我国创业板上市公司内部治理研究

发布时间：2018-06-14 07:56

本文选题：创业板上市公司 + 内部治理结构　；参考：《河北农业大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：经历十年的风雨历程之后,创业板终于于2009年10月23日正式开板,标志着中国创业板正式成立。创业板成立的主要目的不仅仅是完善我国资本市场结构,更重要的是为中小、高新技术企业提供融资渠道,促进知识与资本的结合,为风险投资提供出口。到目前为止,我国创业板已经运行两年多,在此期间频频出现“四高现象”,大量高管辞职套现,高风险低增长,超募资金使用不当等问题。虽然我国资本市场发展不成熟以及创业板运行机制存在严重缺陷等外部原因在一定程度上助推了上述问题的发生,但引起上述问题的最根本原因在于创业板上市公司内部治理存在问题,包括内部治理结构不合理,内部治理机制不完善等。所以本文将创业板上市公司自身具有的规模小、风险高、成长性高、处于初创期、经营业绩不稳定、家族色彩浓厚、重无形资产等特点作为切入点,找出我国创业板上市公司内部治理现状,分析内部治理存在的问题以及影响因素,同时将样本公司的内部治理指标与公司业绩做回归分析,为我国创业板上市公司内部治理提供借鉴。第一部分,我国创业板上市公司内部治理理论基础。通过对公司内部治理、创业板上市公司、创业板上市公司内部治理相关概念界定,以及对代理理论和现代产权理论的阐述和分析,找出创业板上市公司内部治理特点,为描述性统计分析和回归分析的选取指标、提出假设、构建模型提供理论依据。第二部分,我国创业板上市公司内部治理现状的描述性统计分析。从不同行业板块中随机抽取105家创业板上市公司,以其2011年半年度报告为数据来源,并结合创业板上市公司不同于主板、中小板上市公司的特点来研究我国创业板上市公司内部治理现状,主要包括内部治理结构现状和内部治理机制现状两方面。内部治理结构现状又包括股权结构、董事会治理结构、监事会治理、高管层治理的现状;公司治理机制现状具体是从内部决策机制、内部监督机制、内部激励机制三方面进行分析。根据治理现状探索我国创业板上市公司内部治理存在的主要问题。主要问题有:一股独大现象严重;机构投资者持股比例较低,参与公司治理效果不显著;家族色彩浓厚,内部持股现象严重;董事会规模存在一致性,领导权结构存在合一性;监督机制以事后监管为主,以事前监管为辅强调物质激励,忽视非物质激励等。在此基础上从创业板市场、创业板自身以及配套建设三方面进行了原因分析,为回归分析中变量选择和政策建议提供参考依据。第三部分,我国创业板上市公司内部治理与公司绩效的回归分析。从股权结构、董事会治理结构、经理层激励等主要方面选取出创业板上市公司内部治理的自变量,公司规模和资产负债率作为控制变量,公司绩效指标作为因变量,以创业板上市公司2011年半年度报告为数据来源做实证分析,找出内部治理与公司业绩的相关性。结论显示:股权结构、董事会治理、经理层激励等指标的组合对公司绩效的影响具有一定的溢出效应;我国创业板上市公司内部治理与公司绩效存在一定的相关性,尤其股权结构与公司绩效的相关性表现的较为突出;董事会治理与公司绩效的相关性不大;公司所采取的控制形式与公司绩效相关性较大;是否采取股权激励对公司的绩效影响显著。第四部分,完善我国创业板上市公司内部治理的对策建议。根据理论阐述、描述性统计分析和回归分析结论,从公司内部治理结构、内部治理机制以及与公司内部治理相关的配套建设三方面提出对策建议,为我国创业板上市公司内部治理的构建提供借鉴。内部治理结构方面包括增加第二至第五股东持股比例,增加机构投资者持股,适当增加国有股比例,增强董事会独立性,强化监事会职能等内容。公司治理机制方面主要有加大核心技术人员薪酬激励,谨慎实施股权激励,发挥非物质激励作用,调整监管理念等。与公司内部治理相关的配套建设主要是从信息披露制度、保健制度、退市制度三方面的建设提出相应对策建议。
[Abstract]:After ten years of rain and rain, the gem was officially opened in October 23, 2009, marking the formal establishment of the Chinese gem. The main purpose of the gem is not only to improve the capital market structure of our country, but also to provide financing channels for small and medium-sized enterprises, to promote the combination of knowledge and capital, to invest in risk. So far, China's GEM has been running for more than two years. During this period, the "four high phenomenon" has appeared frequently, a large number of senior executives resign, high risk and low growth, improper use of funds and other problems. Although the development of the capital market in China is not mature and the operation mechanism of the gem has serious defects, the external reasons are certain. The fundamental reason for the above problems lies in the internal governance of the GEM listed companies, including the irrational internal governance structure and the imperfect internal governance mechanism. Therefore, this paper has the small scale, high risk and high growth of the GEM listed companies. The characteristics of the business performance are unstable, the family color is strong, and the intangible assets are used as the breakthrough point to find out the internal governance status of the GEM listed companies in China, analyze the existing problems and influence factors of internal governance, and analyze the internal governance indexes of the Sample Firms and the company's performance, so as to manage the internal governance of the GEM listed companies in our country. Provide reference.
The first part is the theoretical basis of the internal governance of China's GEM listed companies.
Through the internal governance of the company, the GEM listed companies, the internal governance related concepts of the GEM listed companies, and the exposition and analysis of the agency theory and the modern property rights theory, the internal governance characteristics of the GEM listed companies are found out, and the selection indexes of descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis are put forward, and the models are provided. On the basis.
The second part is a descriptive statistical analysis of the internal governance status of China's GEM listed companies.
