信息不对称、会计稳健性与中小股东利益保护

发布时间：2018-07-05 12:49

本文选题：会计稳健性 + 中小股东利益保护　；参考：《南开大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：中小股东是证券市场上最主要的参与者，，是保证证券市场运行和发展的重要力量。中小股东利益保护水平是影响甚至决定一个国家或地区证券市场发展水平的关键因素。信息不对称是导致中小股东利益受损的重要原因，也是投资者保护研究的热点问题。会计系统作为投资者保护的一项制度安排，其基本功能是通过向投资者提供高质量的会计信息来缓解信息不对称。会计稳健性作为一项传统而应用广泛的信息质量特征，在保护中小股东利益方面能否发挥作用、如何发挥作用，这个问题并没有得到足够的重视和系统地研究。本文以信息不对称理论、投资者保护理论、会计信息在投资者保护中的作用等理论为基础，结合我国证券市场发展状况和有关中小股东利益保护的制度背景，建立了一个研究会计稳健性与中小股东利益保护关系的分析框架。在该框架下，重点分析了会计稳健性帮助中小股东克服逆向选择问题的作用机制和经济后果，并从中小股东利益保护的角度出发，研究了控股股东利益侵占动机和外部制度环境对我国上市公司会计稳健性的影响。在理论分析的基础上，本文运用C_Score模型计量公司/年度会计稳健性，对会计稳健性保护中小股东利益的经济后果和影响因素进行了实证检验。本文的主要研究结论如下：对会计稳健性保护中小股东利益的作用机制的研究发现：会计稳健性主要通过两条路径解决逆向选择问题。第一，会计稳健性能够提高企业当期业绩的可证实性，有助于中小股东准确判断企业未来的价值变化，进而做出正确的投资决策。因为稳健的会计盈余所反映出的企业盈利能力具有较强的可证实性，与企业未来的价值变化具有更紧密的联系，中小股东据此对企业价值进行判断时，出现高估收益或者低估损失的可能性较小。第二，会计稳健性能够提高企业“坏消息”的披露水平，保证中小股东在做出投资决策之前充分了解可能影响企业价值的各种不利因素。因为企业内部人倾向于充分披露好消息而避免披露坏消息，而会计稳健性要求对坏消息的确认速度比好消息快，能更加及时地将坏消息传递给中小股东，避免因为坏消息的推迟披露而遭受损失。对会计稳健性保护中小股东利益的经济后果的研究发现：第一，会计稳健性较高的公司当期会计盈余与未来股票回报率显著正相关，尤其是在会计盈余水平较高以及企业信息不对称程度较高的情况下。这说明会计稳健性能够起到提高信息可证实性的作用，帮助中小股东更加准确地判断企业价值的变化。第二，当期会计稳健性较高的企业未来发生股价大跌的风险较小,而且对于信息不对称程度较高的企业来说，稳健性抑制股价大跌的作用更加明显。这说明会计稳健性能够通过提高“坏消息”的披露水平而起到保护中小股东利益的作用。对会计稳健性保护中小股东利益的影响因素的研究发现：会计稳健性并没有随着信息不对称程度的提高而增强，说明我国上市公司的稳健性程度还达不到中小股东利益保护的要求；在较高的信息不对称条件下，控股股东的利益侵占动机能够显著降低公司的会计稳健性，说明信息不对称环境和控股股东侵占动机的共同作用降低了会计稳健性的供给；较为完善的外部制度环境能够抑制控股股东利益侵占动机对会计稳健性的损害。本文的创新之处主要体现在：第一，将会计稳健性与中小股东利益保护相结合，扩展了对会计稳健性投资者保护作用的研究。现有文献主要研究会计稳健性对债权人利益的保护，本文则针对中小股东，深入分析了会计稳健性如何通过缓解企业内部人和中小股东之间的信息不对称，来实现保护中小股东利益的目的。第二，从会计稳健性与未来股票回报率以及会计稳健性与股价大跌风险的关系入手，分析并检验了会计稳健性保护中小股东利益的经济后果，丰富了关于会计稳健性经济后果的研究。第三，从中小股东利益保护的角度出发，研究了控股股东利益侵占动机以及外部制度环境对会计稳健性发挥中小股东利益保护作用的影响，丰富了关于会计稳健性影响因素的研究。
[Abstract]:The medium and small shareholders are the most important participants in the securities market, and it is an important force to ensure the operation and development of the securities market. The protection level of the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders is the key factor affecting the development level of the securities market in a country or region. Information asymmetry is an important reason for the damage of the interests of small and medium shareholders, and also the investor protection. As an institutional arrangement for investor protection, the basic function of the accounting system is to alleviate information asymmetry by providing high quality accounting information to investors. As a tradition, accounting conservatism can play a role in protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders and how to play a role in protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders. In this paper, based on the theory of information asymmetry, the theory of investor protection, the role of accounting information in the protection of investors, this paper has established a research association based on the development of the securities market and the institutional background of the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders in China. In this framework, we analyze the mechanism and economic consequences of accounting conservatism to help small and medium shareholders overcome reverse choice. From the perspective of protecting the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, this paper studies the motivation of the interests of the controlling shareholders and the external institutional environment. On the basis of theoretical analysis, based on the theoretical analysis, this paper uses the C_Score model to measure the company / annual accounting conservatism, and makes an empirical test on the economic consequences and influencing factors of the accounting conservatism to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
