial crisis sweeping the world in 2008 proves that the internal governance of Listed Companies in China is not optimistic, and even experts have experts. The financial crisis in Zhaoyuan is that the internal governance mechanism of the company is out of order. Then whether the external governance of the company has played its role, how the debt governance is an important form of external governance of the company, what is the influence of its governance role, and whether the debt governance of the listed companies in different industries exists. Essential differences, these problems are urgently needed to be studied in the field of corporate governance theory and practice.
On the basis of the literature on debt governance at home and abroad, this paper first analyzes the mechanism and function of the corporate debt financing from the theory of financial contract, the contract cost theory, the theory of camera governance, the theory of signal transmission, the theory of product market and the theory of corporate control, and then clearly defines the probability of debt governance. In addition, debt governance is a kind of incentive, constraint and coordination mechanism; the main forms and influencing factors of debt governance performance are summed up again. Finally, the data of 2006-2010 years of A listed companies listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities are used as samples to test the status of debt governance, influencing factors and industry differences.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) the concept of debt governance was developed on the basis of previous research, and the principal component analysis was used to construct three comprehensive variables representing debt governance rather than a direct use of one or several financial indicators to replace the debt governance variables.
(2) systematically derives the mechanism of the governance of debt financing from various theoretical perspectives, and describes several forms of performance of debt governance, which mainly include the reduction in the cost of corporate dominant shares and creditor's rights, which are replaced by the ratio of the two expenses of management and financial expenses, which are different from those of the predecessors, and over investment. Reducing (the function of the company's growth opportunities to determine overinvestment variables, different from the previous), the improvement of business performance and the increase of corporate value, and the theoretical analysis of several major factors that may affect the performance of corporate debt governance.
(3) the conclusion that bank loans can not play the role of expected governance. In the fourth chapter, the empirical test of all listed companies without consideration of external factors shows that the increase in the proportion of bank loans will reduce the performance of the company and the value of the company, that is, it does not play a role in promoting the performance of the company and the promotion of the company's value. Therefore, in the fifth chapter, we further test the factors that weaken or promote the governance function of bank loans.
(4) it is concluded that the enterprise political association will weaken the bank's borrowing governance function, and the level of regional financial development can promote the improvement of the bank's borrowing governance function. On the basis of the above conclusion (3) of the overall sample test, this paper further examines the factors that can not play a governance role in the bank loan in the fifth chapter, and results in the result of the discovery of the enterprise. The political connection is the main factor that causes the bank's borrowing to play a role of governance, and the improvement of the level of regional financial development can significantly improve the governance of the bank's borrowing and weaken the negative impact of the political connection.
(5) it is concluded that the debt financing degree of the listed companies, the debt maturity structure and the governance of the debt type structure show a significant difference with the listed companies in other industries. The significant difference in the governance of debt financing is that the debt financing degree of the agricultural listed companies can not be reduced. The low agency cost can significantly improve the performance of the company, while the other industries are just the opposite. The significant difference in the governance of the type of debt financing is that there is a significant difference in the relationship between the proportion of the bank loans and the agency cost, the overinvestment, the performance and the value of the company. The significant difference in the term structure governance of debt financing is that the long-term debt financing of the listed agricultural companies can significantly reduce its overinvestment, but it does not have a significant correlation with the company's value, which is very different from other industries.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古农业大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】