运气薪酬问题研究

发布时间：2018-05-29 00:30

本文选题：“运气”薪酬 + 公司治理结构　；参考：《福州大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：长期以来,我国企业的高管薪酬与业绩挂钩程度一直受到质疑。随着全球经济危机的爆发,高管异常薪酬、收入差距过大和“穷庙富方丈”等现象愈加“吸睛”,民众对社会不公平现象的负面情绪升级。为了避免引起“公愤”而影响自身声誉,高管具有强烈的动机为自己的高薪或涨薪进行辩护,希望提供让社会大众信服的充分正当理由。“运气”是指行业冲击带来的超出高管控制之外的公司业绩影响因素。即“运气”业绩并非管理层付出努力得到的公司业绩增长。高管获得“运气”薪酬是一种抽租行为,系公司治理机制弱化和管理层权力膨胀的后果,不符合主流代理理论的预期,偏离了最优契约理论所能解释的范围。由于委托代理关系的存在,管理层极有可能利用权力对董事或薪酬委员会委员施压,并根据行业整体变化趋势巧妙地应用“运气”为自己进行薪酬辩护。“运气”薪酬问题,本质上是公司治理结构存在缺陷所导致的。本论文选取2007～2011年沪深两所A股上市公司为研究对象。首先,将公司业绩分离成“运气”和管理者技能两个部分,再构建OLS模型估计CEO薪酬与“运气”业绩之间的相关性及其显著性,发现我国国有上市公司中存在明显的高管“运气”薪酬现象,而非国有上市公司中并不明显。然后,进一步检验我国公司治理结构的具体要素能否有效抑制“运气”薪酬现象,研究结果显示独立董事比例和薪酬委员会独立性的提高都不能对高管“运气”薪酬现象起到明显的约束作用；但是,前五大股东持股比例之和提高能够对“运气”薪酬现象起到一定控制作用,且国有企业的独立董事提高履行职能的积极性能够显著抑制“运气”薪酬现象；同时,第一大股东持股比例提高在一定程度上有助于高管获得“运气”薪酬,且国有企业CEO兼任提名委员会委员对“运气”薪酬现象具有明显的鼓励作用,但CEO两职合一与“运气”薪酬没有显著相关性。最后,根据研究结果,结合我国实际情况,提出以下健全和完善公司治理结构的相关对策建议：①健全独立董事制度,包括提高独立董事选聘制度的客观性和制定良好的独立董事激励机制；②加强董事会实质上的独立性；③改善股权结构,提高股权集中度；④完善外部治理机制。
[Abstract]:For a long time, the executive compensation and performance of Chinese enterprises have been questioned. With the onset of the global economic crisis, such phenomena as abnormal executive pay, excessive income gap and "poor temple rich abbot" and other phenomena are increasingly "aspiration", people's negative feelings about social injustice escalated. To avoid "public outrage" and damage to their reputation, executives have a strong incentive to defend their high pay or pay hikes, in the hope of providing sufficient justification to convince the public. Luck refers to factors that affect the performance of companies beyond the control of executives as a result of industry shocks. That is, "luck" performance is not a management effort to achieve corporate performance growth. Executive's "luck" compensation is a kind of rent-drawing behavior, which is the consequence of the weakening of corporate governance mechanism and the expansion of management power. It does not accord with the expectation of mainstream agency theory and deviates from the scope of the optimal contract theory. Because of the principal-agent relationship, management is likely to use its power to put pressure on directors or compensation committee members, and skillfully apply "luck" to defend their pay in the light of the overall changing trend in the industry. The problem of "luck" compensation is essentially caused by the defect of corporate governance structure. In this paper, two A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2011 are selected as research objects. Firstly, the company's performance is divided into two parts: "luck" and "manager's skill", and then the OLS model is constructed to estimate the correlation between CEO compensation and "luck" performance and its significance. It is found that there is an obvious phenomenon of executive "luck" compensation in the state-owned listed companies, but not in the non-state-owned listed companies. Then, to further test whether the specific elements of corporate governance structure in China can effectively curb the "luck" pay phenomenon, The results show that neither the proportion of independent directors nor the increase in the independence of compensation committees can significantly constrain executive "luck" pay; however, The increase of the proportion of the top five shareholders can control the phenomenon of "luck" compensation, and the independent directors of state-owned enterprises can significantly restrain the phenomenon of "luck" compensation by improving the enthusiasm of the independent directors to perform their functions. The increase in the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder has helped executives get "luck" pay to some extent, and the fact that state-owned CEO is also a member of the nominating committee has a clear incentive for "luck" pay. But there is no significant correlation between CEO and luck pay. Finally, according to the research results, combined with the actual situation in China, this paper puts forward the following relevant countermeasures to improve and perfect the corporate governance structure: 1 to improve the independent director system, It includes improving the objectivity of the system of selecting and appointing independent directors and establishing a good incentive mechanism for independent directors. (2) strengthening the independence of the board of directors in essence and improving the ownership structure, improving the degree of ownership concentration and perfecting the external governance mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：福州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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