信息披露的投资者保护效应研究

发布时间：2018-07-05 11:48

本文选题：投资者保护效果 + 信息披露　；参考：《暨南大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：信息披露有利于投资者权益的保护已被学术界及实务界普遍认可，但上市公司信息披露违规事件却时有发生。信息披露如何影响投资者保护及上市公司信息披露对投资者保护的效果如何是本文探讨的核心内容。在法律制度、社会规范及市场机制的共同协调下，以投资者保护为目的的信息披露制度体系已逐步完善，但上市公司信息披露的质量仍表现出千差万别，究其原因当属公司内部构建的信息披露机制存在差异，信息披露机制在企业内部通过会计系统、财务机制及内部控制机制等形成企业相关信息并对外进行发布从而产生信息质量差异。文章在探讨投资者保护效应的相关理论后，从信息披露功能出发阐述信息披露对投资者权益保护产生影响的作用机理，，并结合上市公司内部产生的外部投资者与内部代理人之间，及控股股东与外部投资者之间的双层委托代理关系，从信息披露定价功能角度实证信息披露减少上市公司及外部投资者间代理问题，从信息披露治理功能角度则实证信息披露减少上市公司控制股东与外部投资者间的代理问题，信息披露也正是通过减少代理问题，作用公司内部人行为，最终表现为公司价值的变化，从而从微观效果上表现出投资者权益受到影响。通过理论及实证分析，文章得出以下研究结论：1、上市公司信息披露机制对投资者权益的保护作用主要体现在：一方面，信息披露借助公司财务会计及内部审计体系等对公司内部人实施监督抑制内部人的侵占行为，协助公司内部治理实现投资者保护；另一方面，通过信息披露机制形成对外发布的信息，减少公司与投资者间代理问题，增加公司透明度指导投资决策，影响投资者在资本市场中的资金供给，从而影响上市公司融资成本及资产价格。2、定价功能检验，采用股权融资成本表现投资者保护效果构建多元回归模型，检验结果显示上市公司信息披露质量越高，表现为股权融资成本越低，是投资者权益受保护而愿意增加资本供给的表现。3、治理功能检验针对控股股东与外部股东间的代理问题，选取资金占用表现投资者保护的效果。资金占用是控股股东从自身利益出发转移公司财产的行为，因而资金占用行为发生越少对外部投资者保护越强。实证检验显示信息披露质量越高，控股股东资金占用行为发生的概率越小。
[Abstract]:The protection of information disclosure in favor of investors' rights and interests has been generally recognized by the academic and practical circles, but information disclosure violations of listed companies have occurred from time to time. How information disclosure affects investor protection and the effect of listed company information disclosure on investor protection is the core content of this paper. Under the coordination of legal system, social norm and market mechanism, the system of information disclosure for the purpose of investor protection has been gradually improved, but the quality of information disclosure of listed companies is still very different. The reason is that there are differences in the information disclosure mechanism built within the company, and the information disclosure mechanism is passed through the accounting system within the enterprise. Financial mechanism and internal control mechanism form enterprise related information and release it to the outside to produce information quality difference. After discussing the relevant theory of investor protection effect, this paper expounds the mechanism of the influence of information disclosure on investor's rights and interests protection from the function of information disclosure. And combined with the two-tier principal-agent relationship between external investors and internal agents, and between controlling shareholders and external investors, From the perspective of pricing function of information disclosure, empirical information disclosure reduces agency problems between listed companies and external investors, while from the perspective of information disclosure governance function, empirical information disclosure reduces agency problems between controlling shareholders and external investors of listed companies. It is through reducing the agency problem that information disclosure acts on the behavior of the insiders of the company, and the ultimate performance is the change of the value of the company, thus showing that investors' rights and interests are affected from the microscopic effect. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: 1. The protection of the information disclosure mechanism of listed companies to investors' rights and interests is mainly reflected in the following aspects: on the one hand, Information disclosure uses the financial accounting and internal audit system of the company to supervise and restrain the embezzlement behavior of the insiders and help the internal governance of the company to realize investor protection; on the other hand, Through the information disclosure mechanism to form the information released to the outside, to reduce the agency problem between the company and the investors, to increase the transparency of the company to guide the investment decision, and to affect the capital supply of the investors in the capital market. Therefore, it can influence the financing cost and asset price of listed companies, test the pricing function, use equity financing cost to express investor protection effect, and build a multivariate regression model. The test results show that the higher the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, the higher the quality of listed companies' information disclosure. The lower the cost of equity financing is the performance of investors' rights and interests being protected and willing to increase capital supply. The governance function test aims at the agency problem between controlling shareholders and external shareholders and selects the funds to represent the effect of investor protection. Capital occupation is the behavior of controlling shareholders to transfer the company's property from their own interests, so the less the capital occupation occurs, the stronger the protection of external investors is. Empirical test shows that the higher the quality of information disclosure, the smaller the probability of capital occupation of controlling shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：暨南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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