In this paper, 105 GEM listed companies are randomly selected from different industries, taking the 2011 semi annual report as the data source, and combining the characteristics of the GEM listed companies different from the main board and the small and medium board listed companies to study the internal governance status of the GEM listed companies in China, mainly including the internal governance structure and internal governance mechanism. Two aspects. The present situation of internal governance includes the ownership structure, the governing structure of the board of directors, the governance of the board of supervisors, and the management of top management. The present situation of the corporate governance mechanism is analyzed from three aspects: internal decision-making mechanism, internal supervision mechanism, and internal incentive mechanism.
According to the status quo of governance, the main problems of internal governance of Chinese GEM listed companies are explored. The main problems are: one big phenomenon is serious, the proportion of institutional investors is low, and the effect of corporate governance is not significant; family color is strong and the internal shareholding is serious; the size of the board is in consistency, and the structure of leadership has the consistency. The supervision mechanism is based on post supervision, emphasizing material incentives and ignoring non material incentives, supplemented by pre supervision, and on this basis, the reasons are analyzed from three aspects: the GEM market, the gem itself and the supporting construction, so as to provide reference for the selection of variables and policy suggestions in the regression analysis.
The third part is the regression analysis of the internal governance and corporate performance of China's gem.
From the ownership structure, the board governance structure, the manager layer incentive and other main aspects, we choose the independent variables of the internal governance of the GEM listed companies, the company size and the asset liability ratio as the control variables, the company performance indicators as the dependent variables, and take the 2011 half year report of the GEM listed companies as the data sources for the empirical analysis, and find out the internal governance. The conclusion shows that the combination of stock ownership structure, board governance, managers' incentive and so on has a certain spillover effect on the impact of corporate performance; there is a certain correlation between the internal governance of the GEM listed companies in China and the company performance, especially the correlation between the ownership structure and the company performance. The relationship between board governance and corporate performance is not very relevant; the control form adopted by the company is related to the company performance, and whether the equity incentive has a significant impact on the performance of the company.
The fourth part, the countermeasures to improve our gem's internal governance.
According to the theory, descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis, we put forward three countermeasures and suggestions from the internal governance structure of the company, the internal governance mechanism and the supporting construction related to the internal governance of the company. It provides a reference for the construction of internal governance of the GEM listed companies in China. The internal governance structure includes an increase of second to fifth. The proportion of shareholders, increasing the shareholding of institutional investors, increasing the proportion of the state-owned shares, strengthening the independence of the board of directors and strengthening the function of the board of supervisors. The main part of the corporate governance mechanism is to increase the salary incentive of the core technicians, carry out the equity incentive carefully, play the non material incentive effect, adjust the supervision idea and so on. And the internal governance of the company. Related supporting construction is mainly from the three aspects of information disclosure system, health care system and delisting system, and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：河北农业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51

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