The study of the mechanism of accounting conservatism to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders shows that accounting conservatism mainly solves the problem of reverse selection through two paths. First, accounting conservatism can improve the verifiability of the enterprise's current performance, and help the small and medium shareholders to judge the value changes that the enterprise has not come to, and then make the correct investment decision. The firm's profitability has strong verifiability because of the sound accounting surplus, and has a closer relationship with the future value change of the enterprise. When the small shareholders judge the value of the enterprise, the possibility of overestimating the income or underestimating the loss is less. Second, the accounting conservatism can improve the enterprise "bad". The level of information disclosure ensures small and medium shareholders to fully understand the adverse factors that may affect the value of the enterprise before making investment decisions. Because the insiders tend to fully disclose good news and avoid disclosing bad news, accounting conservatism requires that the recognition of bad news is faster than good news, and it will be more timely. Interest is passed to minority shareholders to avoid losses due to delayed disclosure of bad news.
The study of the economic consequences of accounting conservatism to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders: first, the accounting surplus with higher accounting conservatism has a significant positive correlation with the future return on stock, especially in the situation of higher accounting earnings and higher level of information asymmetry in the enterprise. This shows that the Accounting Conservatism can be raised. The role of high information verifiability helps small and medium shareholders to judge the change of enterprise value more accurately. Second, the risk of a steep fall in the stock price of higher accounting conservatism in the future is smaller, and for enterprises with higher information asymmetry, the role of robustness to restrain the stock price fall is more obvious. Health can play a role in protecting the interests of minority shareholders by improving the level of "bad news" disclosure.
The research on the influencing factors of the conservatism of accounting conservatism on the interests of small and medium shareholders shows that the accounting conservatism does not increase with the increase of information asymmetry, indicating that the robustness of the listed companies in China can not reach the requirement of protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders; under the condition of high information asymmetry, the interests of the controlling shareholders are encroachment. Motivation can significantly reduce the accounting conservatism of the company, which shows that the asymmetric information environment and the share of the controlling shareholders' invading motivation reduce the supply of accounting conservatism; the more perfect external institutional environment can restrain the damage to accounting conservatism of the controlling shareholders' interest embezzlement motivation.
The innovation of this article is mainly reflected in the following:
First, combining the accounting conservatism with the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders, we expand the research on the protection of the accounting conservatism investors. The existing literature mainly studies the protection of the accounting conservatism to the creditor's interests. In this paper, in view of the small and medium shareholders, this paper deeply analyzes how the accounting conservatism can be achieved by alleviating the internal and small shareholders between the enterprise and the small and medium shareholders. Information asymmetry to achieve the purpose of protecting the interests of minority shareholders.
Second, from the relationship between accounting conservatism and future stock return, accounting conservatism and stock price plunge risk, this paper analyzes and examines the economic consequences of accounting conservatism protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders, and enriches the research on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism.
Third, from the perspective of the protection of the interests of the small and medium shareholders, this paper studies the influence of the controlling shareholders' interest embezzlement motivation and the external institutional environment on the protection of the interests of the small and medium shareholders, which enriches the research on the factors affecting the accounting conservatism.
【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F233;F832.51

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