我国创业板董事会特征对大股东资金占用影响研究

发布时间：2018-07-10 12:07

本文选题：创业板 + 董事会特征　；参考：《华南理工大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：在现代的企业制度建设中，董事会治理是公司治理的有机组成部分，有效的董事会治理可以促使公司控制者做出以公司所有者利益最大化为准的决策。然而在我国，上市公司的股权结构普遍存在“一股独大”的现象，内外部治理机制不合理，关联方（特别是大股东）常常通过频繁关联交易侵占上市公司的资金。这种对上市公司的掏空行为具有隐蔽性和掠夺性，会带来严重的后果。在创业板这个新兴的投资市场上，董事会治理是否能有效遏制大股东资金占用行为是一个值得研究的问题。本文针对我国创业板上市公司董事会特征对大股东资金占用的影响进行研究，具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文利用实证研究方法，就创业板上市公司董事会特征对大股东资金占用的影响进行研究。首先，对研究背景和意义、国内外研究现状、研究内容和方法进行了阐述，设计了本文的研究框架；其次，对我国创业板上市公司董事会特征及大股东资金占用的现状及问题进行了描述和分析；再次，结合“委托代理理论”、“产权理论”进行理论分析并提出研究假设；然后，在实证分析中，本文选取董事持股比例、独立董事比例、董事会规模和家族企业四个变量作为董事会特征变量，，以2011年创业板145家上市公司，实证检验了创业板董事会特征对大股东资金占用的影响；最后，对本文的研究结果进行分析并提出研究结果所带来的启示。本文的研究结果表明：(1)独立董事比例对大股东资金占用无显著影响；（2）创业板上市公司的董事持股比例对大股东资金占用行为具有显著的负向影响；(3)创业板上市公司董事会规模对大股东资金占用行为有显著的正向影响；（4）家族企业对大股东资金占用行为具有显著的负向影响。基于以上研究结果，提出政策性的建议。本文研究的结果具有以下重要意义：（1）用实证证据验证了股权激励所产生的“利益协同效应”；（2）反映了创业板上市公司董事会治理的家族化特征，用实证证据说明了创业板家族化治理在这一阶段的独特优势；（3）丰富了国内有关董事会特征与大股东资金占用关系的文献。
[Abstract]:In the construction of modern enterprise system, board governance is an organic part of corporate governance, and effective board governance can urge the company controllers to make decisions based on the maximization of the interests of the owners of the company. However, in China, the ownership structure of listed companies generally exists the phenomenon of "one share dominates", the internal and external governance mechanism is unreasonable, and the related parties (especially the major shareholders) often encroach on the funds of listed companies through frequent related party transactions. This kind of tunneling behavior of listed companies has concealment and predatory, which will bring serious consequences. In the emerging investment market of gem, it is worth studying whether the governance of board of directors can effectively curb the behavior of large shareholders' capital occupation. This paper studies the influence of board characteristics on the capital occupation of large shareholders of gem listed companies in China, which has important theoretical and practical significance. In this paper, the empirical research method is used to study the influence of board characteristics on the capital occupation of large shareholders in gem listed companies. First of all, the research background and significance, domestic and foreign research status, research content and methods are elaborated, and the research framework of this paper is designed. This paper describes and analyzes the characteristics of the board of directors of gem listed companies in China and the current situation and problems of the capital occupation of large shareholders. Thirdly, combining with the principal-agent theory and the theory of property rights, it makes a theoretical analysis and puts forward the research hypotheses. In the empirical analysis, this paper selects four variables as the characteristic variables of the board of directors: the proportion of directors' shareholding, the proportion of independent directors, the size of the board of directors and the family firm, taking 145 listed companies on the gem in 2011. This paper empirically tests the influence of the board characteristics of gem on the capital occupation of large shareholders. Finally, the paper analyzes the research results and puts forward the enlightenment brought by the research results. The results show that: (1) the proportion of independent directors has no significant influence on the capital occupation of large shareholders; (2) the proportion of directors' shares in gem companies has a significant negative impact on the capital occupation behavior of large shareholders. (3) the size of board of directors of gem has significant positive influence on the behavior of large shareholders' capital occupation; (4) Family firms have significant negative influence on the behavior of large shareholders' capital occupation. Based on the above research results, policy recommendations are put forward. The results of this paper have the following important significance: (1) the empirical evidence is used to verify the "benefit synergy effect" caused by equity incentive; (2) it reflects the family characteristics of board governance of gem listed companies. Empirical evidence is used to illustrate the unique advantages of family governance of gem in this stage; (3) it enriches the literature on the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and the capital occupation of large shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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